Ketchings v. Jackson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: April 19, 2004
• Docket: 03-1054
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Ketchings v. Jackson No. 03-1054 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0112P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0112p.06 _________________ COUNSEL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ARGUED: Debra M. Gagliardi, OFFICE OF THE FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. _________________ Phillip D. Comorski, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Debra M. Gagliardi, OFFICE OF THE ROBERT HENRY KETCHINGS X ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. JR., - Gerald Lorence, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. Petitioner-Appellee, - _________________ - No. 03-1054 - v. > OPINION , _________________ - ANDREW JACKSON , Warden, - RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Robert Henry Respondent-Appellant. - Ketchings Jr. was tried by a jury in a Michigan state court and - convicted of second-degree murder, assault with intent to N inflict great bodily harm less than murder, intentional Appeal from the United States District Court discharge of a firearm at a dwelling, and the use of a firearm for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. in a felony. The charges arose from Ketchings’s involvement No. 01-73141—Nancy G. Edmunds, District Judge. in a drive-by shooting in Detroit. After exhausting his state- court remedies, Ketchings petitioned the district court for a Argued: March 17, 2004 writ of habeas corpus. He argued, among other things, that the length of his sentence was unlawfully extended because Decided and Filed: April 19, 2004 of his refusal to admit that he was guilty of the offenses for which he was convicted. Ketchings contended that his Before: KRUPANSKY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; sentence was therefore imposed in violation of his right RUSSELL, District Judge.* against self-incrimination, a right enshrined in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court concluded that the state court had unreasonably applied the relevant holdings of the United States Supreme Court regarding the Fifth Amendment. It therefore granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus, to become effective unless Ketchings is properly resentenced by another state trial judge. Michigan now appeals. For the * The Honorable Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the Western District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.

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reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the to 10 years for assault, and 2 to 4 years for the discharge of a district court. firearm, and to a consecutive 2-year term for using a firearm to commit a felony. The sentence imposed on the second- I. BACKGROUND degree murder count was nearly twice the maximum recommended by the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines, which A summation of the material facts is provided by the establishes a relevant range of 10 to 25 years’ imprisonment. Michigan Court of Appeals: In his appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, the last At trial, the evidence established that defendant’s court in Michigan to address the merits of his case, Ketchings friend had been robbed the night before the drive-by presented the following six claims: shooting in question. The next day, defendant, along with three other persons, sought revenge for the robbery. 1. that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting They set out in a car in search of “Rick,” the alleged other-acts evidence; robber. Defendant was armed with a .380 automatic and the other persons in the vehicle were likewise armed with 2. that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury an AK-47 and a 9 millimeter semi-automatic pistol. on the cognate lesser included offenses of voluntary and They stopped in front of a house looking for Rick, and involuntary manslaughter and careless, reckless, and unable to find him, emptied a barrage of gunfire at the negligent use of a firearm with death resulting; house, outside of which children were playing. Although testimony at trial indicated that defendant’s gun jammed, 3. that the trial court abused its discretion when it witnesses testified that defendant raised himself out of denied Ketchings’s motion for a mistrial; the driver’s side window of the car as he fired at the house. Spent shell casings were later found at the scene 4. that Ketchings was denied his right to a speedy trial; belonging to both defendant’s .380 automatic and the codefendant’s 9 millimeter weapon. A nine-year-old girl 5. that the trial court improperly took Ketchings’s who was playing outside of the house was shot and killed failure to admit guilt into account at sentencing; as a result of the gunfire. 6. that his sentence of 40 to 80 years for second-degree People v. Ketchings, 1999 WL 33437836, at * 3 (Mich. App., murder violates the principle of proportionality. Aug. 20, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished). The drive-by shooting took place on October 29, 1994. Ketchings was 19 The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected all six claims. years old at the time. The forensic evidence established that (Although the appellate court found that the trial court had the victim was killed by a 9 millimeter bullet, which did not erred when it admitted into evidence certain other bad acts, come from the gun used by Ketchings. this error was determined to be harmless.)

