STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
2025 CA 0081
KEVIN QUATREVINGT
VERSUS
STATE OF LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, THROUGH THE HONORABLE JAMES LEBLANC, SECRETARY, AND ST. TAMMANY PARISH SHERIFF['] S OFFICE THROUGH RANDY SMITH, SHERIFF
Judgment Rendered: SEP 19 2025
On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Docket No. 751427
Kevin M. Quatrevingt Plaintiff/ Appellant Covington, Louisiana Pro se
Jason G. Hessick Counsel for Defendant/ Appellee Faye D. Morrison State of Louisiana, Department of Baton Rouge, Louisiana Public Safety and Corrections
Andrew R. Capitelli Counsel for Defendants/ Appellees Kenneth R. Whittle Randy Smith and St. Tammany Parish Andrew C. Wilson Sheriff's Office Sarah F. Constantine Joseph Thigpen Paige S. Stein Nicholas P. Isolani Mandeville, Louisiana
BEFORE: McCLENDON, C. 3.,, GREENE AND STROMBERG., 33. MCCLENDON, C.3.
Kevin Quatrevingt appeals a judgment sustaining an exception raising the
objection of res judicata and dismissing his suit. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history herein are synopsized from this court's prior
opinion in Quatrevingt v. State through Landry, 2017- 0884 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 8/ 18),
242 So. 3d 625, writ denied, 2018- 0391 ( La. 4/ 27/ 18), 239 So. 3d 837 ( hereinafter
Quatrevingt I), which forms the basis of the exception raising the objection of res
judicata herein.
This matter arises out of an incident wherein Mr. Quatrevingt pleaded guilty on
January 24, 2006, in Military Court, to one count of conduct prejudicial to good order and
discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces under Article 134 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. The conduct for which Mr. Quatrevingt pleaded guilty
arose from possession of child pornography, resulting in his conviction and incarceration
for approximately nine months in the State of Texas. Following his release, he was given
notice by the federal government of his obligation to register as a sex offender in any state in which he would reside. On October 21, 2006, Mr. Quatrevingt returned to the
State of Louisiana and was notified by the State that he was required to register as a Tier
I sex offender.
Although Mr. Quatrevingt claimed to have complied with the registration, he
pleaded guilty for failing to register as a sex offender between November 8, 2006, and
May 3, 2007, in violation of LSA- R. S. 15: 542. On November 3, 2008, Mr. Quatrevingt
pleaded guilty in the matter entitled " State of Louisiana v. Kevin Michael Quatrevingt," r
Docket No. 438,897, Division " E" in the 22nd Judicial District Court for St. Tammany
Parish, and was sentenced to serve two years imprisonment at hard labor.
On April 22, 2010, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections,
through Public Safety Services, Office of State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification
and Information ( the " Bureau"), provided Mr. Quatrevingt written notice that the Bureau
had determined that his military conviction was comparable to and would equate to a
conviction or adjudication of Possession, Production, and/ or Distribution of Child
2 Pornography under LSA- R. S. 14: 81. 1. The Bureau explained that it determined him to
be a Tier II offender under LSA- R. S. 15: 544 and 15: 542. 1, which would require him to
register in the State of Louisiana for a period of twenty-five years from his initial
registration, with in- person renewals every six months. The written notice set forth the
manner in which Mr. Quatrevingt could appeal the Bureau' s determination by submitting
a written request for an administrative hearing under LSA- R.S. 49: 950, et.5eq. within one
year from the Bureau posting its determination on the State Sex Offender and Child
Predator Registry ( the " Registry"). The Bureau posted its determination on April 22,
2010, and Mr. Quatrevingt did not request an administrative appeal.
On June 14, 2010, Mr. Quatrevingt was arrested for a second time for failing to
register as a sex offender between May 17, 2010, and June 14, 2010, in St. Tammany Parish. Mr. Quatrevingt filed a motion to quash the prosecution in the matter entitled
State of Louisiana v. Kevin Michael Quatrevingt," Docket No. 493, 820, Division " F" in the
22nd Judicial District Court for St. Tammany Parish ( the " 22nd JDC criminal case'.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion ruling that Mr. Quatrevingt's military conviction was not comparable to a sex offense in Louisiana.
