Kevin Fitzpatrick v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 23, 1999
Docket03-98-00692-CR
StatusPublished

This text of Kevin Fitzpatrick v. State (Kevin Fitzpatrick v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kevin Fitzpatrick v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN




NO. 03-98-00692-CR
Kevin Fitzpatrick, Appellant


v.



The State of Texas, Appellee



FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 7 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. 496,552, HONORABLE CLAUDE D. DAVIS, JUDGE PRESIDING

After appellant Kevin Fitzpatrick waived a jury trial, the court found him guilty of assault and assessed punishment at confinement in county jail for forty-five days. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1) (West 1994). Appellant raises one issue challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We will affirm the conviction.

Background

On December 31, 1997, appellant and his wife, Michelle Fitzpatrick, went out to celebrate the new year. In the early morning hours of January 1, 1998, they received a phone call from their babysitter asking them to return home because their three-year-old son was ill. Not long after they returned and while the babysitter was still at the house, appellant told Michelle he was going to return to the bar where they had been celebrating. Michelle became upset and the two argued. As appellant went outside to leave, Michelle followed him. At trial, the witnesses presented different versions of what occurred before appellant drove away from the house.

Michael Morton, a deputy with the Travis County Sheriff's Office, testified that on January 1 at about 3:15 a.m., he and a female deputy responded to a call from Michelle. When they arrived at the Fitzpatrick home, Michelle was upset and crying and the babysitter was present; appellant was not at the house. Michelle told Morton that appellant assaulted her by hitting her with his hand causing bruises on her face and scratches on her chest. The babysitter also told Morton that she saw appellant assault Michelle. Because Michelle told Morton that appellant hit her, Morton had EMS attendants who were also at the Fitzpatricks' take photographs of Michelle's injuries. The photographs were admitted at trial.

Michelle's version was that she followed appellant outside and asked him not to leave the house. She explained that "[I] slapped him and pushed him, and then he, you know, pushed me back. And that's really about all I remember." She testified later that appellant pushed against her chest and she fell to the ground. She called police after appellant drove away because she was scared and did not know what appellant would do when he returned since she and appellant had "never argued that bad before." She wanted the police to "just make him leave for the night until he got sober." When questioned about what she told police that night, she could not recall. Specifically, she could not recall telling police who hit whom first. She testified that the EMS photographs accurately reflected her appearance the night of the incident.



The babysitter testified that she was in the house when Michelle and appellant started arguing. She went to the door as appellant and Michelle went outside. She came back inside when she heard screaming and yelling. After appellant drove away in his truck, Michelle came back in the house crying and told her what happened. The babysitter, however, could not recall what Michelle told her. She stated that she "probably" told police she saw appellant hit Michelle. She definitely recalled telling police that appellant yelled at Michelle to "get up" after she fell to the ground and that appellant then drove away in his truck. She never saw Michelle hit appellant. Additionally, the babysitter stated that the photographs taken that night by EMS accurately reflected Michelle's appearance the night of the incident.

Appellant's version was that as he was getting into his truck, Michelle began slapping him. In trying to get her away from him so that he could leave, he reacted and slapped her on the side of the face. In trying to get her to step back so he could close the truck door, he pushed her. He realized that he pushed her too hard and tried to stop her from falling by grabbing her shirt. She nevertheless fell to the ground after which he told her to "get up." As he drove away he heard Michelle say she was calling the police. Appellant also testified about their relative sizes; he weighed about 280 pounds while Michelle weighed about 120 pounds. While Michelle sustained bruises, scratches and cuts, appellant was uninjured.



Discussion

Appellant contends that the evidence raised the issue of self-defense because initially Michelle hit him and she continued to hit him several times before he finally struck her once ending the conflict. He contends that Michelle's use of force was unlawful and that he had no alternative but to respond by hitting her.

One is justified in using force against another when and to the degree one reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary for protection against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31(a) (West 1994). A defendant has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to raise the issue of self-defense. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Shelvin v. State, 884 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, pet. ref'd). The State has the burden of proving assault beyond a reasonable doubt and is not required to produce evidence refuting a self-defense claim. Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913. Once raised, the issue of self-defense is a question to be determined by the fact finder. Id. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, an appellate court, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The trier of fact, in this case the trial court, is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and is free to accept or reject all or part of any witness's testimony. Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The fact finder may draw reasonable inferences and make reasonable deductions from the evidence. Benavides v. State, 763 S.W.2d 587, 588-89 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, pet. ref'd).

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Saxton v. State
804 S.W.2d 910 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Geesa v. State
820 S.W.2d 154 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)
Griffin v. State
614 S.W.2d 155 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1981)
Adelman v. State
828 S.W.2d 418 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1992)
Bowden v. State
628 S.W.2d 782 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1982)
Shelvin v. State
884 S.W.2d 874 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1994)
Miller v. State
909 S.W.2d 586 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1995)
Benavides v. State
763 S.W.2d 587 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1988)

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Kevin Fitzpatrick v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kevin-fitzpatrick-v-state-texapp-1999.