Kevreion Raines v. Valero Refining Meraux

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: November 8, 2022
• Docket: 2022-C-0630
• Status: Published

Opinion

KEVREION RAINES * NO. 2022-C-0630

VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL VALERO REFINING MERAUX * FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO ST. BERNARD 34TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 21-0467, DIVISION “E” Honorable Eric A. Bopp, ****** Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano ****** (Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Paula A. Brown, Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase)

Raymond P. Ward Roland M. Vandenweghe, Jr. Taylor E. Brett ADAMS AND REESE LLP 701 Poydras Street, Suite 4500 New Orleans, LA 70139

Jacque R. Touzet 900 Camp Street, Floor 3 New Orleans, LA 70130

COUNSEL FOR VALERO REFINING-MERAUX, L.L.C., DEFENDANT/RELATOR

Lance V. Licciardi LICCIARDI & NUNEZ 1019 W. Judge Perez Dr. Chalmette, LA 70043

Michael C. Ginart, Jr. 2114 Paris Rd. Chalmette, LA 70043 David C. Jarrell 9101 W. St. Bernard Hwy. Chalmette, LA 70043

COUNSEL FOR KEVREION RAINES, PLAINTIFF/ RESPONDENT

WRIT GRANTED; VACATED

NOVEMBER 8, 2022 JCL Relator, Valero Refining-Meraux, LLC (“Valero”), seeks supervisory review

PAB of the district court’s judgment in favor of Respondent, Kevreion Raines

TGC (“Raines”), against Valero, assessing costs as a sanction for violating La. C.C.P.

art. 1450 in the total amount of $1,413.30 for the costs incurred by Raines for the

purchase and filing of deposition transcripts, in connection with Valero’s motion

for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we grant the writ

application, exercise our supervisory jurisdiction, and vacate the sanctions award.1

Valero filed a motion for summary judgment and submitted excerpts of the

depositions of Raines and four of her family members in support of the motion for

summary judgment. After receipt of the motion for summary judgment, Raines’

counsel sent an email to counsel for Valero making a “formal demand under

[Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure] Article 1450(A)(4) for [Valero] to introduce

the entirety of all depositions rather than excerpts.” The email further requested

that Valero “provide a copy of the depositions.” In a reply email, Valero’s counsel

1 This proceeding originated with the filing of Raines’ Petition for Damages in the Justice of the

Peace Court, Parish of St. Bernard. After conducting a trial on the merits, the Justice of the Peace Court rendered a judgment in Valero’s favor against Raines, rejecting Raines’ demands and dismissing the action with prejudice at her costs. Thereafter, Raines filed a Petition for Appeal in the Thirty-Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Bernard, appealing the judgment of the justice of the peace. See La. C.C.P. art. 4924(A). In the Petition for Appeal, Raines requested a trial de novo. See La. C.C.P. art. 4924(B).

1 responded that Valero “[would] not be introducing the entirety of these deposition

transcripts” on the basis that La. C.C.P. art. 1450(A)(4) does not apply to summary

judgment proceedings, and suggested Raines obtain the depositions from the court

reporter.

Raines submitted an opposition to the motion for summary judgment and, in

support thereof, attached complete copies of the depositions and requested that the

costs incurred by her for the purchase and filing of the deposition transcripts be

taxed to Valero. Valero filed a reply wherein it asserted that La. C.C.P. art.

1450(A)(4) does not apply to summary judgment proceedings and that, even if it

were to apply to summary judgment proceedings, La. C.C.P. art. 1450 has no

provision that mandates “that costs associated with introducing the full deposition

transcripts be taxed against the party that introduced the excerpts.”

The district court denied Valero’s motion for summary judgment and

“assess[ed] costs as a sanction” against Valero for violating La. C.C.P. art. 1450, in

the total amount of $1,413.30, representing the cost of obtaining and filing the

depositions incurred by Raines. Valero seeks review of the sanctions award.

The sole assignment of error presented by Valero for this Court’s review is

that “the district court committed legal error in sanctioning Valero,” because no

provision in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure “authorizes a sanction for

failure to respond to an informal request for production or for ‘violating’ La. Code

Civ. P. art. 1450.”

A district court’s determination regarding the imposition of sanctions

ordinarily is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Elysian, Inc. v.

Neal Auction Co., Inc., 20-0674, p. 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/21/21), 325 So.3d 1075,

1087. However, if the district court’s decision was based on its erroneous

2 interpretation or application of law, rather than a valid exercise of discretion, an

incorrect decision is not entitled to deference by the reviewing court. Reich, Album

& Plunkett, L.L.C. v. Mugnier, 14-339, p. 4 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/22/21), 334 So.3d

986, 990 (citing Mitchell v. Gaylord Container, 03-2762, p. 3 (La. App. 1 Cir.

10/29/04), 889 So.2d 300, 302).

Valero argues that there is no provision in the Louisiana Code of Civil

Procedure that authorizes the imposition of sanctions for failing to comply with La.

C.C.P. art. 1450 and that the district court therefore erred in assessing as a sanction

against Valero the costs incurred by Raines in obtaining and filing the depositions

for Valero’s refusal to introduce the entirety of the deposition transcripts after

being requested to do so by Raines.2 We agree that the district court did not have

authority under art. 1450 to impose sanctions.

Raines references La. C.C.P. art. 191 which states that “a court possesses

inherently all of the power necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction even though

not granted expressly by law,” in addition to other codal articles that have a

“mechanism for enforcement,” particularly La. C.C.P. arts. 863 and 1420. These

articles in fact have enforcement mechanisms, including the imposition of

sanctions, which are not applicable in this case because they were not utilized as a

basis for the district court’s imposition of sanctions.3 The record does not contain

2 Valero does not argue in its writ application, as it did before the district court, that La. C.C.P.

art. 1450(A)(4) does not apply to motions for summary judgment. For that reason, we need not address whether the district court committed legal error in applying La. C.C.P. art. 1450(A)(4). Valero asserts in its writ application that its refusal to introduce the complete depositions was based on its reasonable interpretation of current case law and that its good faith interpretation of the law precludes an award of sanctions. Since we hold that the law does not authorize an award of sanctions under La. C.C.P. art. 1450, Valero’s good faith argument is moot. 3 Both La. C.C.P. art. 863 and La. C.C.P. art. 1420, which pertain to the signing of pleadings and

discovery requests, responses, and objections, respectively, require that upon motion of a party or on the court’s own motion, and only after a hearing at which the parties may present any

3 any order prior to the sanctions order at issue requiring Valero to introduce full

copies of the deposition transcripts or requiring or compelling Valero to produce

the depositions. The district court therefore lacked authority to impose sanctions

against Valero under La. C.C.P. art. 1450.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the writ and vacate the district court’s

award of sanctions against Valero.4 We further deny Raines’ motion for damages

pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2164.

WRIT GRANTED; VACATED.

evidence or argument relevant to the issue of imposition of a sanction, can the court, after it determines that a certification has been made in violation of the articles, impose an appropriate sanction. See La. C.C.P. art. 863(D) and (E); and La. C.C.P. art. 1420(D) and (E). 4 Nothing in this opinion should be construed as depriving Raines of her remedy to file a motion

to tax costs associated with the depositions pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1920 and La. R.S. 13:4533.