Kessler v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: June 9, 2020
• Docket: 2:19-cv-01740
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 DYANNE K., CASE NO. 2:19-CV-1740-DWC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER AFFIRMING DEFENDANT’S 12 v. DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS 13 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 14 Defendant. 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Plaintiff filed this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial review of the 17 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (“Commissioner”) denial of Plaintiff’s 18 applications for disability insurance (“DI”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits. 19 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 and Local Rule MJR 13, 20 the parties have consented to have this matter heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. See 21 Dkt. 4. 22 After considering the record, the Court concludes the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 23 did not harmfully err when he rejected Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of her 24 1 symptoms, and medical opinions from Phyllis Sanchez, Ph.D., Melanie Mitchell, Psy.D., and 2 Heidi Griffin Street, LICSW. Accordingly, the ALJ’s finding of non-disability is supported by 3 substantial evidence, and the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. 4 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

5 Plaintiff filed applications for DI and SSI in June 2014, alleging disability as of August 7, 6 2013. See Dkt. 10, Admin. Record (“AR”), 82, 92, 194–206. The applications were denied on 7 initial administrative review, and on reconsideration. See AR 82–101, 104–27. A hearing was 8 held before ALJ Cheri Filion on June 9, 2016. See AR 37–79. In a decision dated July 28, 2016, 9 ALJ Filion determined Plaintiff to be not disabled. See AR 20–32. The Appeals Council denied 10 review. See AR 1–3. 11 Plaintiff then sought review before this Court. See AR 510–11. On August 20, 2018, U.S. 12 District Judge Benjamin H. Settle entered an order reversing and remanding Plaintiff’s case for 13 further administrative proceedings. See AR 514–34. Judge Settle ordered that the ALJ must 14 reevaluate Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and

15 pace; reevaluate the opinions of Dr. Sanchez, Dr. Mitchell, and Cynthia Collingwood, Ph.D.; 16 reevaluate the lay testimony of Ms. Street; and conduct further proceedings as necessary to 17 reevaluate the disability determination. AR 533–34. 18 On remand, ALJ Timothy Mangrum held a new hearing. See AR 442–83. In a decision 19 dated July 1, 2019, ALJ Mangrum determined Plaintiff to be not disabled. See AR 420–36. 20 Plaintiff did not file written exceptions and the Appeals Council did not assume jurisdiction of 21 the case. See generally AR. ALJ Mangrum’s decision thus became the Commissioner’s final 22 decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.984(d), 416.1484(d). 23

24 1 In Plaintiff’s opening brief, she maintains the ALJ erred by (1) discounting Plaintiff’s 2 symptom testimony, and (2) rejecting the opinions of Dr. Sanchez, Dr. Mitchell, and Ms. Street. 3 See Dkt. 10, p. 1. 4 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

5 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of 6 social security benefits if the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by 7 substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th 8 Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). 9 IV. DISCUSSION 10 A. Whether the ALJ Erred in Discounting Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony 11 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the 12 severity of her symptoms. See Dkt. 12, pp. 9–17. At the first hearing in this case, Plaintiff 13 testified she sometimes cannot leave her house or be around people due to anxiety, agoraphobia, 14 and panic attacks. See AR 51. Plaintiff also testified she cannot maintain concentration,

15 persistence, or pace because of her symptoms. Id. 16 Judge Settle affirmed the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her alleged 17 inability to leave her house or be around people. See AR 520. Judge Settle found the ALJ erred, 18 however, in her rejection of Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her ability to maintain concentration, 19 persistence, and pace. See AR 520–23. 20 At the second hearing, Plaintiff testified she cannot work full-time because she gets 21 overwhelmed by stress. See AR 455–59. Plaintiff testified she has on average at least one panic 22 attack per week. See AR 460–61. Plaintiff testified she has trouble concentrating and focusing on 23 tasks. See AR 467–70.

