AFFIRMED as MODIFIED; and Opinion Filed August 1, 2024
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00653-CR
KEVIN LARENZIN HENDERSON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F19-75007-K
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Smith, Miskel, and Breedlove Opinion by Justice Smith
Appellant Kevin Larenzin Henderson was convicted by a jury of murder. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2). At the punishment stage, the jury found
that appellant “caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion
arising from an adequate cause,” thus reducing the offense from a first-degree felony
to a second-degree felony. See id. § 19.02(d). The jury assessed appellant’s
punishment at five years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, and the trial court sentenced him accordingly. In
four issues, appellant argues the judgment should be modified to accurately reflect (1) the amount of costs authorized to be assessed against him, (2) the attorneys for
the State, (3) the section of the penal code for the offense, and (4) the degree of the
offense. The State agrees that the judgment should be modified but disagrees with
appellant as to the amount of costs authorized. In a single cross issue, the State also
argues that appellant should have been assessed additional costs. This Court has the
power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we have the necessary
information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26,
27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the
judgment of conviction as modified herein.
Modification of the Judgment
Appellant argues in his first issue that he was assessed unauthorized costs
based on the date of the offense—December 30, 2018—and that the judgment should
be modified to reduce the total amount of court costs by $83, making the total
amount of costs $207. We agree. The imposition of certain court costs is mandatory
upon conviction and should be reflected in the judgment. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 42.16. However, a cost cannot be imposed for a service not
performed or for a service for which a cost is not expressly provided by law. Id. art.
103.002. As we explained in Shuler v. State, several cost related statutes were
amended by the legislature in 2019. 650 S.W.3d 683, 687–91 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2022, no pet.); see also Contreras v. State, Nos. 05-20-00185, 00186-CR, 2021 WL
–2– 6071640, at *5–9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 23, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh’g,
not designated for publication). The new cost structure, set forth in the amended
statutes, became effective on January 1, 2020, and applies only to offenses
committed on or after that date. Shuler, 650 S.W.3d at 687–91; Contreras, 2021
WL 6071640, at *5–9. Here, the offense was committed on December 30, 2018.
Thus, the changes that became effective on January 1, 2020, do not apply to
appellant’s conviction.
The judgment provides that appellant was assessed $290 in costs. The bill of
costs provides the following breakdown of the costs assessed:
Clerk’s Fee 40.00 Jury Fee 1.00 Court House Sec Fee 10.00 Cons State Fees 185.00 County Records Mgt 25.00 Specialty Court 25.00 State Jury Fee 4.00
Appellant asserts that the jury and specialty court fees should be deleted, the
courthouse security fee should be reduced from $10 to $5, and the consolidated State
fees should be reduced from $185 to $133. The State agrees that the specialty court
fee should be struck and that the security fee and consolidated State fee should be
reduced; however, the State also responds that the jury fee should have been assessed
at $4 based on former article 102.0045.
We agree that the $1 Jury Fee and the $25 Specialty Court Fee were among
the January 2020 changes and thus should be deleted. See Shuler, 650 S.W.3d at
–3– 687; Contreras, 2021 WL 6071640, at *9, 9 n.7. As to the State’s argument that the
jury fee should have been assessed at $4 based on former article 102.0045, we note
that the bill of costs already includes the $4 State Jury Fee, as previously authorized.
See FORMER TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.0045(a) (effective Sept. 1, 2011,
through Dec. 31, 2019). We also agree that the Court House Security Fee was
authorized by former article 102.017 in an amount of $5 and thus should be reduced
from $10 to $5. See Contreras, 2021 WL 6071640, at *9 n.7. And the State
Consolidated Fee was authorized by former section 133.102 of the local government
code in an amount of $133, not $185. See Shuler, 650 S.W.3d at 691; Contreras,
2021 WL 6071640, at *9. Additionally, the Clerk’s Fee and the County Records
Management Fee were previously authorized by former article 102.005, subsections
(a) and (f), of the code of criminal procedure and thus were properly assessed. See
Contreras, 2021 WL 6071640, at *9 n.7.
