IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1667 Filed December 15, 2021
KEVIN JACOB MUEHLENTHALER, Applicant-Appellee,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, James C. Ellefson,
Judge.
The State appeals the grant of a new trial to a postconviction-relief applicant
found guilty of sexual exploitation by a school employee. REVERSED AND
REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellant State.
Joseph R. Cahill of Cahill Law Offices, Nevada, for appellee.
Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and May, JJ. 2
TABOR, Judge.
A jury convicted Kevin Muehlenthaler of three counts of sexual exploitation
by a school employee. In postconviction-relief proceedings, the district court
determined Muehlenthaler received ineffective assistance of counsel and ordered
a new trial. Finding no prejudice from trial counsel’s performance, we reverse and
remand.
Muehlenthaler was a part-time band teacher at North Polk Elementary
School when Kate,1 a high school student, started volunteering in his class. Kate
testified she liked spending time in Mr. Muehlenthaler’s classroom because she
was “really stressed out” her senior year and appreciated sharing her worries with
an adult. But after a few months, the teacher became more than a sympathetic
ear. He pursued an intimate relationship with Kate, leading to sexual intercourse
at a motel. After that night at the motel, the sexual relationship continued for a few
months. But it ended when Muehlenthaler told Kate that his wife decided she
wanted to have children.
About a year after she graduated, Kate discovered Muehlenthaler had
started a new position as a high school band teacher in Chariton. Concerned that
Muehlenthaler would “be around teenage girls all the time,” Kate reported their
sexual relationship to one of her college professors. The professor tipped off
Muehlenthaler’s new school district.
1Because these events occurred when she was a minor, the student’s name is confidential. For readability, we choose to assign a randomly-generated pseudonym rather than use initials. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.25; Random Word Generator, https://randomwordgenerator.com/name.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2021). 3
The day after receiving this tip, Chariton Superintendent Paula Wright met
with Muehlenthaler. At the meeting, Muehlenthaler “didn’t act surprised.” He
acknowledged the allegations and volunteered that Kate acted inappropriately
around him, crossing boundaries that normally existed between students and
educators. He claimed that he reported Kate’s behavior to North Polk Principal
Donna Spence and sought advice from fellow North Polk teacher Mary Schmiltz.
Meanwhile, Kate reported Muehlenthaler’s conduct to police. The State charged
him with three counts of sexual exploitation by a school employee. And a jury
convicted him as charged.
On direct appeal, Muehlenthaler raised evidentiary challenges and six
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Muehlenthaler, No. 18-
0159, 2019 WL 761635, at *3–10 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2019). We affirmed his
convictions and preserved five of his ineffective-assistance claims for
postconviction relief. Id. at *10.
In his postconviction-relief petition, Muehlenthaler reprised the five
preserved claims and advanced four new ones. The district court granted relief,
finding trial counsel was ineffective in two ways: (1) by not challenging racially
insensitive comments credited to Muehlenthaler;2 and (2) by not objecting when
the prosecution introduced, by implication, unsworn, out-of-court statements.3 See
2 According to Kate’s testimony, Muehlenthaler joked about his fifth-grade student’s father being deported and mocked African Americans for eating fried chicken. 3 During Chariton Superintendent Paula Wright’s direct examination, the
prosecutor asked about her communication with North Polk Principal Donna Spence. Defense counsel objected, arguing the statements were hearsay, and the district court agreed. So the prosecution tried again, asking a similar question but prefacing it with “without saying what anyone told you.” 4
State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 495–97 (Iowa 2017) (discussing “backdoor”
hearsay).
The court decided these instances of ineffective assistance required a new
trial. The State now appeals, claiming Muehlenthaler did not prove his first trial
was constitutionally flawed.
To succeed on his claims, Muehlenthaler must show trial counsel “failed an
essential duty and that the failure resulted in prejudice.”4 State v. Schlitter, 881
N.W.2d 380, 388 (Iowa 2016). Failure to prove either prong will preclude relief.
State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017). Today we focus on prejudice.5
To establish prejudice, Muehlenthaler must show “a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). But that
probability doesn’t require a more-likely-than-not showing. State v. Clay, 824
N.W.2d 488, 496 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted). Instead, a “reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694.
