Kettell v. Alliance Insurance

76 Mass. 144
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedNovember 15, 1857
StatusPublished

This text of 76 Mass. 144 (Kettell v. Alliance Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kettell v. Alliance Insurance, 76 Mass. 144 (Mass. 1857).

Opinion

Shaw, C. J.

[After stating the other facts.] It appears by the accounts of the sales of the tin, that the net proceeds, after deducting the necessary costs and expenses of raising and sending them to Liverpool and the costs of sale, were less than half of the value of the shipment, though the gross sales without such deduction would exceed half the value. But the court are of opinion that the costs and charges ought to be thus deducted. The property would - probably bring little or nothing, as taken from the ship on the coast of Ireland; it must be taken to a market; the expenses of such transportation and of the sales at Liverpool were a necessary diminution of the value, and, as such, reduced it to a sum less than half the value of the shipment. All the boxes of tin were alike submerged and lay some time in the salt water, by means of which the tin plates were more or less tarnished and damaged; none of the boxes escaped entirely dry, and some were entirely broken and lost. We have not found it necessary to determine the question of fact, upon which the depositions were conflicting, whether, if the plates had been reshipped from Liverpool to Boston, their original destination, the cost of such transportation would have exceeded the value of the tin upon arrival.

The first question raised in this case is respecting the time construction of this exception, contained in a printed line in the very last clause in the body of the policy, without context to explain or give it effect. “ Partial loss on sheet iron, iron wire, brazier’s rods, iron hoops and tin plates, is excepted.” It is contended that as it stands it is senseless and void for uncertainty. The sentence is certainly elliptical [151]*151and abbreviated to the fewest possible words, and so is obscure, as a new clause crowded into an old printed form is likely to be, having neither preamble nor recital to introduce it. But we think that the meaning cannot be mistaken. The main purpose of the whole contract was for one party to insure the other against certain maritime losses, some designated as total and some as partial. It is not repugnant, in the sense in which a clause is contradictory and so void for repugnancy; where a proposition is expressed in general terms, and in the same writing are other clauses limiting or qualifying the generality of this proposition, or excepting something out of it, though not in the same sentence, yet in the same instrument and going into operation at the same time, both may well stand together and have their full force, as if the words of qualification or exception were in immediate connection with the proposition. We can have no doubt that by the true construction of this clause the insurers were not to be liable for loss on tin plates, unless such loss, estimated according to the rules and usages of Boston, should amount to a total loss. It is somewhat like the provision in regard to goods perishable in their own nature, enumerated in another part of the policy. But it differs in one respect; those articles are not absolutely exempted, but the underwriter is liable for a partial loss, in case it be occasioned by the stranding of the vessel, and exceed seven per cent. It is manifest therefore, that if this exception had come under the memorandum clause, the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover, because it is manifest from the uncontested facts of the case, that this vessel was lost by stranding, and the damage to the goods was occasioned thereby and did greatly exceed seven per cent.

What then is the extent of this exception ? The natural construction is, that it leaves the insurer liable for all total losses; but it makes no distinction between absolute and constructive total losses ; and in case of a constructive total loss, which gives the assured a right to abandon, and he exercises the right, it becomes a legal total loss, as if absolute in its nature. The clause in the contract gives no intimation that it is any particular kind of total loss, whether absolute or technical; it simply excludes [152]*152all kind of liability for a partial loss. By the natural construction of these provisions, it would seem that if the goods insured were placed by one of the perils insured against in that situation in which the assured has a right to abandon, and be-docs abandon, he has sustained a total loss, not within the exception.

But it has been argued that a constructive total loss is not within the exception, but that it must be an actual loss or destruction of the thing to take the case out of theroperation of the exception and render the underwriter liable as for a total loss. This is maintained as resulting from a series of decisions, as a well established principle of insurance law. It is not indeed insisted or claimed that there is any such rule, or any judicial decision to such effect, upon this special, unqualified exception of liability for partial loss on commodities of iron, brass and tin ; but the argument is, that there is a strict analogy between this exception and the common one applicable to memorandum articles “ warranted free of average, unless general, or the ship be stranded,” that the rule applicable to the one must include the other, and in case of such qualified exception there must be proof of an absolute total loss to take it out of the exception.

There is certainly a distinction of a practical character between these excepted articles and the memorandum articles which are subject to a limited and qualifiéd exception. The exception is of sheet iron, iron wire, brazier’s rods, iron hoops, tin plates, articles liable to be tarnished, corroded and damaged by contact with sea water to almost the whole extent of their commercial value, but indestructible in their nature. One reason given why a constructive total loss should not be made up of damage on memorandum articles, so as to allow of an abandonment for damage, was that in case of mere damage it was so difficult to distinguish between that part of the visible damage which proceeds from internal tendency to decay, and that part from perils of the sea, that it must have been the intention of the contracting parties to exclude it altogether. In this respect there is a marked difference between tin and brass goods liable to tarnish, and memorandum articles liable to decay. Another clause in the policy guards the insurer against loss by dampness [153]*153or other indirect damage to goods, not caused by actual contact of sea water with the articles damaged. So that it is only when these polished but indestructible articles come into actual contact with sea water, and that by stranding or some one of the perils of the sea insured against, that the underwriter can become liable at all; and a loss of this character can in general be ascertained with as much certainty as a similar loss to dry goods, hardware, or other merchandise not perishable in its nature.

It seems a little singular that upon the construction of this special exemption of tin plates and other metal goods liable to tarnish by sea water, there is no judicial decision ; none was referred to in the argument, and we. have no reference to it in any of the cases, except perhaps where, in a few instances, they are simply enumerated with other memorandum articles. We say nothing now of a ease where there is a specific insurance on goods, and they arrive at the port of destination in specie, but having sustained damage by a peril insured against to an amount exceeding half their value.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
76 Mass. 144, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kettell-v-alliance-insurance-mass-1857.