Kevin Tyrone Izal Hairston v. K. Juarez

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 9, 2025
• Docket: 3:22-cv-01801
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KEVIN TYRONE IZAL HAIRSTON, Case No.: 22-cv-01801-BAS-VET

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 13 v. UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 14 K. JUAREZ,

15 (ECF No. 51) Defendant.

17 18 Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”). (ECF 19 No. 51.) Plaintiff Kevin Hairston (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner proceeding pro se, does not 20 oppose the Motion. (ECF No. 53.) For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS 21 the Motion (ECF No. 51). 22 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 23 On August 22, 2022, while housed at Richard J. Donovan Correction Facility, 24 Plaintiff broke free from an escort and rushed towards Defendant K. Juarez (“Defendant”) 25 with a flying kick, hitting him in the knee. (ECF No. 51 at 6.) Plaintiff continued to attack 26 Defendant, eventually knocking him off balance. (Id. at 6–7.) At the same time, a non- 27 party officer used pepper spray, spraying both Plaintiff and Defendant. (Id. at 7.) 28 Defendant then wrapped his arms around Plaintiff and forced him to the ground. (Id.) 1 While on the ground, Plaintiff continued to resist by kicking and thrusting his body, despite 2 repeated instructions to stop resisting. (Id.) 3 During the encounter, Defendant punched Plaintiff in the face three separate times. 4 (ECF No. 51 at 7.) Defendant describes the punches as a “distraction strike,” and contends 5 that each time, he was aiming for Plaintiff’s upper chest but inadvertently struck Plaintiff’s 6 face because Plaintiff was thrusting his body and resisting by kicking his feet. (Id.) During 7 this sequence of events, several officers gave Plaintiff loud and clear instructions to stop 8 resisting. (Id.) Plaintiff stopped resisting only after Defendant was able to apply leg 9 restraints. (ECF No. 51 at 7–8.) Officers removed Plaintiff from the area and placed him 10 in a holding cell in a climate-controlled area to relieve the effects of the pepper spray. (Id. 11 at 8.) Defendant alleges that he suffered the following injuries: (1) swelling and throbbing 12 pain to his third finger; (2) abrasions and pain to both knees; (3) swelling to his inside upper 13 lip; (4) pepper spray to right side of his chest/head area; and (5) lower back pain and 14 stiffness. (Id.) 15 Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violation of the Eighth 16 Amendment based on excessive force. (ECF No. 8 at 3.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant 17 punched him in the face multiple times, while Plaintiff was lying down, completely 18 defenseless, and no longer a threat.1 (Id.) 19 On April 18, 2025, Defendant filed the instant Motion, arguing that Plaintiff cannot 20 meet his burden of proof of showing that Defendant used excessive force. (ECF No. 51.) 21 Defendant further contends that Defendant’s use of force was appropriate given Plaintiff’s 22 physical attack. (Id. at 11–14.) Finally, Defendant claims he is entitled to qualified 23 immunity against Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. (Id. at 6, 12.) Plaintiff filed a Notice 24 of Non-Opposition on May 2, 2025. (ECF No. 53.) 25 26 27 1 Plaintiff also alleges that he was left in a room with no medical attention after being pepper-sprayed, which left him unable to breathe while experiencing a burning sensation. ECF No. 8 at 3. However, 28 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court may enter judgment on 3 factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just, speedy, and 4 inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 5 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits 6 show there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to 7 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is material when it affects the 8 outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The 9 moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of 10 material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party satisfies this initial burden 11 in two ways: “(1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the 12 nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating the nonmoving party failed to establish 13 an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case on which the nonmoving party bears 14 the burden of proving at trial.” Montgomery v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-cv-3057- 15 AJB (DHB), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185217, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2015). If the moving 16 party fails to meet this initial burden, summary judgment must be denied, and the court 17 need not consider the nonmoving party’s evidence. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 332. 18 If the moving party establishes the absence of genuine issues of material fact, then 19 the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and designate 20 “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324. Courts view the 21 record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, “so long as their version of the facts 22 is not blatantly contradicted by the video evidence.” See Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 23 892 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018). However, “[t]he mere existence of video footage of 24 the incident does not foreclose a genuine factual dispute as to the reasonable inferences 25 that can be drawn from that footage.” Id. 26 The Court does not engage in credibility determinations, weighing of evidence, or 27 drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts; these functions are reserved for the trier 28 of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Further, a nonmovant’s bare assertions, standing alone, 1 are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a motion for summary 2 judgment. Id. at 247–48. 