Following the dismissal of the 22nd JDC criminal case, Mr. Quatrevingt sought to
have his name removed from the Registry and the sex offender label removed from his driver's license. After the Bureau refused to remove his name, Mr. Quatrevingt flied a
motion for clarification and request for removal in the 22nd JDC criminal case. On July
17, 2014, the court determined it had no jurisdiction to have Mr. Quatrevingt's name
removed from the Registry and denied relief.
Thereafter, in 2015, Mr. Quatrevingt, seeking to have his named removed from
the Registry, filed a petition and incorporated memorandum for writ of mandamus and
declaratory judgment in the matter of "Kevin Quatrevingt v. State of Louisiana," Docket
No. 2015- 13724, Division " I" in the 22nd Judicial District Court for St. Tammany Parish the " 22nd JDC civil case). The State filed several exceptions, and the trial court
sustained the exceptions raising the objections of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
improper venue, stating that any concerns regarding the Registry were to be brought in the 19th Judicial District Court for East Baton Rouge Parish. Mr. Quatrevingt filed a writ
3 application, which this court denied as to the exception raising the objection of venue
and granted as to the exception raising the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
See Quatrevingt v. Louisiana Attorney General, 2016- 0322 ( La. App. 1 Cir.
4/ 21/ 16)( unpublished), writ denied, 2016- 1173 ( La. 10/ 10/ 16), 207 So. 3d 409.
Subsequently, in 2017, Mr. Quatrevingt filed an " Emergency Petition for
Extraordinary Relief in the Nature of a Writ of Mandamus, Temporary Restraining Order,
Stay Order, and Preliminary Injunction," in Docket Number 654, 843, Division " 23" in the
19th Judicial District Court for East Baton Rouge Parish. Mr. Quatrevingt sought an
injunction and requested a writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the Attorney General
of the State of Louisiana, to cease infringing on his constitutional and codal rights, to
enjoin the Attorney General from ignoring the ruling made in the 22nd JDC criminal case,
to cease any and all present or future attempts to require him to register as a sex
offender, and to cease any and all present or future attempts to arrest him for failing to register as a sex offender. The Bureau was not a named party, but intervened in the
In response, the State filed multiple exceptions, and the trial court, in a May 2,
2017 judgment, granted the peremptory exception raising the objection of peremption
and dismissed Mr. Quatrevingt's petition with prejudice. Following the denial of a motion
to reconsider, Mr. Quatrevingt appealed to this court.
On appeal, this court noted that the Bureau sent Mr. Quatrevingt notice on April
22, 2010. Therein, the Bureau indicated it determined under LSA- R.S. 15: 542. 1. 3( B)
Mr. Quatrevingt's military conviction was comparable to LSA- R. S. 14: 81. 1 ( pornography
involving juveniles), that he was required to register as a sex offender for twenty-five
years with semi- annual reviews, and that he had one year to appeal this determination
pursuant to LSA- R. S. 49: 964 ( recently redesignated as LSA- R. S. 49: 978. 1) in the 19th
Judicial District Court. Quatrevingt 1, 242 So. 3d at 633. This court noted that Mr.
Quatrevingt acknowledged receipt of this notification, but he did not appeal this
determination. Id.
0 On appeal, this court also found that "[ t] he trial court properly applied the
applicable rules of peremption in determining that [ Mr. Quatrevingt's] time period in
which to appeal the Bureau' s determination pursuant to La. R. S. 15: 542. 1. 3 expired and
his right to challenge the Bureau' s determination extinguished." Id. at 635. Accordingly,
this court concluded that Mr. Quatrevingt's right to challenge the classification
determination was lost, and as such, affirmed the trial court's judgment Judgment granting the
exception raising the objection of peremption. Id.
