KEVIN B WILLIAMS, Case No. 25-cv-09527-HSG Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER v. Re: Dkt. No. 1 TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS INC., et al., Defendants. Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Kevin B. Williams’s motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). See Dkt. No. 1 (“Mot.”). The Court DENIES the request. On November 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant Transworld is unlawfully attempting to collect on disputed charges from Plaintiff’s medical procedure at UCSF and is threatening to furnish allegedly inaccurate credit data. See Dkt. No. 2 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1–2. Plaintiff brings claims for financial elder abuse and violation of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, the Rosenthal Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, and the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act. Id. ¶¶ 20–39. Plaintiff also appears to assert some or all of these claims against the Regents of the University of California. Dkt. No. 7.1 Plaintiff seeks a TRO preventing Defendant Transworld from (1) collecting or attempting 1 Plaintiff filed Dkt. No. 7 after filing his TRO motion with the title “First Amended Complaint.” Despite this title, it does not include any factual allegations or causes of action. See generally Dkt. No. 7. Instead, it seeks to add the Regents of the University of California to the original complaint, Dkt. No. 2, apparently intending to supplement that pleading. But “an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders it without legal effect.” See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). While Plaintiff will need to amend his to collect on Plaintiff’s UCSF account; (2) furnishing or continuing to furnish information about Plaintiff’s UCSF account; and (3) selling or assigning Plaintiff’s account. See Mot. at 6. The Court ordered Plaintiff to serve Defendant Transworld by November 13, 2025, and ordered Defendant Transworld to respond by November 20, 2025. Dkt. No. 6 at 2. Plaintiff emailed Defendant Transworld and detailed his attempts at service, as ordered. Dkt. No. 8 (notice and declaration regarding service). Defendant did not respond. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a temporary restraining order may enjoin conduct pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order and issuing a preliminary injunction are substantially identical. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff seeking preliminary relief must normally establish: (1) that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in its favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Preliminary relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22. A court must find that “a certain threshold showing” is made on each of the four required elements. Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the Ninth Circuit’s sliding scale approach, a preliminary injunction may issue if there are “serious questions going to the merits” and “a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the [movant], . . . so long as the [movant] also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff argues that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm because “[d]erogatory credit furnishing threatens credit, housing, and essential access,” and “coercive collection injures a senior on SSDI—harms not compensable by money.” Mot. at 4. While his original motion did Plaintiff’s credit data, Plaintiff claims in his notice of service that Transworld would begin reporting on November 16, 2025. Dkt. No. 8 at 2. In the same notice, Plaintiff further argues that “medical debt reporting distorts creditworthiness and creates non-economic harms (credit denials, higher borrowing costs, reputational injury) that money cannot adequately remedy.” Id. These allegations are not enough for Plaintiff to show that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent the extraordinary remedy of a TRO. “[E]conomic injury alone does not support a finding of irreparable harm, because such injury can be remedied by a damage award.” Rent-A- Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television and Appliance Rental, Inc. 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991). While the Court acknowledges the financial impact that negative credit reporting can have, “[m]ere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough,” and “[t]he possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (quotation omitted). For these reasons, courts presented with similar TRO applications have typically found that the plaintiff has not shown irreparable harm and noted that “harms to [a plaintiff’s] credit score and finances more broadly are fundamentally economic harms, unsuitable for a temporary restraining order.” See Silva v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. CV 24-06367-MWF (EX), 2025 WL 819076, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2025); Brinker v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., No. 13-CV- 01344-LHK, 2013 WL 7798675, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2013) (noting that “reporting erroneous and derogatory credit information” was “not likely to cause Plaintiff to suffer irreparable harm”); Perry v. Exeter Fin. LLC, No. CV-25-01552-PHX-DWL, 2025 WL 1839457, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2025) (holding that denial of financial opportunities, costs incurred due to a lack of financing, and “conclusory and unsubstantiated” allegations of reputational damage did not show likely irreparable harm). Plaintiff argues that “loss of goodwill, reputation, and control” are “irreparable harms not readily compensable with money.” Dkt. No. 8 at 3 (citing Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t 1 irreparable harm,” Herb Reed, 736 F.3d at 1250, Plaintiff has only made conclusory assertions that 2 his reputation will be impacted by Transworld’s potential actions. Plaintiff thus fails to establish a 3 likelihood of irreparable harm so as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of a temporary restraining 4 order, and the Court need not reach any of the other factors. See Oakland Trib., Inc. v. Chron. 5 Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Because [Plaintiff] has not made that minimum 6 showing [that there exists a significant threat of irreparable injury,] we need not decide whether 7 [his claim] is likely to succeed on the merits.”). 9 The Court DENIES Plaintiff's TRO application, Dkt. No. 1. The Court also ORDERS 10 Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 21 days that properly describes the factual 11 allegations and causes of action against both Defendants in a single complaint.”