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 “In excessive force cases brought under the Eighth Amendment, the relevant inquiry 5 is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or 6 maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31 F.4th 1211, 1221 7 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 8 1, 7 (1992)); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). To determine whether 9 force was “malicious and sadistic,” the Ninth Circuit applies the following five-factor test 10 referred to as the Hudson factors: “(1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate; (2) the 11 need for application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force 12 used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any efforts 13 made to temper the severity of the forceful response.” Hughes, 31 F.4th at 1221 (quoting 14 Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013)). Courts accord wide-ranging 15 deference to prison administrators in the exercise of policies and practices that in their 16 judgment are needed to preserve internal security, safety and discipline. Whitley, 475 U.S. 17 at 321–22. 18 In support of the contention that his use of force was reasonable and not excessive, 19 Defendant offers, in part, his sworn declaration, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, and video 20 footage of the incident generated by the correctional facility’s Audio-Visual System 21 Surveillance (“AVSS”) and a Body Worn Camera (“BWC”). See ECF Nos. 51-2 at Ex. A, 22 Depo. of Kevin Hairston, dated Mar. 4, 2025 (“Hairston Depo.”);2 51-3, Decl. of K. Juarez 23 (“Juarez Decl.”); 51-4, Decl. of E. Taboada at Exs. A (“AVSS Video”) and B (“BWC 24 25 26 27 2 Plaintiff’s deposition is attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of S. Gray Gilmore. 28 1 Video”). In response, Plaintiff does not dispute any of Defendant’s evidence or otherwise 2 oppose the Motion. (See ECF No. 53.) Therefore, because the Motion is unopposed, the 3 Court considers all properly supported facts asserted by Defendant as undisputed. See Fed. 4 R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (if a party fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact, the 5 court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion); see also Hartford Fire 6 Ins. Co. v. NBC Gen. Contractors Corp., No. C 09-5363 SBA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7 25629, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013) (considering all properly supported facts as 8 undisputed because motion was unopposed). 9 Here, the undisputed evidence shows that Defendant was acting in response to 10 Plaintiff’s initial attack, an unprovoked attack that required seven officers to subdue him. 11 Plaintiff admits to kicking at the officers three or four times, which the AVSS Video 12 confirms. (See AVSS Video; Hairston Depo. at 32:7-19, 43:25, 44:1-3.) The same video 13 footage and testimony also confirm that Plaintiff initiated the altercation when he broke 14 free while being escorted to medical, ran towards officers, including Defendant, and lunged 15 at them with a “flying kick.” (See AVSS Video; Hairston Depo. at 24:6-20; 32:3-9; see 16 also Juarez Decl. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s initial kick struck Defendant in the knee/thigh area, 17 and Plaintiff’s continued advancement forced Defendant backwards and eventually 18 knocked Defendant off balance. (See AVSS Video; see also Juarez Decl. at ¶¶ 3–4.) And 19 despite repeated commands by prison staff to stop resisting, Plaintiff kept kicking his feet, 20 thrashing his body, and attempting to stand up after Defendant forced him to the ground 21 following his initial attack. (See AVSS Video; Juarez Decl. at ¶¶ 4–6; see also BWC 22 Video.) The AVSS Video further shows that Defendant delivered the distraction strikes 23 when Defendant was resisting, thrashing on the ground, and refusing to follow commands. 24 (See AVSS Video; see also Juarez Decl. at ¶¶ 7–8.) Critically, Plaintiff charged at 25 Defendant and other officers while they were addressing a separate situation with another 26 27 3 Pursuant to the Court’s Order, Defendant lodged, in electronic format, for the Court’s 28 1 inmate who had manipulated his waist restraints by removing them from his waist and was 2 refusing orders to relinquish the waist restraints. (ECF No. 51-5 at 4.) 3 Moreover, Hairston suffered what appear to be minor injuries, consisting of pain in 4 his nose (not a broken nose) and “little cuts” inside of his mouth. (Hairston Depo. at 57:12– 5 58:3.) There is no evidence that those injuries required any significant medical care or 6 resulted in lasting injury. (Id. at 58:4–10.) To the extent Plaintiff suffered discomfort or 7 pain from being pepper-sprayed, that conduct is not at issue because another a non-party 8 officer is responsible for pepper-spraying Plaintiff, not Defendant. See Barren v. 9 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Liability under § 1983 must be based 10 on the personal involvement of the defendant.”). 