On July 30, 2024, Mr. Quatrevingt filed the underlying " Emergency Petition for
Extraordinary Relief in the Nature of a Writ of Mandamus, Temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary Injunction, Permanent Injunction and Judicial Review of Validity or
Applicability of Rules," naming the Louisiana Department of Public Safety through its
Secretary, James LeBlanc ( the " Department"), and the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs
Office, through Sheriff Randy Smith ( the " STPSO"), as defendants. Relying on the ruling
from the 22nd JDC criminal case, he sought to have the defendants " cease any and all
present or future attempts to require [ Mr. Quatrevingt] to register as a sex offender and
or notify the public that he is a sex offender[.]"
In response, the Department filed, among other exceptions, a peremptory
exception raising the objection of res judicata. Following a hearing on the Departments
exceptions and Mr. Quatrevingt's request for preliminary injunction, the trial court signed
a judgment on October 10, 2024, which granted the exception raising the objection of
res judicata and dismissed Mr. Quatrevingt' s suit " i[ n] its entirety, WITH PREJUDICE."'
Mr. Quatrevingt has appealed the October 10, 2024 judgment, asserting that the
trial court erred in 1) granting the exception raising the objection of res judicata; 2) not
allowing him to argue exceptions to res judicata; and 3) not granting the relief he
requested in his petition.
AIAT11A
Res judicata bars relitigation of a subject matter arising from the same transaction
or occurrence of a previous suit. Pierrotti v. Johnson, 2011- 1317 ( La. App. 1 Cir,
I Although the STPSO did not file its own exception raising the objection of res judicata, the exception can be noticed by the trial court on its own motion. See I- SA- C. C. P. art. 927( 6).
5 3/ 19/ 12), 91 So. 3d 1056, 1063. It promotes judicial efficiency and final resolution of
disputes. Id. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13: 4231 addresses res judicata, and provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment.
2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.
Thus, under LSA- R. S. 13: 4231, all of the following criteria must be satisfied in order for
res judicata to preclude a second action: ( 1) the first judgment is valid; ( 2) the first
judgment is final; ( 3) the parties are the same; ( 4) the cause or causes of action asserted
in the second suit existed at the time of final judgment in the first litigation; and ( 5) the
cause or causes of action asserted in the second suit arose out of the transaction or
occurrence that was the subject matter of the first litigation. Burguieres v. Pollingue,
2002- 1385 ( La. 2/ 25/ 03), 843 So. 2d 1049, 1053. 1
The burden of proving the facts essential to sustaining the objection of res judicata
is on the party pleading the objection. Pierrotti, 91 So. 3d at 1063. The concept should
be rejected when doubt exists as to whether a plaintiff's substantive rights actually have
been previously addressed and finally resolved. Id. The res judicata effect of a prior
judgment is a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. Id.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Quatrevingt asserts that he " seeks to get into Court and obtain a
declaration of rights pursuant to the 2014 decision and stop [ defendants] from violating
2 Similarly, LSA- C. C. P. art. 425( A) provides that "[ a] party shall assert all causes of action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation." Because Article 425 is enforced through res judicata, all five elements of res judicata must apply for preclusion under Article 425 to apply. See Carollo v. Department of Transportation and Development, 2021- 01670 ( La. 9/ 9/ 22), 346 So. 3d 751, 763.
0 his] rights" and avers that the defendants " have successfully avoided this by asserting
Peremption ... ." Mr. Quatrevingt also asserts that " fflhe current state of litigation is that
he] hasn' t committed a sex offense ( per a final judgement), but [ he] cannot stop
defendants] from placing him on the registry and arresting him for failing to comply with
the requirements because he cannot get into Court based on Res Judicata." Mr.
Quatrevingt maintains that "[ t] he fact that the State continues to harass and arrest [ an]
individual for registration violations which a Court has determined is not applicable to that
individual should be enough of a dispute to overcome Res Judicata." Further, Mr.
Quatrevingt avers that the State never appealed the 22nd JDC' s criminal ruling, " yet [ the
defendants] continue to assert they don' t agree with it and therefore don't have to
comply." Mr. Quatrevingt avers that the Louisiana Constitution is not to protect the
State—but protect the citizens from the State' s overreaching.
