Kevin Lebeau v. Department of the Navy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 26, 2022
DocketPH-0752-20-0001-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Kevin Lebeau v. Department of the Navy (Kevin Lebeau v. Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kevin Lebeau v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

KEVIN J. LEBEAU, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-0752-20-0001-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: August 26, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Noelle Clapham, Esquire, Providence, Rhode Island, for the appellant.

Colleen M. Shook, Norfolk, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which affirmed his removal based on the charges of unauthorized removal of Government property, unauthorized sale of Government property, and misuse of a Government vehicle. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly M ODIFIED to find that the agency established a nexus between the appellant’s misconduct and the efficiency of the service, we AFFIRM the initial decision. ¶2 On petition for review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s fact and credibility findings regarding the charges of unauthorized removal and unauthorized sale of Government property. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-10. He largely repeats his arguments from his prehearing submission, including his assertion that he never took and sold any Government-owned scrap metal from the naval base. Id.; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 27 at 4-5. He does not challenge the misuse of an assigned Government vehicle (GOV) charge and admits again to “negligible use” of his GOV for personal reasons to transport scrap metal, which he maintains that he obtained off -base. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 8; IAF, Tab 27 at 5. Finally, regarding the penalty, he argues that misuse of a GOV, the only misconduct to which he admits, warrants only a suspension and not removal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9. ¶3 The appellant’s arguments on review constitute mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s findings and are unavailing. The administrative judge thoroughly reviewed the record evidence and made reasoned credibility findings 3

in sustaining all three charges, 2 including the misuse of GOV charge that the appellant does not challenge on review, and we find that the appellant has presented no basis for disturbing the initial decision. IAF, Tab 38, Initial Decision (ID) at 14-17; see Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues of credibility); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987). Although the appellant raises an argument about the maximum reasonable penalty for his misuse of a GOV, PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 8-9, the administrative judge properly sustained all three charges, ID at 14-17. The record supports the administrative judge’s finding that the penalty of removal was reasonable and that the deciding official had considered the relevant factors. ID at 17-18; see Pinegar v. Federal Election Commission, 105 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶ 53 (2007) (stating that, when all of the agency’s charges are sustained, the Board will review the agency -imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all of the relevant factors and exercised management discretion within the tolerable limits o f reasonableness); Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981).

2 The agency charged the appellant with 25 specifications of unauthorized sale of Government property between August and December 2018, all concerning scrap metal sold to the same private company. IAF, Tab 7 at 39-41. On review, the appellant generally denies ever selling any Government property. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-8. The documentary evidence in the record contains detailed receipts from the company to which the appellant sold the scrap metal, and he has not challenge d their authenticity. IAF, Tab 36 at 4-23; PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-9. Rather, he disputes the origin of the scrap metal, maintaining throughout his appeal that he did not obtain it on the naval base . PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5; IAF, Tab 27 at 4-5. The administrative judge considered this argument below, and after assessing record and testimonial evidence including the appellant’s own testimony, the administrative judge found that the weight of the evidence was sufficient to support the deciding official’s finding that the scrap metal in question had come from the naval base. IAF, Tab 38, Initial Decision at 16-17. The appellant has not provided a basis for disturbing this well -reasoned finding on review. 4

¶4 In addition to the requirement that an agency prove its charges against the appellant, the agency must also prove that there is a nexus, i.e., a clear and direct relationship between the articulated ground for the adverse action and either the appellant’s ability to accomplish his duties satisfactoril y or some other legitimate interest. Ellis v. Department of Defense, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 8 (2010); see 5 C.F.R. § 752.403(a) (stating that an agency may take an adverse action only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service). Here, the administrative judge did not make an explicit finding regarding the nexus between the sustained misconduct and the efficiency of the service. ID at 14-19. Neither party raised this issue on review. Nonetheless, we find that the appellant was not prejudiced by the administrative judge’s omission because the record clearly supports a finding of nexus. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4 -10, Tab 4 at 4-10; see Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (stating that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision). ¶5 It is well established that a nexus exists between the efficiency of the service and the charge of misuse of Government property. See Els v. Department of the Army, 82 M.S.P.R. 27, ¶ 11 (1999). The Board has also found nexus for an employee’s off-duty misuse of a GOV. See Hoofman v. Department of the Army, 118 M.S.P.R.

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Hoofman v. Department of the Army
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582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Kevin Lebeau v. Department of the Navy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kevin-lebeau-v-department-of-the-navy-mspb-2022.