Kevin Creme Rita v. Warden, North Florida Detention Facility, et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

KEVIN CREME RITA,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-1294-JEP-SJH

WARDEN, NORTH FLORIDA DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,

Respondents. ___________________________________/

ORDER Petitioner, a detainee of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking, among other relief, an order directing Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or alternatively, to release him. (See Doc. 1 at 1, 6).1 Petitioner, a citizen of Cuba, alleges that he entered the United States on September 28, 2023, and was granted parole. (Id. at 2–3; Doc 1-1 at 3). ICE re-encountered Petitioner on March 8, 2026, following a traffic stop. (Doc. 1 at 3). The Federal Respondents expressly recognize that Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami,

1 It appears that Petitioner is now represented by counsel. (See generally Doc. 11). However, Petitioner’s counsel has not filed a reply to the Federal Respondents’ response on his behalf. 175 F.4th 1258, 1276 (11th Cir. 2026) “controls the outcome of this matter.” (Doc. 8 at 2). Additionally, they maintain that, because “the Court may resolve

the petition on the statutory question, it need not proceed to evaluate any other claims raised in the Petition.” (Id.). This Court previously addressed claims and arguments similar to those raised in this case, concluding that the Court has jurisdiction, but the relevant

statutory language and context support the Federal Respondents’ position that an alien without lawful admission who has resided in the United States for some appreciable period of time is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Diaz Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t of Removal Operations,

817 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2026); see also Lozano Sousa v. Ripa, No. 3:25- cv-1617-JEP-PDB, 2026 WL 958794 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2026). However, on May 6, 2026, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took the opposite approach on the substantive issue under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),

concluding that “§ 1225 applies to arriving aliens seeking entry at the border, whereas § 1226 applies to aliens unlawfully in the interior.” Hernandez Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1276.2 As mentioned above, the Federal Respondents F

2 Although the mandate has not yet issued, the Eleventh Circuit’s published opinion has immediate precedential effect. See Martin v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 944, 945 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that a published opinion “is the law in this circuit unless and until it is reversed, overruled, vacated, or otherwise modified by the Supreme Court of the United States or by [the Eleventh Circuit] sitting en banc,” and that a stay of the mandate “in no way affects the duty of . . . the courts in this circuit to apply now the precedent established by” the published opinion “as binding concede that this Court is bound by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in this case. (Doc. 8 at 1–2).3

Therefore, it is ORDERED: 1. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) is GRANTED as to Petitioner’s claim that his detention without an individualized bond hearing violates the INA.4 Within F seven days of this Order, Respondents shall either afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or release Petitioner. If Respondents release Petitioner, they shall facilitate his transportation from the detention facility

by notifying his counsel when and where he can be collected.

authority”); 11th Cir. IOP—Cir. R. 36.2 (“Under the law of this circuit, published opinions are binding precedent. The issuance or non-issuance of the mandate does not affect this result.”). 3 While the opinion did not specifically address the circumstance of an individual, like Petitioner, who had been paroled into the country and whose parole had since expired, the reasoning of the opinion is equally applicable to Petitioner. Petitioner was detained within the interior of the United States—not at the border. See Hernandez Alvarez, 175 F.4th at 1285 (recognizing “the longstanding border- interior distinction for purposes of [immigration] detention”). And he was not “seeking lawful entry after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer”— indeed, he was “not applying for entry in any literal sense when [he was] detained following a traffic stop.” Id. at 1269 (some internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Because the Court grants relief on Petitioner’s claim under the INA, the Court need not address Petitioner’s other claims. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 689 n.10 (2004) (declining to address an additional claim in a habeas petition after granting relief on another claim because “any relief [petitioner] could obtain on that claim would be cumulative”). 2. The Warden’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 10) is DENIED for the same

reasons stated in Lanvin-Valdez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft, No. 3:26-CV-180-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 1004569, at *2—3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2026). 3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment granting the petition, terminate any pending motions as moot, and close this case. DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on July 1, 2026.

□ JORDAN E. PRATT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Counsel of Record