Kevin M. Abbey v. Shannon M. Abbey

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: October 1, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-1622
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed October 1, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D2024-1622 Lower Tribunal No. 17-DR-16-K ________________

Kevin M. Abbey, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

vs.

Shannon M. Abbey, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Sharon I. Hamilton, Judge.

Law Office of Deborah Adams Marsh, and Deborah Adams Marsh, for appellant/cross-appellee.

Siverson Law Firm PLLC, and Scott Edmund Siverson (Winter Garden), for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before FERNANDEZ, LOGUE and GORDO, JJ.

GORDO, J. In this appeal from a second amended final judgment of dissolution of

marriage, Kevin Abbey (the “Husband”) challenges the trial court’s equitable

distribution award to Shannon Abbey (the “Wife”), arguing it lacks competent

substantial evidence. 1 The Wife cross-appeals. Upon review of the record,

we find the trial court’s durational alimony award and its division of assets

within the equitable distribution scheme are supported by competent

substantial evidence. We therefore affirm. See Kurtanovic v. Kurtanovic,

248 So. 3d 247, 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (“An appellate court reviews an

award of alimony for abuse of discretion. The appellate court . . . will not

reverse an alimony award if it is supported by competent, substantial

evidence.”); Apesteguy v. Keglevich, 319 So. 3d 150, 153 (Fla. 3d DCA

2021) (“Generally, we review a trial court’s equitable distribution

determination for an abuse of discretion. . . . Where there is substantial

competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings, the appellate court

cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”) (quotation marks

and citation omitted).

The Husband also appeals the finding of entitlement to attorney’s fees

contained within the final judgment. We dismiss that portion of the appeal

as premature and one taken from a non-final, non-reviewable order. See

1 We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).

2 Altman v. Brown, 365 So. 3d 1232, 1232 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (“We dismiss

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction to the extent Altman seeks review of the

trial court’s determination that the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney’s fees. An

order which merely determines the right to attorney’s fees without setting the

amount is a nonfinal, non-appealable order.”); McIlveen v. McIlveen, 644 So.

2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (“[W]e lack jurisdiction to review the issue

of entitlement and deny review of that issue. . . . [A]n order which only

determines the right to attorney's fees without setting the amount is a

nonappealable, nonfinal order.”).

Affirmed in part; appeal dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction.