Kerr v. Urstadt

73 Misc. 2d 953, 343 N.Y.S.2d 739, 1973 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1983
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Kerr v. Urstadt. Read the opinion of the Court — 72 Misc. 2d 942
New York Supreme Court·Decided April 27, 1973·Published

Opinion

Peter A. Quinn, J.

These two motions under calendar No. 10 of February 9, 1973 and No. 43 of March 5, 1973 are consolidated for disposition.

Petitioners Kerr and Leventhal, in their respective capacities as New York City Housing and Development Administrator and as Commissioner of the Department of Rent and Housing Maintenance, apply, pursuant to article 78 of the CPLR, for a judgment declaring chapter 1012 of the Laws of 1971 (amdg. Local Emergency Housing Rent Control Act, L. 1962, ch. 21, § 1, subd. 5) unconstitutional, and vacating and annulling the respondents’ determination by which Amendment No. 33 of the New York City Rent, Eviction and Rehabilitation Regulations was denied approval.

In the exercise of discretion, the application of Joseph Rothfield, a tenant at 424 East 52nd Street, New York City, for leave to intervene as a petitioner in this action is granted. By order of this court on February 7, 1973 leave to intervene [954]*954was granted to 241 East 22nd Street Corp. as a landlord intervenor-respondent.

The part of chapter 1012 of the Laws of 1971 pertinent to this case provides that: “ No housing accommodation's presently subject to regulation and control pursuant to local laws or ordinances adopted or amended under authority of this subdivision shall hereafter be by local law or ordinance or by rule or regulation which has not been theretofore approved by the state commissioner of housing' and community renewal subjected to more stringent or restrictive provisions of regulation and control than those presently in effect.”

In the absence of a showing of denial of due process, or equal •protection of the laws, directly affecting petitioners (Matter of Posner v. Rockefeller, 33 A D 2d 314, 316, affd. 26 N Y 2d 970), the question of the constitutionality of this statute may not be raised by them as governmental functionaries seeking to strike down a statute which purports to restrict their authority. (Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N Y 2d 109, dissenting opn., p. 118; Kerr v. Urstadt, 72 Misc 2d 942.) Assuming, however, that the intervenor-petitioner may properly raise the question, the arguments advanced in support of the proposition that the statute is an unlawful delegation of the legislative power do not impress as of sufficient weight to overcome the presumption of constitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. (Matter of Van Berkel v. Power, 16 N Y 2d 37, 40.) The authority given the respondents by this statute is to review the rule promulgations of petitioners and make a factual determination of comparative stringency.

The critical issue is whether respondents have arbitrarily or capriciously exercised their power to withhold approval of a rule of petitioners, properly subject to review, rather than for “ good and valid reasons ”. (Matter of 241 East 22nd St. Corp. v. City Rent Agency, 39 A D 2d 453, 455.) The questions arising from the conflicting exercise of the rule-making and rule-reviewing powers, as between these governmental agencies, are properly before this court, as is the construction of the underlying local law on which the rule-making power depends. (Matter of Saratoga Springs Mun. Civ. Serv. Comm. v. New York State Civ. Serv. Comm., 70 Misc 2d 744.)

Amendment No. 33, effective January 1, 1972, amends section 33 of the Bent, Eviction and Behabilitation Begulations by adding a new subdivision e of section 33 and revoking and adding a new section 33.5. The new subdivision e of section 33 pertains to the apportionment of increases, obtained under [955]*955sections 33.5 (hardship increase), 33.6, 33.7 and 33.8 of the rent regulations, to the various rent-controlled apartments. The amount of increase is limited by section 26 of the rent regulations which, as mandated by paragraphs (5) and (6) of subdivision a of section Y51-5.0 (Administrative Code of City of New York, tit. Y; Local Laws, 1970, No. 30 of City of New York), limits the increase to 7%% a year on the maximum rent collectible. Thus, the collectibility of the increase is limited to those controlled accommodations which have not yet attained their maximum base rent (MBE). No increase could be apportioned to an accommodation which had reached its MBE until a new MBE was established for that accommodation. Section 25 provides for a biennial adjustment of MBEs. Section 33.5 provides that “a landlord may file an application for an increase in maximum rents on the ground that the current Maximum Gross Building Rental established pursuant to Sections 24 or 25 of these regulations does not equal ”. (Italics added.) This subordinates the old hardship increase to the MBE formula. That is, the maximum gross building rental would have to be established before a hardship increase application could be entertained.

It is petitioners’ contention that the so-called hardship grant provided under the ‘1 net annual return ’ ’ provision of Local Law No. 30 of the Local Laws of 1970 of the City of New York, when that statute is properly construed, is not a separate, parallel avenue to rent increases, but a subordinate adjunct to the MBE formula and that rent increases due to a hardship increase cannot be apportioned to accommodations that have reached their MBE. The respondents maintain that petitioners acted without statutory authority in promulgating Amendment No. 33 and it is therefore void or, in the alternative, that the respondents withheld approval of Amendment No. 33 for “ good and valid reasons ”.

It is not disputed that after long, intensive studies and research by acknowledged experts and consultants in the field of urban housing, and full exploration of such studies and reports and all shades of opinion at extensive public hearings, Local Law No. 30 of the Local Laws of 1970 of the City of New York was enacted for the purpose of establishing a. uniform, city-wide system of rent control which would be as fair as possible to all landlords and all tenants and make it attractive for the owners of realty to arrest the serious blight of abandoned buildings menacing housing in the City of New York. This was to be accomplished under the legislative scheme, by an adjusted series of immediate, transitory increases in rent for [956]*956all rent-controlled tenants so as to establish a uniform system of base rents which would become the starting point for the MBB formula. .The MBB increases were to be initiated, computed and projected for years to come by the city rent commission’s use of a scientifically-evolved, standardized formula (the maximum base rents formula: a cost index to controlled rents) to the end that all landlords would receive the automatic benefit of a fair rate of return without the need of individualized hardship application proceedings where (under the old regulations) success too often depended on the financial ability to command a specialized force of legal and accounting experts. In no other way could landlords, for whom the long, involved, expensive process of seeking hardship increases was too formidable an obstacle, be encouraged to hang on as interested managers of badly needed housing accommodations.

"While it cannot be said that Local Law No. 30 of the Local Laws of 1970 of the City of New York mandated, in so many words, Amendment No.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Kerr v. Urstadt, 73 Misc. 2d 953, 343 N.Y.S.2d 739, 1973 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1983 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1973).

73 Misc. 2d 953 (Kerr v. Urstadt) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Kerr v. Urstadt
72 Misc. 2d 942 (New York Supreme Court, 1973)