24 1 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s testimony “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence 2 and other evidence in the record.” AR 426. The ALJ incorporated ALJ Filion’s earlier discussion 3 of Plaintiff’s inability to leave her house or be around people, leaving only Plaintiff’s testimony 4 regarding her ability to concentrate and persist for the ALJ to consider. See AR 429–30. The ALJ

5 rejected this testimony because it was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s level of treatment, her ability 6 to function with her symptoms, as demonstrated by her past full-time and present part-time work, 7 and her pursuit of unemployment benefits. See AR 426 –31. The ALJ further reasoned Plaintiff’s 8 testimony was undermined because she presented differently to doctors examining her as part of 9 her disability applications than she presented to her treatment providers. See AR 426–27. 10 The ALJ did not harmfully err in rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity of 11 her symptoms as inconsistent with her level of treatment. An ALJ may discount the claimant’s 12 testimony when the “‘level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of 13 complaints.’” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Social Security 14 Ruling (“SSR”) 96–7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7 (July 2, 1996)).1 The ALJ reasonably noted

15 Plaintiff received little to no treatment between August 2012 and November 2015. See AR 295– 16 98, 353–66, 377–78, 382–85, 399–408, 426–29. The ALJ also reasonably noted Plaintiff’s 17 symptoms appeared stable and managed with medication once she started consistent treatment, 18 with the counseling sessions Plaintiff attended focusing on working through stressful work 19 20 21 22 1 SSR 96–7p has been superseded by SSR 16–3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017). SSR 16–3p nonetheless retains language providing that an ALJ may discount a claimant’s 23 testimony “if the frequency or extent of the treatment sought by an individual is not comparable with the degree of the individual’s subjective complaints.” Id. at *9. 24 1 relationships and acute situational stressors. See AR 389–92, 397, 428–29, 678, 681, 689–90, 2 701, 703, 723, 725, 741, 762. 3 The Court need not address the remainder of the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s 4 testimony because any error in that analysis was harmless. “[A]n error is harmless so long as

5 there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error ‘does not negate 6 the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion.’” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Batson v. 7 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004)). Whether Plaintiff’s past and 8 current work history contradicted her testimony, for example, does not invalidate the ALJ’s 9 conclusion that Plaintiff’s level of treatment contradicted her testimony. The ALJ therefore did 10 not harmfully err in rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 11 B. Whether the ALJ Erred in Rejecting Several Medical Opinions 12 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of examining psychologists Dr. 13 Sanchez and Dr. Mitchell, and treating therapist Ms. Street. Dkt. 12, pp. 2–8. The ALJ addressed 14 the opinions of Dr. Sanchez and Dr. Mitchell together, so the Court will do the same.

15 1. The ALJ Did Not Harmfully Err in Rejecting Dr. Sanchez’s and Dr. Mitchell’s Opinions 16 Dr. Sanchez examined Plaintiff in August 2013. See AR 301–07. She conducted a clinical 17 interview and mental status exam. AR 301, 304. Dr. Sanchez opined that Plaintiff had marked 18 limitations in her ability to maintain a regular work schedule, adapt to changes in a routine work 19 setting, communicate and perform effectively in a work setting, maintain appropriate behavior in 20 a work setting, and complete a normal work day or week without interruptions from her 21 psychologically-based symptoms. AR 303. 22 Dr. Mitchell examined Plaintiff in March 2014. See AR 308–24. She reviewed Dr. 23 Sanchez’s report, conducted a clinical interview and mental status exam, and administered 24 1 several psychological tests. See AR 308–09, 311–12, 319–24. Dr. Mitchell gave an opinion 2 similar to that of Dr. Sanchez. She opined that Plaintiff had marked limitations in her ability to 3 maintain a regular work schedule, communicate and perform effectively in a work setting, 4 maintain appropriate behavior in a work setting, and complete a normal work day or week