After considering the evidence, we find no reasonable probability of a
different outcome based on the two alleged omissions in counsel’s performance.
The State’s case against Muehlenthaler was strong. See State v. Lorenzo
Baltazar, 935 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2019) (finding no reasonable probability that
4 We review postconviction-relief rulings for corrections of errors at law. Ruiz v. State, 912 N.W.2d 435, 439 (Iowa 2018). But we review ineffective-assistance claims de novo. Id. 5 We assume, without deciding, that counsel performed deficiently. 5
result of trial would have been different given overwhelming evidence of guilt).
Kate testified about her year-long relationship with this teacher. She testified that
she “felt like he was treating her like an adult” when he would tell her sexual jokes
and share details of his personal life. She also testified that he called her at strange
hours and sent sexually charged text messages.
By January, Muehlenthaler’s transgressions turned physical, grabbing her
breasts and “spooning” with her. And just one month later, he booked a motel
room for their first sexual encounter. According to Kate, over the next few months,
they had sex several more times before the relationship ended. A detective
testified that Kate was consistent throughout the conversations he had with her
about these events.
But the jury had even more than Kate’s word. The State offered
corroboration. For example, the jury saw phone records logging many late-night
calls between the student and teacher. And the State produced Kate’s drawings
that accurately depicted the locations where the sex acts occurred.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1667 Filed December 15, 2021
KEVIN JACOB MUEHLENTHALER, Applicant-Appellee,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, James C. Ellefson,
Judge.
The State appeals the grant of a new trial to a postconviction-relief applicant
found guilty of sexual exploitation by a school employee. REVERSED AND
REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellant State.
Joseph R. Cahill of Cahill Law Offices, Nevada, for appellee.
Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and May, JJ. 2
TABOR, Judge.
A jury convicted Kevin Muehlenthaler of three counts of sexual exploitation
by a school employee. In postconviction-relief proceedings, the district court
determined Muehlenthaler received ineffective assistance of counsel and ordered
a new trial. Finding no prejudice from trial counsel’s performance, we reverse and
remand.
Muehlenthaler was a part-time band teacher at North Polk Elementary
School when Kate,1 a high school student, started volunteering in his class. Kate
testified she liked spending time in Mr. Muehlenthaler’s classroom because she
was “really stressed out” her senior year and appreciated sharing her worries with
an adult. But after a few months, the teacher became more than a sympathetic
ear. He pursued an intimate relationship with Kate, leading to sexual intercourse
at a motel. After that night at the motel, the sexual relationship continued for a few
months. But it ended when Muehlenthaler told Kate that his wife decided she
wanted to have children.
About a year after she graduated, Kate discovered Muehlenthaler had
started a new position as a high school band teacher in Chariton. Concerned that
Muehlenthaler would “be around teenage girls all the time,” Kate reported their
sexual relationship to one of her college professors. The professor tipped off
Muehlenthaler’s new school district.
1Because these events occurred when she was a minor, the student’s name is confidential. For readability, we choose to assign a randomly-generated pseudonym rather than use initials. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.25; Random Word Generator, https://randomwordgenerator.com/name.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2021). 3
The day after receiving this tip, Chariton Superintendent Paula Wright met
with Muehlenthaler. At the meeting, Muehlenthaler “didn’t act surprised.” He
acknowledged the allegations and volunteered that Kate acted inappropriately
around him, crossing boundaries that normally existed between students and
educators. He claimed that he reported Kate’s behavior to North Polk Principal
Donna Spence and sought advice from fellow North Polk teacher Mary Schmiltz.
Meanwhile, Kate reported Muehlenthaler’s conduct to police. The State charged
him with three counts of sexual exploitation by a school employee. And a jury
convicted him as charged.
On direct appeal, Muehlenthaler raised evidentiary challenges and six
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Muehlenthaler, No. 18-
0159, 2019 WL 761635, at *3–10 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2019). We affirmed his
convictions and preserved five of his ineffective-assistance claims for
postconviction relief. Id. at *10.