On April 30, 1997, Ketchings was convicted on a number Ketchings sought habeas relief in the district court after of charges arising out of his involvement in the drive-by exhausting his state-court remedies. In a 51-page opinion, the shooting. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of district court denied habeas relief with respect to all but the imprisonment of 40 to 80 years for second-degree murder, 5 fifth of Ketchings’s claims: that the trial court improperly took Ketchings’s failure to admit guilt into account at No. 03-1054 Ketchings v. Jackson 5 6 Ketchings v. Jackson No. 03-1054

sentencing in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The State-court findings of fact must be accepted unless district court concluded that the Michigan Court of Appeals’s rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. application of United States Supreme Court precedent in § 2254(e)(1). We review the district court’s legal conclusions evaluating Ketchings’s fifth claim was objectively de novo. Hudson v. Jones, 315 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003). unreasonable. Ketchings’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was therefore conditionally granted, subject to an B. The state court’s decision involved an unreasonable appropriate resentencing by a state trial judge other than the application of Supreme Court Precedent one who originally imposed the sentence. The state appeals. The Michigan Court of Appeals’s entire discussion of II. ANALYSIS Ketchings’s Fifth Amendment claim is contained in the following paragraph: A. Standard of review Defendant’s next claim of error on appeal is that the Ketchings filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus after trial court improperly took defendant’s failure to admit the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death guilt into account at sentencing. We disagree. A Penalty Act of 1996, principally codified at 28 U.S.C. sentencing court cannot, in whole or in part, base its § 2254(d). Habeas relief may be granted only if the state sentence on a defendant’s refusal to admit guilt. People court’s decision either (1) “resulted in a decision that was v. Yennior, 399 Mich. 892; 282 NW2d 920 (1977). See contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, also People v. Adams, 430 Mich. 679, 687, n 6; 425 clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme NW2d 437 (1988). However, evidence of a lack of Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that remorse may be considered in determining an was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in individual’s potential for rehabilitation. People v. Wesley, light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 428 Mich. 708, 711; 411 NW2d 159 (1987) (opinion of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Archer, J.). As previously explained by this Court in People v. Calabro, 166 Mich.App 389, 396; 419 NW2d The Supreme Court explained these concepts in Williams 791 (1988), “[A] defendant’s lack of remorse may be v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000): considered by a court in imposing sentence. It is undeniable that when a defendant is remorseful, it is Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court urged in mitigation by him or on his behalf, and it is may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a healthful to ventilate the process from both perspectives conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme rather than to sanction the use in amelioration while Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides condemning it in aggravation.” See also People v. a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set Houston, 448 Mich. 312, 323; 532 NW2d 508 (1995). In of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the this case, it is clear from our review of the full comments “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court made by the sentencing judge that the court was merely may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct addressing the factor of remorsefulness in the context of governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] defendant’s rehabilitative potential and avoidance of decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the responsibility for his actions. There is no indication in facts of the prisoner’s case. the record that defendant’s sentence was improperly No. 03-1054 Ketchings v. Jackson 7 8 Ketchings v. Jackson No. 03-1054

influenced by his failure to admit guilt or that the court objective review of the transcript makes clear that the was attempting to punish defendant for exercising his sentencing judge was not, as the Michigan Court of Appeals constitutional right to maintain his innocence. Wesley, found, “merely addressing the factor of remorsefulness in the supra; People v. Stewart (On Remand), 219 Mich.App context of defendant’s rehabilitative potential . . . .” 38, 44; 555 NW2d 715 (1996); People v. Drayton, 168 Ketchings, 1999 WL, at * 7. To the contrary, the relevant Mich.App 174, 178; 423 NW2d 606 (1988). We portion of the sentencing-hearing transcript reads as follows: therefore find no error. THE COURT: The first thing I have to say is that you People v. Ketchings, 1999 WL 33437836, at * 7 (Mich. App., indicate to the Court that you’re not guilty. And as your Aug. 20, 1999). lawyer will tell you and I’ll tell you one of the things the Judge considers in sentencing, in determining what the The Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s Fifth sentence should be is whether a person can be Amendment right against self-incrimination “is fulfilled only rehabilitated. But if you don’t think you did anything when a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right ‘to remain wrong to start with and you don’t accept what a jury says silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of – his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.’” Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981) (quoting Malloy v. DEFENDANT KETCHINGS: But – Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)). This guarantee extends to the sentencing phase of the trial. Mitchell v. United States, 526 THE COURT: I’m just giving you my thinking now. U.S. 314, 328-29 (1999) (“In accordance with the text of the Can I talk? I didn’t interrupt you. Fifth Amendment, we must accord the privilege the same protection in the sentencing phase of ‘any criminal case’ as DEFENDANT KETCHINGS: I understand. that which is due in the trial phase of the same case.”). THE COURT: How can you be rehabilitated? How In its brief, the state “does not dispute . . . that a petitioner can you ask me to put you back in the community? How retains the privilege against compelled self-incrimination do I know you’re not going to go back out and do through the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings.” The something else like this and say, hey, judge, I didn’t do state instead argues that the “trial court never attempted to get it. I wasn’t part of it. Ketchings to admit his guilt.” Indeed, the Michigan Court of Appeals found “no indication in the record that defendant’s We have and I don’t know if you’re ever heard me say sentence was improperly influenced by his failure to admit this, but the jury system, you, know, sometimes I like it guilt or that the court was attempting to punish defendant for and sometimes I don’t. But we’re one of the very few exercising his constitutional right to maintain his innocence.” countries in the world that has a jury, a judge of their Ketchings, 1999 WL, at * 7. peers. They’re people like you. They judge you. And I’m sort of upset that you don’t acknowledge that you did A state court’s findings of fact are binding in a federal something wrong at this point. habeas proceeding unless they are rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The record in .... this case provides such clear and convincing evidence. An No. 03-1054 Ketchings v. Jackson 9 10 Ketchings v. Jackson No. 03-1054