In response, both the Department and the STPSO contend that the instant suit is
barred by res judicata as the issues and facts presented are identical to those previously
litigated to a final judgment in Quatrevingt I. The STPSO notes that in Quatrevingt I
and in the current suit, Mr. Quatrevingt sought removal from the sex offender Registry.
The STPSO also notes that in Quatrevingt I, this court found that Mr. Quatrevingt' s
right to challenge his sex offender registration extinguished one year from the date the
Bureau posted its determination because he did not administratively appeal the Bureau' s
determination during that time period. See Quatrevingt 1, 242 So. 3d at 635. It is the
STPSO' s position that the Bureau' s decision became final in 2018 when the Louisiana
Supreme Court denied Mr. Quatrevingt's writ application.
Moreover, the appellees note that, at the hearing on the exception, Mr.
Quatrevingt argued that his claim should not be dismissed because it was based on LSA-
R. S. 49: 963 ( redesignated as LSA- R. S. 49: 968) as opposed to the grounds previously
raised under LSA- R. S. 49: 964 ( redesignated as LSA- R. S. 49: 978. 1). However, appellees
note that the trial court recognized that Mr. Quatrevingt's petition does not specifically
state any claims under LSA- R. S. 49: 963 ( redesignated as LSA- R. S. 49: 968). Further, the
appellees contend that the trial court properly found that under the doctrine of res
judicata, any claim under LSA- R. S. 49: 963 could have and should have been brought in
7 Quatrevingt I. Accordingly, the appellees argue that this court should affirm the trial
court's judgment.
At the outset, we note that Mr. Quatrevingt points to nothing in the hearing
transcript to support his second assignment of error that the trial court limited his
argument on res judicata. Moreover, our review of the transcript reflects the trial court
allowed Mr. Quatrevingt to argue every point he requested at the hearing, even granting
Mr. Quatrevingt's request to rebut the defendants' position after they completed their,
arguments and apologizing to Mr. Quatrevingt for cutting him off at one point and
thereafter allowing Mr. Quatrevingt " to keep going" until he finished his argument. As
such, Mr. Quatrevingt' s assignment of error that his res judicata argument was limited is
without merit.
With regard to the merits of res judicata, we note that the first and second of the
five criteria recognized in Burguieres are clearly met—i. e., the first judgment from
Quatrevingt I is valid and final. As noted above, on February 8, 2018, this court
affirmed the trial court's May 2, 2017 judgment on peremption. Quatrevingt 1, 242
So. 3d at 639- 40. The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently denied writs from this
court's ruling on April 27, 2018. Accordingly, the May 2, 2017 judgment became " final
and definitive" on May 4, 2018, or five days after the Louisiana Supreme Court mailed
the denial of Mr. Quatrevingt' s application for certiorari. See LSA- C. C. P. art. 2166( E)
When an application for certiorari to the supreme court is timely filed, a judgment of
the court of appeal becomes final and definitive after a delay of five days, exclusive of
legal holidays, commencing to run on the day after the clerk has mailed the denial by the
supreme court of the application for certiorari.' As such, the first two Burguieres
factors are met.
The fourth and fifth criteria, i. e., the cause of action existed at the time of final
judgment of the first litigation and the cause of action asserted in the second suit arose
out of the transaction or occurrence of the first litigation, are also met. Specifically, all
claims Mr. Quatrevingt has made existed at the time the final judgment was rendered in Quatrevingtj.3 Mr. Quatrevingt does not indicate why he was precluded from asserting those claims in Quatrevingt 1. See S. 13: 4231( 2). Accordingly, the last two
Burguieres criteria are met.
The third criterion requires that the parties be the same. Clearly, the plaintiff, Mr.