The State also argues that the law prior to the 2019 amendments required a
defendant convicted by a jury in district court to pay a $40 jury fee,1 a $4 county and
district technology fee,2 a $50 DNA fee,3 a $6 judicial support fee,4 a $2 indigent
1 See FORMER TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.004(a) (effective Sept. 1, 2015, through Dec. 31, 2019). 2 See FORMER TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.0169(a) (effective Sept. 1, 2009, through Dec. 31, 2019). 3 See FORMER TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.020(a)(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2017, through Aug. 31, 2019); FORMER TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.1471(a)(3)(A) (effective Sept. 1, 2017, through Aug. 31, 2019). 4 See FORMER TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 133.105(a) (effective Oct. 1, 2007, through Dec. 31, 2019). –4– defense fee,5 and a $5 statewide e-filing fee.6 Thus, the State argues that the total
amount of costs assessed with these additional fees should be $314.
We decline the State’s invitation to add these six other fees to the bill of costs
and limit our review to whether the costs assessed by the clerk’s office were
authorized by law. An argument requesting that new costs should be assessed
against a defendant is more properly suited for the trial court and the district clerk’s
office. Therefore, we overrule the State’s cross-issue and conclude that the costs
assessed against appellant should be reduced from $290 to $207.
In appellant’s second issue, he further argues that the judgment should be
modified to accurately reflect that the attorneys for the State were Megan Reed, State
Bar No. 24110260, and Marissa Hatchett, State Bar No. 24085486, not Christ
Crozier. And in his third and fourth issues, he argues that the judgment should
accurately reflect that he was convicted under sections 19.02(b)(1), (b)(2), and (d)
of the penal code, not just section 19.02 generally, and that his conviction was for a
second-degree felony because of the sudden passion finding, not a first-degree
felony. The State agrees, as do we, that the record supports the proposed
modifications by appellant.
5 See FORMER TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 133.107(a) (effective Sept. 1, 2011, through Dec. 31, 2019). 6 See FORMER TEX.
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AFFIRMED as MODIFIED; and Opinion Filed August 1, 2024
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00653-CR
KEVIN LARENZIN HENDERSON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F19-75007-K
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Smith, Miskel, and Breedlove Opinion by Justice Smith
Appellant Kevin Larenzin Henderson was convicted by a jury of murder. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2). At the punishment stage, the jury found
that appellant “caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion
arising from an adequate cause,” thus reducing the offense from a first-degree felony
to a second-degree felony. See id. § 19.02(d). The jury assessed appellant’s
punishment at five years’ confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, and the trial court sentenced him accordingly. In
four issues, appellant argues the judgment should be modified to accurately reflect (1) the amount of costs authorized to be assessed against him, (2) the attorneys for
the State, (3) the section of the penal code for the offense, and (4) the degree of the
offense. The State agrees that the judgment should be modified but disagrees with
appellant as to the amount of costs authorized. In a single cross issue, the State also
argues that appellant should have been assessed additional costs. This Court has the
power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we have the necessary
information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26,
27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the
judgment of conviction as modified herein.
Modification of the Judgment
Appellant argues in his first issue that he was assessed unauthorized costs
based on the date of the offense—December 30, 2018—and that the judgment should
be modified to reduce the total amount of court costs by $83, making the total
amount of costs $207. We agree. The imposition of certain court costs is mandatory
upon conviction and should be reflected in the judgment. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 42.16. However, a cost cannot be imposed for a service not
performed or for a service for which a cost is not expressly provided by law. Id. art.
