Kertrina Nicole Mims v. the State of Texas

Opinion

NUMBER 13-25-00034-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

KERTRINA NICOLE MIMS, Appellant, v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 130TH DISTRICT COURT OF MATAGORDA COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

Following a jury trial, appellant Kertrina Nicole Mims was convicted of injury to a child, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(f). Mims was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, see id. § 12.34, which was suspended, and she was placed on community supervision for five years. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.055.

Mims’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, Mims’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.” (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), Mims’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Mims’s counsel also informed this Court in writing that he: (1) notified Mims that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided Mims with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed Mims of her rights to file pro se responses, to review the record prior to filing those responses, and to seek discretionary

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review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided Mims with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only requires Mims’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408–09.

Mims filed a pro se response. When appellate counsel files an Anders brief and the appellant independently files a pro se response, the court of appeals has two choices:

[i]t may determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it has reviewed the record and finds no reversible error. Or, it may determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand the cause to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief the issues.

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (internal citations omitted). We are “not required to review the merits of each claim raised in an Anders brief or a pro se response.” Id. at 827. Rather, we must merely determine if there are any arguable grounds for appeal. Id. If we determine there are such arguable grounds, we must remand for appointment of new counsel. Id. Reviewing the merits raised in a pro se response would deprive an appellant of the meaningful assistance of counsel. Id.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and Mims’s pro se response, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but

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found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, Mims’s counsel has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days from the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to Mims and to advise her of her right to file a petition for discretionary review. 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

CLARISSA SILVA

Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 24th day of July, 2025.

1 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Mims wish to seek further review of this case by

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, she must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.