11 Considering the Hudson factors, Defendant reasonably perceived a need for the 12 application of force given that Plaintiff broke free from his escort and kicked Defendant 13 and other officers while they were tending to another inmate who had removed his waist 14 restraints. Further, following Plaintiff’s initial, unprovoked attack, Defendant applied 15 force only after Plaintiff failed to comply with commands and physically resisted efforts to 16 subdue him. By physically resisting Defendant and other officers, including kicking and 17 thrashing, Plaintiff threatened the safety of Defendant, other correctional officers, and at 18 least one other inmate. Defendant’s expert confirms that even while thrashing on the 19 ground, Plaintiff presented a threat given his ability to bite or headbutt officers. (See ECF 20 No. 51-6 at 5.) Plaintiff also created an institutional security risk given the presence of a 21 separate inmate who removed his restraints and was similarly resisting directions from 22 officers. Under these circumstances, a need for the application of force existed to effect 23 custody of Plaintiff. 24 Moreover, Defendant did not intentionally strike Plaintiff in the face. Instead, 25 Defendant used distraction strikes intended to strike Plaintiff in the upper torso/chest area, 26 a technique available to officers trying to defend against an attack and effect custody. (Id.) 27 Defendant inadvertently struck Plaintiff in the face because Plaintiff was thrashing on the 28 ground uncontrollably. While those strikes caused Plaintiff pain, specifically pain in his 1 nose, Plaintiff suffered minor injuries consisting of small cuts that required no medical 2 attention. See McCoy v. Stratton, No. 2:12-cv-1137 WBS DB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3 29940, at *17-18 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017) (“The infliction of pain in the course of 4 implementing prison security measures does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment 5 even though it may appear, in hindsight, the degree of force was unreasonable.”). 6 In short, the evidence shows that Defendant struck Plaintiff with distraction blows 7 in a reasonable attempt to effect custody and eliminate the threat and security risk Plaintiff 8 posed. Plaintiff’s continued attempts to physically resist demonstrate that Plaintiff was not 9 amenable to verbal orders and that the force at issue was used after other attempts to subdue 10 Plaintiff failed. Defendant’s use of force was necessary to restore order following 11 Plaintiff’s unprovoked attack and did not result in a wanton and unnecessary infliction of 12 pain. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant applied force in a good-faith effort to 13 maintain or restore discipline, and not maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. As such, 14 Defendant meets his initial burden of presenting evidence that negates an essential element 15 of Plaintiff’s claim. 16 The burden now falls to Plaintiff to go beyond the pleadings and demonstrate a 17 dispute of material fact that could lead a jury to find that Defendant used excessive force 18 in response to Plaintiff’s attack. Plaintiff introduces no evidence to contest the evidence 19 Defendant presents and thus does not meet his burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of 20 material fact. As a result, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant used excessive force in 21 violation of the Eighth Amendment and summary judgement in favor of Defendant is 22 appropriate. See Montgomery, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185217, at *4 (granting summary 23 judgment when the moving party established the absence of a genuine issue of material 24 fact and Plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition); see also Burnett v. Sedillo, No. 1:16- 25 cv-01672-LJO-GSA-PC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189161, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2018) 26 (order adopting Magistrate Judge recommendation to grant summary judgment where 27 Defendant demonstrated that Plaintiff cannot establish a necessary element of claim and 28 Plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition); Walashek v. Asbestos Corp., No. 14-cv- 1 ||} 1567-BTM (BGS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99712, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2015) (granting 2 ||summary judgment where Defendant’s motion established that Plaintiffs have insufficient 3 |}evidence of an essential element of their case and Plaintiffs filed a notice of non- 4 || opposition). 5 Lastly, Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not 6 || violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, and his conduct was objectively reasonable. (ECF 7 ||No. 51 at 17-18.) The Court declines to address the issue of qualified immunity as it is 8 || unnecessary for purposes of ruling on the Motion. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 9 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing that courts are not required to reach issues that are 10 |/“‘unnecessary to the results they reach”); see also Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 11 || Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“[a]s a general rule courts and agencies are not 12 ||required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they 13 reach’). 14 || IV. CONCLUSION 15 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary 16 || Judgment (ECF No. 51). IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor 17 ||of Defendant and against Plaintiff. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close this 18 || action. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 21 || DATED: December 9, 2025 (yi. (Doha H n. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 23 24 25 26 27 28

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