You see, to me, young people like you the key to with. . . . And the prosecutor, she don’t know me. She rehabilitating is say, hey, I did something wrong. I’m really don’t. She can’t even see what type of character I sorry, man. I was in the car, it went over and shot an am in the world. It’s just a bad situation that did happen. innocent child along with other people. I didn’t, you know -- .... THE COURT: Don’t use that expression. All right. It’s an awesome power of a judge to DEFENDANT KETCHINGS: I’m sorry. sentence somebody. . . . And it’s a heavy responsibility and it’s not what I particularly like, but it has to be done Everybody saying I’m just this awful person that I’m and it has to be done to punish and protect society, to really not. And I’m quite sure if she knew me in the rehabilitate you which is why I said the statement I did in world, she would be part of the persons who said I was the beginning. One of the issues we discussed here is always a true friend to her and to the victim’s family. can you be rehabilitated? And you can’t be rehabilitated And I feel that giving me 20, 40 years of incarceration if you say you didn’t do anything. You were here for this that’s not going to bring the family members back or to trial. pay back with my heart. And I can’t feel how the family members feel for losing their child, but I can sympathize As the district court found, “the [sentencing] judge referred because I would hate for that to happen to my son. And negatively directly and indirectly to [Ketchings’s] continued I can only imagine how they feel. I know that she’s truly assertion of his belief in his innocence and implied that upset, you know. [Ketchings] would be sentenced more leniently if he accepted the jury’s verdict, that is, if he gave up his Fifth Amendment When this crime happened, my son was just born three privilege to . . . refuse to admit guilt.” Further contradicting days prior to this case. And I was very truly upset, you the Michigan Court of Appeals’s characterization that the know, to find out what had happened. And I just looked sentencing judge was concerned only with Ketchings’s lack at my son, and, you know, tears came from my eyes. of remorse and not with his unwillingness to admit guilt is the And I do, really do feel in my heart that I’m truly sorry fact that Ketchings made a lengthy statement expressing his for the family members at what happened. And, you remorse immediately prior to the sentencing judge’s know, I do have a strong family background even though comments quoted above. The relevant portion of the I made some wrong decisions in my life, you know. And sentencing-hearing transcript reads as follows: my parents always taught me to be respectful to others, you. THE COURT: Okay. We’ve heard from everybody except you, Mr. Ketchings. Is there anything you want But, you know, I just can’t say nothing more. I’m to tell me before the Court imposes sentence? truly sorry.

DEFENDANT KETCHINGS: Yes. I do have remorse The fact that the sentencing judge criticized Ketchings for for the family. I do like to apologize for the things that his failure to admit guilt even after he made the above-quoted had happened and I am truly sorry. But I still feel that remarks clearly contradicts the Michigan Court of Appeals’s I’m not guilty of this crime that I’ve been charged finding that the sentencing judge concerned himself only with No. 03-1054 Ketchings v. Jackson 11

remorsefulness and not with the admission of guilt. In sum, whether evaluated as “an unreasonable application of [] clearly established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or as “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), the Michigan Court of Appeal’s opinion does not withstand constitutional scrutiny. The state, as a final point, raises the possibility that on remand a sentence of 40 to 80 years for second-degree murder might again be imposed based on other factors. That outcome, although possible, is far from certain in light of the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines. In addition, such a possibility does not affect the appropriateness of resentencing before another judge as the remedy for the Fifth Amendment violation that occurred in this case. III. CONCLUSION For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.