5 without interruptions from her psychologically-based symptoms. AR 310. Dr. Mitchell also 6 opined that Plaintiff was markedly limited in her ability to understand, remember, and persist in 7 tasks by following detailed instructions, and to plan independently. Id. 8 The ALJ gave “minimal weight to the opinions of Dr. Sanchez and Dr. Mitchell.” AR 9 431. The ALJ reasoned that these doctors’ opinions were inconsistent with the overall medical 10 evidence, as Plaintiff’s presentation during their exams did not align with her presentation to her 11 treatment providers. AR 431–32. The ALJ reasoned that Dr. Sanchez’s and Dr. Mitchell’s 12 opinions were inconsistent with their own findings. Id. The ALJ reasoned that these doctors’ 13 opinions were inconsistent with Plaintiff’s demonstrated ability to perform part-time work. Id. 14 Finally, the ALJ noted that Dr. Sanchez “limited the duration of her opined limitations to ten

15 months, further reducing their probative value to the relevant period of this decision.” AR 432 16 (internal citations omitted). 17 An ALJ may only reject the opinions of an examining doctor when contradicted if the 18 ALJ provides “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the 19 record.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 20 F.3d at 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995)). The ALJ can satisfy this requirement “by setting out a 21 detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 22 interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 23 1998) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)).

24 1 The ALJ did not err in rejecting the opinions of Dr. Sanchez and Dr. Mitchell as 2 inconsistent with the overall medical evidence. An ALJ may reasonably reject a doctor’s 3 opinions when they are inconsistent with or contradicted by the medical evidence. See Batson, 4 359 F.3d at 1195. As explained above, the ALJ reasonably found Plaintiff received minimal

5 mental health treatment through at least November 2015. See supra Part IV.A. The ALJ also 6 reasonably noted Plaintiff’s symptoms appeared stable and managed with medication once she 7 started consistent treatment. See id. This evidence conflicted with Dr. Sanchez’s and Dr. 8 Mitchell’s opinions that Plaintiff had marked limitations in her ability to work, and the ALJ did 9 not err in rejecting those opinions based on that conflict. 10 The Court need not address the remainder of the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the opinions 11 of Dr. Sanchez and Dr. Mitchell because, as with his analysis of Plaintiff’s testimony, any error 12 in those additional reasons was harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. The ALJ therefore did 13 not harmfully err in rejecting the opinions of Dr. Sanchez and Dr. Mitchell. 14 2. The ALJ Did Not Harmfully Err in Rejecting Ms. Street’s Opinions

15 Ms. Street was one of Plaintiff’s mental health therapists. See AR 394–96, 414–16, 774– 16 89. She submitted a medical source statement dated June 8, 2016. See AR 414–16. Ms. Street 17 opined that Plaintiff had no ability to respond appropriately to work pressures and changes to the 18 work setting. See AR 414–15. Ms. Street opined that Plaintiff was markedly limited in her ability 19 to interact appropriately with the public, supervisors, and coworkers. Id. 20 The ALJ gave Ms. Street’s opinions minimal weight. AR 432–33. The ALJ reasoned that 21 Ms. Street had no documented exam findings prior to the date of her statement. AR 433. The 22 ALJ reasoned that Ms. Street’s later exam findings showed minimal symptoms that could not 23 support her opinions. Id. The ALJ reasoned that Ms. Street’s opinions were inconsistent with the

24 1 overall medical evidence and Plaintiff’s demonstrated ability to perform part-time work. Id. And 2 the ALJ reasoned that Ms. Street relied too heavily on Plaintiff’s self-reports. 3 The ALJ did not err in rejecting Ms. Street’s opinions as inconsistent with the overall 4 medical evidence, just as he did not err in doing so with respect to Dr. Sanchez’s and Dr.

5 Mitchell’s opinions. See supra Part IV.B.1. Again, Plaintiff received minimal treatment during 6 the beginning of the alleged disability period, and received effective treatment when she sought 7 more of it. See id. 8 Once again, the Court need not address the ALJ’s remaining reasons for rejecting Ms. 9 Street’s opinions because any error in that analysis was harmless. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. 10 The ALJ thus did not harmfully err in rejecting Ms. Street’s opinions. 11 V. CONCLUSION 12 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court finds the ALJ properly concluded Plaintiff was 13 not disabled. Accordingly, Defendant’s decision to deny benefits is affirmed and this case is 14 dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for Defendant and close the

15 case. 16 Dated this 9th day of June, 2020. 17 A 18 David W. Christel United States Magistrate Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24