Kevin Hagan v. Dr. Grace Woo, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00116
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 KEVIN HAGAN, 1:25-CV-00116-JLT-EPG (PC)

11 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 12 RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION v. BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO 13 STATE A CLAIM DR. GRACE WOO, et al.,

14 (ECF No. 15) Defendants. 15 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 16 THIRTY DAYS 17 18 Plaintiff Kevin Hagan is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 19 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed an initial 20 complaint alleging that he was denied proper medical care while incarcerated and that CDCR 21 was retaliating against him for his prior lawsuits. (ECF No. 1). On June 24, 2025, the Court 22 screened Plaintiff’s complaint, found that the complaint failed to state any cognizable claims, 23 and gave Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 12). 24 On August 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (ECF No. 15). 25 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges Defendant Woo has access to Plaintiff’s medical file 26 that includes his medical tests a recommendation for a surgery, but that Defendant Woo is 27 failing to provide the fusion that is recommended or provide Plaintiff with adequate pain 28 1 medication. Separately, Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Doe and 5 Doe officers confined him to a 2 holding cell for over three hours while he was “chained up.” (ECF No. 15 at 3-4). 3 Upon review, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint be 4 dismissed for failure to state a claim without further leave to amend. 5 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 6 As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court screens the complaint under 28 7 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 10). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may 8 have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the 9 action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. 10 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 11 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 12 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 13 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 14 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 15 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 16 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. 17 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting 18 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are 19 not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 20 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s 21 legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 22 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 23 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 24 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 25 II. BACKGROUND 26 A. Plaintiff’s Initial Complaint and Screening Order 27 Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on January 28, 2025. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s 28 complaint named Dr. Grace Woo as the sole defendant. (Id. at p. 1). Plaintiff claimed that 1 Defendant Woo failed to provide him with back surgery and adequate pain medication. 2 On June 24, 2025, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and issued a screening order 3 finding Plaintiff had failed to state a claim and granting Plaintiff leave to file a first amended 4 complaint. (ECF No. 12). The screening order provided the legal standards for an Eighth 5 Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and a First Amendment 6 claim of retaliation. 7 B. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint 8 On August 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. (ECF No. 15). Plaintiff 9 again names Dr. Grace Woo as a defendant and additionally names Lt. Doe and 5 Doe officers 10 as defendants. 11 Plaintiff’s first claim states: Dr. Woo had access to my medical file that has all my MRI, cat-scan, and nerve 12 study reports, along with specialist Dr. Frank Yoo’s medical diagnosis and 13 recommendations, Dr. Farr orthopedic surgeon report, and over 5 medical requests complaining of being in severe pain and knowing all these facts she 14 failed to give me adequate pain medication or order said fusions Doctor Woo stated I needed cruel and unusual punishment also for approving me to be 15 transferring to a prison that took over 15 hours to me being in my wheelchair in 16 excruciating pain. 17 (ECF No. 15, at p. 3-4). 18 Plaintiff’s second claim states: I was placed in a holding cell, chained up for over 3 yours. I’m EOP in the 19 mental health program, making these actions criminal. 20 (ECF No. 15, at p. 4). 21 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 22 A. Section 1983 Legal Standards 23 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows: 24 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 25 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 26 jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 27 action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 28 1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 2 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 3 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see 4 also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los 5 Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 6 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 7 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under 8 color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or 9 federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 10 Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of 11 state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, 12 ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an 13 act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” 14 Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) 15 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal 16 connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which 17 the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” 18 Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of 19 causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” 20 Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 21 of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 22 A plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 23 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must be an actual 24 connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have 25 been suffered by the plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 26 691, 695 (1978). 27 B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs 28 Plaintiff’s first claim concerns Dr. Woo’s medical care. 1 “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an 2 inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 3 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires 4 Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need' by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a 5 prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 6 infliction of pain,’” and (2) that “the defendant's response to the need was deliberately 7 indifferent.” Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992)) 8 (citation and internal quotations marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by WMX 9 Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 10 Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of 11 and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 12 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 13 Deliberate indifference can be established “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to 14 respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” 15 Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted). Civil recklessness (failure “to act in the face of an 16 unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known”) is 17 insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 18 836-37 (1994) (citations omitted). 19 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to provide sufficient facts to support a 20 constitutional claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under these standards. 