In his postconviction-relief petition, Muehlenthaler reprised the five
preserved claims and advanced four new ones. The district court granted relief,
finding trial counsel was ineffective in two ways: (1) by not challenging racially
insensitive comments credited to Muehlenthaler;2 and (2) by not objecting when
the prosecution introduced, by implication, unsworn, out-of-court statements.3 See
2 According to Kate’s testimony, Muehlenthaler joked about his fifth-grade student’s father being deported and mocked African Americans for eating fried chicken. 3 During Chariton Superintendent Paula Wright’s direct examination, the
prosecutor asked about her communication with North Polk Principal Donna Spence. Defense counsel objected, arguing the statements were hearsay, and the district court agreed. So the prosecution tried again, asking a similar question but prefacing it with “without saying what anyone told you.” 4
State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 495–97 (Iowa 2017) (discussing “backdoor”
hearsay).
The court decided these instances of ineffective assistance required a new
trial. The State now appeals, claiming Muehlenthaler did not prove his first trial
was constitutionally flawed.
To succeed on his claims, Muehlenthaler must show trial counsel “failed an
essential duty and that the failure resulted in prejudice.”4 State v. Schlitter, 881
N.W.2d 380, 388 (Iowa 2016). Failure to prove either prong will preclude relief.
State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017). Today we focus on prejudice.5
To establish prejudice, Muehlenthaler must show “a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). But that
probability doesn’t require a more-likely-than-not showing. State v. Clay, 824
N.W.2d 488, 496 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted). Instead, a “reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694.
After considering the evidence, we find no reasonable probability of a
different outcome based on the two alleged omissions in counsel’s performance.
The State’s case against Muehlenthaler was strong. See State v. Lorenzo
Baltazar, 935 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2019) (finding no reasonable probability that
4 We review postconviction-relief rulings for corrections of errors at law. Ruiz v. State, 912 N.W.2d 435, 439 (Iowa 2018). But we review ineffective-assistance claims de novo. Id. 5 We assume, without deciding, that counsel performed deficiently. 5
result of trial would have been different given overwhelming evidence of guilt).
Kate testified about her year-long relationship with this teacher. She testified that
she “felt like he was treating her like an adult” when he would tell her sexual jokes
and share details of his personal life. She also testified that he called her at strange
hours and sent sexually charged text messages.
By January, Muehlenthaler’s transgressions turned physical, grabbing her
breasts and “spooning” with her. And just one month later, he booked a motel
room for their first sexual encounter. According to Kate, over the next few months,
they had sex several more times before the relationship ended. A detective
testified that Kate was consistent throughout the conversations he had with her
about these events.
But the jury had even more than Kate’s word. The State offered
corroboration. For example, the jury saw phone records logging many late-night
calls between the student and teacher. And the State produced Kate’s drawings
that accurately depicted the locations where the sex acts occurred.
Even more telling, though, were two pieces of corroborating evidence that
are difficult to explain away. First, Kate testified that when they were having sex
she saw Muehlenthaler’s insulin pump, which he wears on his buttocks under his
clothes. Second, despite using another student’s name as an alias, Muehlenthaler
left clues to his own identity when registering at the motel. During check-in, he
provided the motel clerk with his cell phone number and the address of an
apartment that he rented years before meeting Kate. And neither Kate nor the
student whose name Muehenthaler borrowed had any reason to know his former
address. Given the strength of that corroboration, Kate’s isolated reference to 6
Muehlenthaler’s bigoted humor did not create the reasonable probability of a
different outcome.
As for the backdoor hearsay, Muehlenthaler insists he was prejudiced by
Paula Wright’s testimony. As he sees it, her inadmissible testimony undermined
his claims that he reported Kate to his principal and a fellow teacher. But the State
offered what was, in essence, the same information through Dr. Daniel Mart. He
testified that he knew nothing about Muehlenthaler reporting Kate’s inappropriate
comments. And if a teacher had reported a student making sexual advances, the
district would have investigated and, as superintendent, he would have been
notified. Because the disputed testimony was cumulative of other testimony, its
admission does not undermine our confidence in the jury’s verdicts. See State v.
Schaer, 757 N.W.2d 630, 638 (Iowa 2008).
Given the strength of the State’s case, trial counsel’s assumed deficiencies
did not result in prejudice. The postconviction court erred in granting relief.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.