Kevin O. Harper v. Steven Johnson, John Doe, C.O. Perzen, C.O. Miles, C.O. Akore, C.O. Jardian, John Does, John Does RN Nurse, Jane Doe HSM Manager, Jane Doe Assistant HSM, Jane Doe 8th Floor UM, and Jane Does RN

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJanuary 9, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-01873
StatusUnknown

This text of Kevin O. Harper v. Steven Johnson, John Doe, C.O. Perzen, C.O. Miles, C.O. Akore, C.O. Jardian, John Does, John Does RN Nurse, Jane Doe HSM Manager, Jane Doe Assistant HSM, Jane Doe 8th Floor UM, and Jane Does RN (Kevin O. Harper v. Steven Johnson, John Doe, C.O. Perzen, C.O. Miles, C.O. Akore, C.O. Jardian, John Does, John Does RN Nurse, Jane Doe HSM Manager, Jane Doe Assistant HSM, Jane Doe 8th Floor UM, and Jane Does RN) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kevin O. Harper v. Steven Johnson, John Doe, C.O. Perzen, C.O. Miles, C.O. Akore, C.O. Jardian, John Does, John Does RN Nurse, Jane Doe HSM Manager, Jane Doe Assistant HSM, Jane Doe 8th Floor UM, and Jane Does RN, (E.D. Wis. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

KEVIN O. HARPER,

Plaintiff, Case No. 25-CV-1873-JPS v.

STEVEN JOHNSON, JOHN DOE, ORDER C.O. PERZEN, C.O. MILES, C.O. AKORE, C.O. JARDIAN, JOHN DOES, JOHN DOES RN NURSE, JANE DOE HSM MANAGER, JANE DOE ASSISTANT HSM, JANE DOE 8TH FLOOR UM, and JANE DOES RN,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Kevin O. Harper (“Plaintiff”), a former inmate, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide him adequate medical treatment. ECF No. 1. This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint. 1. THE FILING FEE A party may submit to the court a request to proceed without prepaying the otherwise required filing fees, otherwise known as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) specifically references “prisoner” litigants, it has been interpreted as providing authority for such requests by both prisoner and non-prisoner pro se litigants alike. Floyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275–76 (6th Cir. 1997) (superseded by rule on other, inapplicable grounds); see also Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1491 n.1 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Section 1915(e) applies to all [in forma pauperis] litigants—prisoners who pay fees on an installment basis, prisoners who pay nothing, and nonprisoners in both categories.”) (Lay, J., concurring)). In making such a request, a pro se litigant must submit an affidavit including a statement of all assets possessed by the litigant as well as stating the nature of the action and the affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). In order to qualify to proceed in forma pauperis, the pro se litigant need not be “absolutely destitute.” Zaun v. Dobbin, 628 F.2d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 1980). In forma pauperis status ought to be granted to those impoverished litigants “who, within the District Court’s sound discretion, would remain without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them.” Brewster v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. 461, F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972). Plaintiff submitted his financial information with his motion to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. ECF No. 2. Based on his monthly expenses and income, the Court accepts that Plaintiff is indigent. The Court will accordingly grant the motion to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. However, the inquiry does not end there; the Court must also screen the action. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Notwithstanding the payment of any filing fee, when a plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must screen the complaint and dismiss it or any portion thereof if it raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997). The Court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). To state a claim, a complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In other words, the complaint must give “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The allegations must “plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level.” Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted). Plausibility requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing the complaint, the Court is required to “accept as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Kubiak, 810 F.3d at 480–81. However, the Court “need not accept as true ‘legal conclusions, or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.’” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal bracketing omitted). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants Steve Johnson (“Johnson”), C.O. Perzen (“Perzen”), C.O. Miles (Miles”), C.O. Akore (“Akore”), C.O. Jardian (“Jardian”), and various John Doe defendants (“Does”). ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide him adequate medical care at the Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility (“MSDF”) Id. Plaintiff arrived at MSDF in mid-August 2025. Id. at 3. Plaintiff told staff during processing that he had severe asthma and had difficulty breathing. Id. Plaintiff requested an asthma inhaler for his condition. Id. Despite this knowledge, the nurse refused his request and told Plaintiff that asthma medication was an undue expense for whiny inmates. Id. Plaintiff also made several Does aware of his need for asthma medication during processing; they ignored his requests. Id. Plaintiff continued to ask staff for asthma treatment during the next few days. Id. On the fourth day, Plaintiff received a medical inhaler, but it had another prisoner’s name on the label. Id. Plaintiff notified the nurse in order to follow the rules; the nurse then threatened Plaintiff with a conduct report for having medication without his name on it. Id. Plaintiff gave back the inhaler to avoid getting a conduct report. Id. Plaintiff was having trouble breathing at this time and he continued to ask staff for medical assistance; the staff all refused to help him. Id. at 4. On August 18, 2025, staff announced that they would be cutting off the air circulation in Plaintiff’s unit for a repair. Id. Plaintiff again told staff about his breathing issues and his need for an inhaler. Id. Plaintiff told staff he had more difficulty breathing as a result of the lack of air circulation. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff told Luckett, Akore, Jalastic, Guardian, and Ferrier about his need for asthma medication, and they refused to help him. Id. Eventually, Plaintiff’s condition worsened and he had an asthma attack that caused his cellmate to bang on the door for medical attention. Id.

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Related

Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
McGowan v. Hulick
612 F.3d 636 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Richard A. Zaun and Lois Jean Zaun v. James Dobbin
628 F.2d 990 (Seventh Circuit, 1980)
Arnett v. Webster
658 F.3d 742 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Donald F. Greeno v. George Daley
414 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Paul v. Skemp
2001 WI 42 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 2001)
Brooks v. Ross
578 F.3d 574 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Laura Kubiak v. City of Chicago
810 F.3d 476 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
James Lewis v. Angela McLean
864 F.3d 556 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink
126 F.3d 895 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)

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Kevin O. Harper v. Steven Johnson, John Doe, C.O. Perzen, C.O. Miles, C.O. Akore, C.O. Jardian, John Does, John Does RN Nurse, Jane Doe HSM Manager, Jane Doe Assistant HSM, Jane Doe 8th Floor UM, and Jane Does RN, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kevin-o-harper-v-steven-johnson-john-doe-co-perzen-co-miles-co-wied-2026.