Kevin R Spindler and Beth A Spindler

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DecidedDecember 28, 2020
Docket1-20-11642
StatusUnknown

This text of Kevin R Spindler and Beth A Spindler (Kevin R Spindler and Beth A Spindler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kevin R Spindler and Beth A Spindler, (Wis. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ In re: Case Number: 20-11642-12 KEVIN R. SPINDLER and BETH A. SPINDLER,

Debtors.

MEMORANDUM DECISION Kevin and Beth Spindler (“Debtors”) filed a Chapter 12 petition. Debtors filed a Chapter 12 Plan.1 The Plan proposed re-amortization of the mortgage debt on the Debtors’ homestead with payments made directly to Farm Service Agency. The Trustee objected to the Plan.2 Debtors then filed an amended plan (“Amended Plan”).3 It contains these provisions relating to the debt owed to Farm Service Agency (“FSA”) on their homestead real estate: Farm Service Agency has a secured claim in the amount of $444,864.22 that is secured by a mortgage on the real estate and a UCC Financing Statement on the farm personal property. All terms and provisions of the mortgage and promissory note remain in effect, except as modified herein.

1) Farm Service Agency holds a valid real estate mortgage and a 1st lien on the Debtors' real estate with a claim in the amount of $392,210.82. The claim shall be amortized over thirty (30) years at 2.375% interest for a monthly payment of $1,524.34. The first payment shall be due 30 days after the Court enters an Order confirming the chapter 12 plan and the same day each subsequent month until paid in full. The Debtors shall

1 ECF No. 26. 2 ECF No. 29. 3 ECF No. 38. pay real estate taxes and insurance directly as they come due. The payment shall continue after the chapter 12 plan is completed. Farm Service Agency retains its mortgage on the real estate until paid in full.

Paid Direct - Monthly Payment of $1,524.34

The Amended Plan also includes a provision for continued current direct payments on a student loan. With that added exception and the FSA mortgage, all payments under the Amended Plan are to be paid through the Trustee. The Trustee does not object to payment of the student loan payments directly to the creditor. Although other parties in interest previously objected, the Amended Plan resolved all objections other than that of the Trustee. At the continued hearing, the Trustee confirmed there were remaining issues with the Plan, including the Trustee’s belief that the re-amortized FSA debt should be paid through the Trustee’s office. Trustee asserts that: The debtor is proposing a new amortization and direct payment on the debt owed to Farm Service Agency, secured by the debtors’ real estate. Since the re-amortization is occurring within the context of the Chapter 12, the proposed payments should be paid through the Trustee's office for the duration of the Plan.4

The Court issued a preliminary oral decision on the question of direct payments but reserved the right to reduce such decision to writing.

4 ECF No. 29 ¶ 4. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (b)(2)(A), and (b)(2)(L). This court has jurisdiction to hear and decide this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).

DISCUSSION The Amended Plan and the Trustee’s objection place before the Court a question of policy versus statutory interpretation. May a Chapter 12 debtor make direct payments to an impaired creditor or one whose claim is modified by a plan? This permits a debtor to avoid making those payments through the trustee while preventing a trustee from collecting fees on those payments. Chapter 12 was created as a response to a downturn in the farm economy during the 1980s and its ripple effect in the agricultural and related

industries. Pub. L. No. 99-554, Title II, 100 Stat. 3110. Chapter 13 bankruptcy was not seen as viable for family famers. The debt ceiling for eligibility was too low; the restrictions on reorganizing residential real estate debt did not allow for the restructuring of typical family farm mortgage debt; and, because payments had to all be scheduled during the short plan term, a long-term workout was impossible. Similarly, Chapter 11 was ill-suited to a family farm operation. While Chapter 11 provides a good forum for debtors with more complex financial difficulties, it is costly, cumbersome, and overwhelming for

an unsophisticated small business. Moreover, the “absolute priority rule” prohibited Chapter 11 debtors from retaining an equity interest in their farm over the objections of a dissenting class of unsecured creditors. This made Chapter 11 unworkable for most farmers. The objective of Chapter 12 is to facilitate plan confirmation without the other complications of a Chapter 11 and not subject to the debt limitations of a

Chapter 13. In other words, simplification of the process. Chapter 12 was modeled on Chapter 13, but it is not a Chapter 13. Congress recognized the difficulties for farmers complying with either Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 and thus blended concepts from both. The submission and confirmation of a plan in Chapter 12 differs from the provisions of Chapters 11 and 13. This confirms the intention of Congress to differentiate among the chapters to address the different needs of various debtors. One area of similarity between Chapter 13 and Chapter 12, however,

is the provision for a standing trustee. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1202(a), 1302(a). 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) of the Code, about plan confirmation, provides that: with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan . . . the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed by the trustee or the debtor under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim . . . .

Thus, by its plain language, the Code allows for payments to creditors by either the debtor or the trustee. Additionally, section 1226(c) states that the trustee shall make distributions to creditors, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan.” And section 1222(a)(1) directs the debtor to submit “all or such portion of future earnings or other future income . . . to . . . the trustee as is necessary for the execution of the plan.” (Emphasis added.) Read together, these sections imply that if the plan provides otherwise, the trustee will not be making payments to creditors under the plan, thereby contemplating direct payments by debtors. There is no statutory rule outlining when direct payments are permitted.

Whether direct payments are permitted percolated through the courts in the 1980s and 1990s. As a downturn in the economy once again is affecting farmers, the question is reemerging. There is no Seventh Circuit case addressing the issue in a Chapter 12. Neither has the question been decided by the Supreme Court. The courts that have wrestled with the issue are split. There are three approaches: (1) debtors cannot make direct payments to impaired creditors; (2) debtors can pay secured creditors directly regardless of impairment; or (3)

whether direct payments should be allowed must be determined case-by-case. The majority approach is the case-by-case analysis. The first approach is straightforward and self-explanatory. It interprets the Code as prohibiting direct payments. Fulkrod v. Savage (In re Fulkrod), 973 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1992); and In re Marriott, 161 B.R. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1993). Under Fulkrod, all payments on impaired or modified claims must be paid through the trustee.

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Related

In Re Marriott
161 B.R. 816 (S.D. Illinois, 1993)
In Re Crum
85 B.R. 878 (N.D. Florida, 1988)
Matter of Pianowski
92 B.R. 225 (W.D. Michigan, 1988)
In Re Martens
98 B.R. 530 (D. Colorado, 1989)
In Re Golden
131 B.R. 201 (N.D. Florida, 1991)
Matter of Seamons
131 B.R. 459 (D. Idaho, 1991)
Westpfahl v. Clark (In Re Westpfahl)
168 B.R. 337 (C.D. Illinois, 1994)
Wagner v. Armstrong (In re Wagner)
36 F.3d 723 (Eighth Circuit, 1994)
Fulkrod v. Savage (In re Fulkrod)
973 F.2d 801 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)

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Kevin R Spindler and Beth A Spindler, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kevin-r-spindler-and-beth-a-spindler-wiwb-2020.