103.002. As we explained in Shuler v. State, several cost related statutes were
amended by the legislature in 2019. 650 S.W.3d 683, 687–91 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2022, no pet.); see also Contreras v. State, Nos. 05-20-00185, 00186-CR, 2021 WL
–2– 6071640, at *5–9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 23, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op. on reh’g,
not designated for publication). The new cost structure, set forth in the amended
statutes, became effective on January 1, 2020, and applies only to offenses
committed on or after that date. Shuler, 650 S.W.3d at 687–91; Contreras, 2021
WL 6071640, at *5–9. Here, the offense was committed on December 30, 2018.
Thus, the changes that became effective on January 1, 2020, do not apply to
appellant’s conviction.
The judgment provides that appellant was assessed $290 in costs. The bill of
costs provides the following breakdown of the costs assessed:
Clerk’s Fee 40.00 Jury Fee 1.00 Court House Sec Fee 10.00 Cons State Fees 185.00 County Records Mgt 25.00 Specialty Court 25.00 State Jury Fee 4.00
Appellant asserts that the jury and specialty court fees should be deleted, the
courthouse security fee should be reduced from $10 to $5, and the consolidated State
fees should be reduced from $185 to $133. The State agrees that the specialty court
fee should be struck and that the security fee and consolidated State fee should be
reduced; however, the State also responds that the jury fee should have been assessed
at $4 based on former article 102.0045.
We agree that the $1 Jury Fee and the $25 Specialty Court Fee were among
the January 2020 changes and thus should be deleted. See Shuler, 650 S.W.3d at
–3– 687; Contreras, 2021 WL 6071640, at *9, 9 n.7. As to the State’s argument that the
jury fee should have been assessed at $4 based on former article 102.0045, we note
that the bill of costs already includes the $4 State Jury Fee, as previously authorized.
See FORMER TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.0045(a) (effective Sept. 1, 2011,
through Dec. 31, 2019). We also agree that the Court House Security Fee was
authorized by former article 102.017 in an amount of $5 and thus should be reduced
from $10 to $5. See Contreras, 2021 WL 6071640, at *9 n.7. And the State
Consolidated Fee was authorized by former section 133.102 of the local government
code in an amount of $133, not $185. See Shuler, 650 S.W.3d at 691; Contreras,
2021 WL 6071640, at *9. Additionally, the Clerk’s Fee and the County Records
Management Fee were previously authorized by former article 102.005, subsections
(a) and (f), of the code of criminal procedure and thus were properly assessed. See
Contreras, 2021 WL 6071640, at *9 n.7.
The State also argues that the law prior to the 2019 amendments required a
defendant convicted by a jury in district court to pay a $40 jury fee,1 a $4 county and
district technology fee,2 a $50 DNA fee,3 a $6 judicial support fee,4 a $2 indigent
1 See FORMER TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.004(a) (effective Sept. 1, 2015, through Dec. 31, 2019). 2 See FORMER TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.0169(a) (effective Sept. 1, 2009, through Dec. 31, 2019). 3 See FORMER TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.020(a)(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2017, through Aug. 31, 2019); FORMER TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.1471(a)(3)(A) (effective Sept. 1, 2017, through Aug. 31, 2019). 4 See FORMER TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 133.105(a) (effective Oct. 1, 2007, through Dec. 31, 2019). –4– defense fee,5 and a $5 statewide e-filing fee.6 Thus, the State argues that the total
amount of costs assessed with these additional fees should be $314.
We decline the State’s invitation to add these six other fees to the bill of costs
and limit our review to whether the costs assessed by the clerk’s office were
authorized by law. An argument requesting that new costs should be assessed
against a defendant is more properly suited for the trial court and the district clerk’s
office. Therefore, we overrule the State’s cross-issue and conclude that the costs
assessed against appellant should be reduced from $290 to $207.