21 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Woo has failed to provide adequate pain medication or 22 order “said fusions” that Dr. Yoo stated Plaintiff needed. However, Plaintiff does not identify 23 his medical condition or allege facts indicating that he has a serious medical need. Nor does 24 Plaintiff describe what pain medication he currently receives or why it is inadequate. 25 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint also does not provide sufficient facts to indicate that 26 Dr. Woo acted with deliberate indifference. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Woo is a “doctor at 27 SATF, Corcoran,” but does not otherwise explain who she is or what her role is in providing 28 1 Plaintiff’s medical care. Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating that she had the authority or 2 responsibility to provide him with a fusion or additional pain medication. 3 Plaintiff also does not allege facts indicating that Dr. Woo knew of and disregarded an 4 excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Woo had access to his medical file, 5 but does not allege that she reviewed these documents or had a responsibility to do so. Plaintiff 6 also does not allege anything about the circumstances of her medical care with Plaintiff, such as 7 how she responded to any request for medical treatment or her reasons for failing to provide the 8 care that Plaintiff seeks. 9 Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his prison transfer also fail to state a constitutional 10 claim. Plaintiff states that Dr. Woo is also liable for “approving me to be transferred to a prison 11 that took over 15 hours to me being in my wheelchair in excruciating pain.” (ECF No. 15, p. 12 4). But Plaintiff does not include facts that indicate he had a serious medical need related to his 13 prison transfer, nor that Dr. Woo was deliberately indifferent to any such medical need. 14 Plaintiff alleges that he was in pain, but he does not allege that Dr. Woo was deliberately 15 indifferent to that pain. 16 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state an 17 Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.1 18 C. Conditions of Confinement 19 Plaintiff’s second claim concerns his temporary restraint by Doe Defendants. 20 “It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions 21 under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. 22 McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) 23 (Prison officials “must provide humane conditions of confinement . . . and must ‘take 24 reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’”). Conditions of confinement 25 may, consistent with the Constitution, be restrictive and harsh. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 26 27 1 The Court notes that Plaintiff has a pending case in this Court concerning his request for back surgery and pain medication, which includes a claim for injunctive relief against Joseph Bick, the Director of Health Care Services 28 for California Correctional Health Care Service (CCHCS), in his official capacity. See Hagan v. Recary et al, 1:22-cv-00562-JLT-EPG-PC. 1 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); see also Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996) (“every 2 injury suffered by an inmate does not necessarily translate into constitutional liability for prison 3 officials”). The Eighth Amendment requires that the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, 4 even if harsh, have some legitimate penological purpose. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 5 584 (1984). However, “prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided 6 adequate shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. 7 Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). 8 “An Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official must meet two requirements, 9 one subjective and one objective.” Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 937. “First, the deprivation must be, 10 objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted). Second, 11 “prison officials must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which for conditions-of- 12 confinement claims, “is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal 13 quotation marks and citation omitted). A prison official acts with deliberate indifference when 14 he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official 15 must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 16 serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. 17 “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim. 18 Because routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses 19 against society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's 20 necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” 21 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 22 Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not allege facts that would constitute an 23 unconstitutional condition of confinement under these legal standards. Plaintiff alleges that Lt. 24 Doe and 5 Doe officers placed Plaintiff in a holding cell and “chained him up” for three hours. 25 However, Plaintiff does not allege any facts that would indicate inhumane conditions during 26 this temporary period of confinement. Plaintiff also does not allege that these conditions 27 caused him harm. 28 Moreover, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does not allege any facts indicating that 1 any defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his health of safety through his 2 confinement. Plaintiff does not allege why he was confined in a holding cell or restricted. 3 Plaintiff also does not allege that any defendant was aware that his confinement could cause 4 him injury. 5 Thus, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state a claim for unconstitutional 6 conditions of confinement. See Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) 7 (“[A]lthough Frost complains about the ... conditions in the temporary holding cell, he has not 8 shown that such circumstances ultimately deprived him of the ‘minimal civilized measures of 9 life's necessities.”); Stafford v. Doss, et al., No. 2:16-CV-1403-JAM-DMC) 2021 WL 3563490, 10 at *1, report and recommendation adopted (E.D. Cal., Sept. 24, 2021, No. 2:16-CV-1403-JAM- 11 DMC), 2021 WL 3563490, *12 (E.D. Cal., Aug. 21, 2021) (finding that a four-hour placement 12 in a holding cell does not satisfy the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment violation); 13 Evans v. Cruz, (C.D. Cal., Jan. 25, 2018, No. CV 15-4047-JFW (JEM)) 2018 WL 2716918, at 14 *5, report and recommendation adopted (C.D. Cal., June 1, 2018, No. CV 15-4047-JFW 15 (JEM)) 2018 WL 2670634 (“Plaintiff fails to allege any facts indicating anything more than a 16 brief time spent in a holding cell with metal benches and without a toilet and drinking water. . . 17 .Plaintiff also does not allege that he suffered any substantial harm as a result of temporary 18 placement in the holding cell that was caused by the conditions of which Plaintiff complains.”). 19 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 20 For these reasons, the Court recommends that this action be dismissed with prejudice 21 for failure to state a claim. The Court screened Plaintiff’s original complaint, provided Plaintiff 22 with relevant legal standards, and provided Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint. 23 Thus, it appears that further leave to amend would be futile. 24 Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that: 25 1. This case be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which 26 relief may be granted; and 27 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. 28 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district 1 || judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 2 || thirty (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file 3 || written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to 4 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 5 || objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 6 || Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 7 || 9th Cir. 1991)). 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 | Dated: _ October 28, 2025 [Je heey — 11 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28