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KEVIN B WILLIAMS, Case No. 25-cv-09527-HSG Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER v. Re: Dkt. No. 1 TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS INC., et al., Defendants. Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Kevin B. Williams’s motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). See Dkt. No. 1 (“Mot.”). The Court DENIES the request. On November 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant Transworld is unlawfully attempting to collect on disputed charges from Plaintiff’s medical procedure at UCSF and is threatening to furnish allegedly inaccurate credit data. See Dkt. No. 2 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1–2. Plaintiff brings claims for financial elder abuse and violation of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, the Rosenthal Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, and the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act. Id. ¶¶ 20–39. Plaintiff also appears to assert some or all of these claims against the Regents of the University of California. Dkt. No. 7.1 Plaintiff seeks a TRO preventing Defendant Transworld from (1) collecting or attempting 1 Plaintiff filed Dkt. No. 7 after filing his TRO motion with the title “First Amended Complaint.” Despite this title, it does not include any factual allegations or causes of action. See generally Dkt. No. 7. Instead, it seeks to add the Regents of the University of California to the original complaint, Dkt. No. 2, apparently intending to supplement that pleading. But “an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders it without legal effect.” See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). While Plaintiff will need to amend his to collect on Plaintiff’s UCSF account; (2) furnishing or continuing to furnish information about Plaintiff’s UCSF account; and (3) selling or assigning Plaintiff’s account. See Mot. at 6. The Court ordered Plaintiff to serve Defendant Transworld by November 13, 2025, and ordered Defendant Transworld to respond by November 20, 2025. Dkt. No. 6 at 2. Plaintiff emailed Defendant Transworld and detailed his attempts at service, as ordered. Dkt. No. 8 (notice and declaration regarding service). Defendant did not respond. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a temporary restraining order may enjoin conduct pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order and issuing a preliminary injunction are substantially identical. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff seeking preliminary relief must normally establish: (1) that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in its favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Preliminary relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22. A court must find that “a certain threshold showing” is made on each of the four required elements. Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the Ninth Circuit’s sliding scale approach, a preliminary injunction may issue if there are “serious questions going to the merits” and “a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the [movant], . . . so long as the [movant] also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff argues that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm because “[d]erogatory credit furnishing threatens credit, housing, and essential access,” and “coercive collection injures a senior on SSDI—harms not compensable by money.” Mot. at 4. While his original motion did Plaintiff’s credit data, Plaintiff claims in his notice of service that Transworld would begin reporting on November 16, 2025. Dkt. No. 8 at 2. In the same notice, Plaintiff further argues that “medical debt reporting distorts creditworthiness and creates non-economic harms (credit denials, higher borrowing costs, reputational injury) that money cannot adequately remedy.” Id. These allegations are not enough for Plaintiff to show that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent the extraordinary remedy of a TRO. “[E]conomic injury alone does not support a finding of irreparable harm, because such injury can be remedied by a damage award.” Rent-A- Center, Inc. v. Canyon Television and Appliance Rental, Inc. 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991). While the Court acknowledges the financial impact that negative credit reporting can have, “[m]ere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough,” and “[t]he possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (quotation omitted). For these reasons, courts presented with similar TRO applications have typically found that the plaintiff has not shown irreparable harm and noted that “harms to [a plaintiff’s] credit score and finances more broadly are fundamentally economic harms, unsuitable for a temporary restraining order.” See Silva v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. CV 24-06367-MWF (EX), 2025 WL 819076, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2025); Brinker v. JP Morgan Chase, N.A., No. 13-CV- 01344-LHK, 2013 WL 7798675, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2013) (noting that “reporting erroneous and derogatory credit information” was “not likely to cause Plaintiff to suffer irreparable harm”); Perry v. Exeter Fin. LLC, No. CV-25-01552-PHX-DWL, 2025 WL 1839457, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 30, 2025) (holding that denial of financial opportunities, costs incurred due to a lack of financing, and “conclusory and unsubstantiated” allegations of reputational damage did not show likely irreparable harm). Plaintiff argues that “loss of goodwill, reputation, and control” are “irreparable harms not readily compensable with money.” Dkt. No. 8 at 3 (citing Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t 1 irreparable harm,” Herb Reed, 736 F.3d at 1250, Plaintiff has only made conclusory assertions that 2 his reputation will be impacted by Transworld’s potential actions. Plaintiff thus fails to establish a 3 likelihood of irreparable harm so as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of a temporary restraining 4 order, and the Court need not reach any of the other factors. See Oakland Trib., Inc. v. Chron. 5 Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Because [Plaintiff] has not made that minimum 6 showing [that there exists a significant threat of irreparable injury,] we need not decide whether 7 [his claim] is likely to succeed on the merits.”). 9 The Court DENIES Plaintiff's TRO application, Dkt. No. 1. The Court also ORDERS 10 Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 21 days that properly describes the factual 11 allegations and causes of action against both Defendants in a single complaint.” a 12 The Court further advises Plaintiff, who is representing himself, that he can seek assistance
13 at the Legal Help Center if he desires assistance complying with this order. The Legal Help
v 14 || Center provides free information and limited-scope legal assistance to pro se litigants. More
15 information about the Legal Help Center is provided at https://cand.uscourts.gov/representing- 16 yourself. Telephone appointments may be scheduled either over the phone at (415) 782-8982 or
= 17 by email at FedPro @ sfbar.org.
Z 18 20 Dated: 11/26/2025
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 22 United States District Judge 23 24 2 While it appears that Plaintiff has given Defendants notice of the TRO application consistent 25 with this Court’s order, Dkt. No. 6, he must still serve Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Failure to do so within 90 days after the complaint is filed may result in 26 dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). A plaintiff may serve a corporation by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an agent “authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of 97 process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Alternatively, service may be made “by . . . following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where 28 the district court is located or where service is made.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4ch)(1)(A) ; Cal. Civ. Code § 416.10.