Kevin Brown v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 21, 2023
DocketNY-0752-17-0108-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Kevin Brown v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Kevin Brown v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kevin Brown v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

KEVIN BROWN, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, NY-0752-17-0108-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: April 21, 2023 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Kevin Brown, Bronx, New York, pro se.

Christopher P. Richins, Esquire, Brooklyn, New York, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which affirmed his indefinite suspension. On petition for review, the appellant argues

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2 Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure. 2

that the administrative judge improperly imposed sanctions that dismissed his affirmative defenses as abandoned. He also argues that the administrative judge erred in finding that the agency established that it had reasonable cause to believe that he had committed a crime for which a term of imprisonment could be imposed. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to clarify the reasonable cause analysis, we AFFIRM the initial decision. ¶2 The appellant challenges the imposition of sanctions, claiming that he failed to comply with the administrative judge’s orders due to technica l difficulties with e-Appeal Online. Even if the appellant experienced the technical difficulties he describes, however, he has not explained how these alleged difficulties prevented him from complying with her orders. Significantly, the appellant succes sfully uploaded a pleading in response to the show cause orders on May 9, 2017, and the administrative judge considered this pleading prior to dismissing his affirmative defenses. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tabs 9-10. The appellant has not explained how his alleged technical difficulties with e-Appeal Online prevented him in any way from substantively responding to the administrative judge’s show cause orders in his successfully uploaded pleading, and he did not mention these alleged 3

difficulties at the time he filed the pleading. Moreover, the administrative judge’s first show cause order contained an explicit warning that a failure to substantively respond to her order with the requested information could result in the dismissal of his affirmative defenses as abandoned. IAF, Tab 7. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion. See Heckman v. Department of the Interior, 106 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 16 (2007) (finding that the administrative judge did not abuse her discretion by dismissing the appellant’s aff irmative defenses for failure to prosecute when the appellant did not comply with multiple orders over a period of 2 1/2 months). ¶3 As to the appellant’s challenge to the administrative judge’s finding that the agency established that it had reasonable cause to believe that he had committed a crime for which a term of imprisonment could be imposed, we modify the initial decision as follows, still concluding that the agency met its burden. In the initial decision, the administrative judge based her conclusion that the agency established reasonable cause largely on the fact that the appellant was arrested and arraigned on several criminal charges, one of which was punishable by imprisonment up to 7 years. IAF, Tab 24, Initial Decision at 6-7. However, relying on an arrest and arraignment alone is insufficient to establish reasonable cause in the context of an indefinite suspension. See Barresi v. U.S. Postal Service, 65 M.S.P.R. 656, 662-63, 666 (1994). Rather, the agency must take some affirmative action on its own to satisfy itself that there was reasonable cause to believe that a crime was committed for which imprisonment could be imposed. Id. at 666 (citing Dunnington v. Department of Justice, 956 F.2d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). ¶4 Here, the record demonstrates that the agency conducted its own investigation of the appellant’s conduct that led to his arrest and arraignment and that it considered this evidence in proposing and sustaining the appellant’s indefinite suspension. In reaching his decision to sustain the indefinite suspension, the deciding official considered the materials contained in the 4

evidence file. IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4c at 1. In addition to evidence related to the appellant’s arrest and arraignment, the materials included a sworn statement from the agency’s own Criminal Investigator summarizing his investigation of the appellant’s alleged conduct, including statements from several witnesses, a confession from the appellant’s alleged coconspirator that implicated the appellant, and a description of video footage that subs tantiated the confession. IAF, Tab 6, Subtab 4e. At the hearing, the deciding official testified that he read the Criminal Investigator’s report and the witness statements included in the report. Hearing Recording (testimony of the deciding official). He further testified that he believed that the statements from the witnesses interviewed by the Criminal Investigator were reliable, including the confession from the appellant’s alleged coconspirator. Id. He concluded, based on all the evidence presented to him, that there was reasonable cause to believe that the appellant had committed the crimes for which he was arrested and arraigned and for which a term of imprisonment could be imposed. Id. Under these circumstances, we find that the agency’s consideration of the appellant’s arrest and arraignment, in conjunction with the results of its own investigation, is sufficient to establish reasonable cause. See Dunnington, 956 F.2d at 1156-58 (finding the reasonable cause standard met when, in addition to four arrest warrants, the agency considered factual material culled from four criminal complaints and statements from complaining witnesses supporting the criminal complaints ). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R.

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Related

Earl v. Dunnington, III v. Department of Justice
956 F.2d 1151 (Federal Circuit, 1992)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
Kevin Brown v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kevin-brown-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2023.