Quatrevingt, is the same in both actions. Moreover, the Department is a party in both
SUitS. 4 We note, however, that the STPSO was not a party in Quatrevingt I nor is the
STPSO considered a party for res judicata purposes simply because other state entities
were involved in Quatrevingt I. See Ward v. State,, Department of Transp. &
Development ( Office of H~_ ( La/\ nn. 2 Cir, 2 SO^3H 1231/
1235 n. 3, writ denied, 2009- 0431 ( La. 4/ 17/ 09), 6 So. 3d 791. Even so, a non- party can
be deemed a party for res judicata purposes when the non- party's interests are
adequately by party tOthe prior2Cƒio0. This occurs VVheM the party can
be considered the " virtual representative" of the non- party because the interests of the
two are SO closely aligned. See Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 551
Herein, the BURe8U is the entity vested with the duty tO" pstablish and maintain a
central registry of sex offenders[ J" LSA- R. S. 15: 578( A)( 7). Further, the Bureau is also
required to determine " which time period of registration"' is applicable to individuals
z On appeal, Mr. Quatrevingt contends that his claims are not time barred because the Department's X%actions were unconstitutional and exceeded the statutory authority of the agenq\" and he references LSA- R. S. 49: 963 ( redesignated as LGA- R. S. 49: 968). However, Mr. C>uatne/ not's claims all challenge the Bureau' s determination that he is a7ler D sex offender, which this court has already found to be time barred. Clearly, classification of an offender falls within the scope of the Bureau' s authority. See LSA- R. S. 15: 542. 1, 3( 8)( 3)( a). By contrast, LSA- R. S. 49: 963 ( redesignated as LSA- R. S. 49: 968) applies when the validity or applicability of rule is being challenged and an action for a declaratory judgment may be filed in the district court of the parish in which the agency is located. See LSA- R. S. 49; 968( A)( 1). The court shall declare the rule invalid or inapplicable ifitfinds that the rule: ( 1) violates constitutional provisions, 2) exceeds the statutory authority ofthe agency, or( 3) was adopted without substantial compliance with the rulemaking procedures. LSA- R. S. 49: 968( C). See June Medical Services, LLC v. Louisiana Department of Health, 2019-0191 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 3V4/ 20), 302 So. 3d 1161, 1163 n. 2. None of Mr. Ouatrevingt'sallegations fall within those provisions.
The Department alleged that in this underlying suit, Mr. Quatrevingt incorrectly named the Secretary of the Department asthe legal entity that is responsible for maintenance of the Registry. However, the Department averred that the proper legal entity is the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Office ofState Police, Bureau ofIdentification and Information. See LSA- R. S. 15: 541( 3), LSA- R. S. 1S: 543. 1. 3, and L8A- R. S. 1S: S77( A). Inany event, inthe first suit, the Louisiana Department ofPublic Safety and Corrections, through Public Safety Services, Office of State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information intervened in and was a party to the action, while here the named defendant is the Department through its Secretary. Quatnevingt 1, 342 So.] d at 629, 631. We find that these defendants share an identity of parties for purposes of res judicata. See Welch v. Crown Zellerbacb Corp., 359 So. 2d 15/, 156 ( La. 1978). (" There exists an identity of parties whenever the same parties, their successors, or others appear so long as they share the same ' quality' as parties.' l convicted under military law. See LSA- R. S. 15: 542. 1. 3( A). By contrast, the statutory
duty of a Louisiana sheriff with respect to the state' s sex offender registry scheme is
primarily to serve as the local entity with whom an offender in the sheriffs jurisdiction
registers. See LSA- R.S. 15: 540, etseq. A Louisiana sheriff has no authority to determine
who is required to register, and his duty only arises following a determination from the
Department, through the Bureau, that an offender is required to register. Nevertheless,
the underlying claim against the Department is the essence of the litigation, and the
STPSO' s interests in that regard were aligned with the Department in the prior litigation
such that the Department was the STPSO' s " virtual representative." Accordingly, we
conclude that the STPSO is to be considered a party for purposes of res judicata.`
Therefore, the third criterion has been met.
Because all five criteria recognized by the Burguieres court are met, we find no
error in the trial court's judgment granting the exception raising the objection of res
judicata and dismissing Mr. Quatrevingt's suit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's October 10, 2024
judgment. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant, Kevin Quatrevingt.
AFFIRMED.
5 We further note that Mr. Quatrevingt's claims against the STPSO appear to be perempted. Although this court can raise this exception on its own motion under I- SA- C. C. P. art. 927( B), we find it unnecessary to do so given our ruling herein.