Kevin Lee Shackelford v. Douglas County Corrections; Nelson, Officer, Unit Officer; Wilson, Officer, Unit Officer; McDoogle, Officer, Unit Officer; Ballard, Sgt, Floor Sergeant, in their individual capacities

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedMay 1, 2026
Docket8:25-cv-00733
StatusUnknown

This text of Kevin Lee Shackelford v. Douglas County Corrections; Nelson, Officer, Unit Officer; Wilson, Officer, Unit Officer; McDoogle, Officer, Unit Officer; Ballard, Sgt, Floor Sergeant, in their individual capacities (Kevin Lee Shackelford v. Douglas County Corrections; Nelson, Officer, Unit Officer; Wilson, Officer, Unit Officer; McDoogle, Officer, Unit Officer; Ballard, Sgt, Floor Sergeant, in their individual capacities) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kevin Lee Shackelford v. Douglas County Corrections; Nelson, Officer, Unit Officer; Wilson, Officer, Unit Officer; McDoogle, Officer, Unit Officer; Ballard, Sgt, Floor Sergeant, in their individual capacities, (D. Neb. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

KEVIN LEE SHACKELFORD,

Plaintiff, 8:25CV733

vs. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DOUGLAS COUNTY CORRECTIONS, and NELSON, Officer, Unit Officer; WILSON, Officer, Unit Officer; MCDOOGLE, Officer, Unit Officer; and BALLARD, Sgt, Floor Sergeant, in their individual capacities;

Defendants.

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Kevin Lee Shackelford's amended complaint filed on April 6, 2026. Filing 8. The Court now conducts an initial review of Plaintiff’s claims to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW The Court is required to review in forma pauperis and prisoner complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). “The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). “A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that while confined within the Douglas County Department of Corrections (DCDC), he was required to provide a fecal sample. Filing 8 at 5. Plaintiff collected the sample while located in his cell rather than the medical unit, and he then notified prison staff that it was ready for pickup. Plaintiff was informed that medical personnel would retrieve it. Filing 8 at 5. But despite Plaintiff's repeated requests and grievances, and his notice to correctional staff, including a supervising sergeant, of the unsanitary and hazardous condition caused by having the fecal sample in his cell, the defendants failed to promptly collect it. The sample remained in his cell for five days. Filing 8 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that due to exposure to the fecal sample in his cell, he suffered persistent headaches and symptoms of disorientation. He was not taken to the medical unit for evaluation or treatment. Instead, Plaintiff was given Ibuprofen and instructed to lie down. Filing 8 at 5. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $250,000.00 for each day of exposure as compensation for "the physical, mental, and emotional harm suffered due to Defendants' repeated disregard for Plaintiffs well-being. Defendants' actions, including the inaction of correctional and medical staff, demonstrate a complete lack of concern for Plaintiffs safety." Filing 8 at 5. III. DISCUSSION Liberally construed, Plaintiff claims his conditions of confinement and lack of medical care violated his Eighth Amendment rights. He seeks recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A. Claims against DCDC As the Court explained on review of Plaintiff's initial complaint, (Filing 7), DCDC is not a distinct legal entity subject to suit. De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Jail, Corr. Inst., 18 F. App'x 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (county jail and sheriff's department not legal entities subject to suit) (collecting cases); Mixon v. Omaha Police Dep't Officers, No. 8:17CV325, 2019 WL 2143882, at *2 (D. Neb. May 16, 2019) (county department of corrections is not distinct legal entity subject to suit) (collecting cases); see also Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (departments or subdivisions of local government are “not juridical entities suable as such”). Any claims against DCDC must be dismissed. Even if the Court construes Plaintiff's claims against DCDC as claims against Douglas County, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. The Court's prior order explained that to state a claim against Douglas County, Plaintiff must allege a violation of his constitutional rights due to the implementation of an official policy, an unofficial custom, or a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise others acting on its behalf. Corwin v. City of Independence, 829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016). Like the initial complaint, Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges no facts indicating the delayed retrieval of his fecal sample or the alleged lack of adequate medical care arose from a county custom or policy, or a deliberately indifferent lack of training and supervision of the DCDC staff. Plaintiff's claim against DCDC, construed as a claim against Douglas County, must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. B. Individual Capacity Claims Plaintiff names Nelson, Wilson, McDoogle, and Ballard, in their individual capacities, as defendants. To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant was personally involved in or had direct responsibility for incidents that resulted in injury. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff's amended complaint does not allege who he talked to about the fecal sample in his cell and his alleged symptoms, or who responded (or failed to respond) to his complaints.

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Kevin Lee Shackelford v. Douglas County Corrections; Nelson, Officer, Unit Officer; Wilson, Officer, Unit Officer; McDoogle, Officer, Unit Officer; Ballard, Sgt, Floor Sergeant, in their individual capacities, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kevin-lee-shackelford-v-douglas-county-corrections-nelson-officer-unit-ned-2026.