In appellant’s second issue, he further argues that the judgment should be
modified to accurately reflect that the attorneys for the State were Megan Reed, State
Bar No. 24110260, and Marissa Hatchett, State Bar No. 24085486, not Christ
Crozier. And in his third and fourth issues, he argues that the judgment should
accurately reflect that he was convicted under sections 19.02(b)(1), (b)(2), and (d)
of the penal code, not just section 19.02 generally, and that his conviction was for a
second-degree felony because of the sudden passion finding, not a first-degree
felony. The State agrees, as do we, that the record supports the proposed
modifications by appellant.
5 See FORMER TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 133.107(a) (effective Sept. 1, 2011, through Dec. 31, 2019). 6 See FORMER TEX. GOV’T CODE § 51.851(d) (effective Sept. 1, 2015, through Dec. 31, 2019). –5– It is incumbent on the trial court and the district clerk’s office to issue
judgments that properly reflect what occurred in any given case. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. arts. 42.01 (setting out required provisions of a criminal judgment),
42.16 (providing judgment shall adjudge costs). It is also incumbent on the parties
to review the judgment for any errors and seek to correct such errors while the trial
court retains plenary power so that an accurate judgment can be presented on appeal.
This Court should not be tasked with correcting the trial court’s judgments time and
time again. Because the trial court’s judgment contains numerous errors as
discussed above, we sustain appellant’s four issues on appeal.
Conclusion
The judgment is modified as follows:
“Attorney for State: Christ Crozier 24050466” is modified to read, “Attorney for State: Megan Reed, 24110260, and Marissa Hatchett, 24085486”;
“Statute for Offense: 19.02 Penal Code” is modified to read, “Statute for Offense: 19.02(b)(1), (b)(2), and (d) Penal Code”;
“Degree of Offense: 1st Degree Felony” is modified to read, “Degree of Offense: 2nd Degree Felony”; and
“Court Costs: $290” is modified to read “Court Costs: $207.”
The bill of costs is also modified as follows:
“Jury Fee 1.00” is deleted;
“Court House Sec Fee 10.00” is modified to read, “Court House Sec Fee 5.00”;
–6– “Cons State Fees 185.00” is modified to read, “Cons State Fees 133.00”;
“Specialty Court 25.00” is deleted; and
“Initial Amount Due 290.00” is modified to read “Initial Amount Due 207.00.”
The “Amount Paid” and “Remaining Amount Due” will also need to be updated
based on the new initial amount due and any payments appellant has made while this
case has been pending on appeal.
As modified, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The trial court is
directed to prepare a corrected judgment and bill of costs that reflect the
modifications made in this Court’s opinion and judgment. See Shumate v. State, 649
S.W.3d 240, 245–46 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.). The corrected judgment
and bill of costs should be filed with this Court, provided to the parties, and sent to
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
/Craig Smith/ CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 230653F.U05
–7– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
KEVIN LARENZIN HENDERSON, On Appeal from the Criminal District Appellant Court No. 4, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F19-75007-K. No. 05-23-00653-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Miskel and Breedlove THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:
“Attorney for State: Christ Crozier 24050466” is modified to read, “Attorney for State: Megan Reed, 24110260, and Marissa Hatchett, 24085486”;
“Statute for Offense: 19.02 Penal Code” is modified to read, “Statute for Offense: 19.02(b)(1), (b)(2), and (d) Penal Code”;
“Degree of Offense: 1st Degree Felony” is modified to read, “Degree of Offense: 2nd Degree Felony”; and
“Court Costs: $290” is modified to read “Court Costs: $207.”
Additionally, the bill of costs is MODIFIED as follows:
“Court House Sec Fee 10.00” is modified to read, “Court House Sec Fee 5.00”;
–8– “Cons State Fees 185.00” is modified to read, “Cons State Fees 133.00”;
“Initial Amount Due 290.00” is modified to read “Initial Amount Due 207.00.”
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
We DIRECT the trial court to prepare a corrected judgment and bill of costs that reflect this modification. The corrected judgment and bill of costs should be filed with this Court, provided to the parties, and sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
Judgment entered this 1st day of August 2024.
–9–