Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. United States

21 Ct. Int'l Trade 1179, 985 F. Supp. 1162, 21 C.I.T. 1179, 19 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2444, 1997 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 156
United States Court of International Trade·Decided November 12, 1997·No. Court No. 96-02-00397·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

Opinion

Carman, Chief Judge:

Before this Court is Defendant’s Motion to Strike nine items from Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment Upon the Administrative Record (“Plaintiffs’ Reply”) pursuant to U.S. CIT R. 12(f). Defendant argues these portions of Plaintiffs’ Reply contain “evidence” and “argument” not presented to, or obtained by, the Department of Commerce (“Department” or “Commerce”) during the course of the administrative review and are therefore not properly part of the record for review before this Court.

Plaintiffs oppose defendant’s motion and argue they were denied due process in Commerce’s Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Manganese Metal From the People’s Republic of China, 60 Fed. Reg. 56,045 (Dep’t Comm. 1995) (final determ.). Defendant-intervenors filed no response to defendant’s motion.

Plaintiffs additionally moved for Oral Argument on Defendant’s Motion to Strike, arguing oral argument is necessary for the parties to elaborate fully on the arguments made in the parties’ submissions regarding Defendant’s Motion to Strike. Neither defendant nor defendant-inter-venors responded to Plaintiffs Motion for Oral Argument. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1581(c) (1988), and for the reasons set forth below, grants Defendant’s Motion to Strike the nine items listed below of Plaintiff s Reply and denies Plaintiffs’ Motion for Oral Argument on Defendant’s Motion to Strike.

Discussion

The standard of review this Court must apply is whether a final determination by Commerce is supported by substantial evidence on the record and is otherwise in accordance with law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i) (1994). For purposes of judicial review, the Court [1181] may consider only materials contained in the administrative record. See Neuweg Fertigung GmbH v. United States, 16 CIT 724, 726, 797 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (1992). The administrative record is defined by statute to consist of:

(i) a copy of all informationpresenied to or obtained by the Secretary, the administering authority, or the Commission during the course of the administrative proceeding, including all governmental memoranda pertaining to the case and the record of ex parte meetings required to be kept by section 1677f(a)(3) of this title; and
(ii) a copy of the determination, all transcripts or records of conferences or hearings, and all notices published in the Federal Register.

19U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(A) (1994) (emphasis added). The relevant legislative history sheds light on the meaning of the statutory phrase “during the course of the administrative proceeding”. It states:

Scope and Standard of Review. — Judicial review of determinations subject to the provisions of subsection (a)(1) would proceed upon the basis of information before the relevant decision-maker at the time the decision was rendered including any information that has been compiled as part of the formal record. The court is not to conduct a trial de novo in reviewing such determinations.

S.Rep. No. 96-249 at 247-48 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 633 (emphasis added).

In an earlier slip opinion in this case, this Court emphasized the statutory language cited above has been interpreted by this Court to mean that, barring exceptional circumstances, ‘“[t]he scope of the record for purposes of judicial review is based upon information which was “before the relevant decision-maker” and was presented and considered “at the time the decision was rendered.”’” Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. United States, 955 F. Supp. 1466, 1472 (CIT 1997) (denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Settle the Record) (quoting Beker Industries Corp. v. United States, 7 CIT 313, 315 (1984)). See also Neuweg Fertigung GmbH, 16 CIT at 726, 797 F. Supp. at 1022 (“The case law of this court is very clear that the administrative record ‘is limited to the information that was presented to or obtained by the agency making the determination during the particular review proceeding for which section 1516 authorizes judicial review.’ ‘Any information received by [the ITA] after the particular determination at issue is not part of the reviewable administrative record.’”) (citations omitted); Win-Tex Products, Inc. v. United States, 16 CIT 760, 763, 797 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (1992) (“‘[Rjeview of agency determinations in antidumping proceedings is to be undertaken upon the basis of the record made before the agency.’”) (citation omitted); Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 13 CIT 218, 222, 710 F. Supp. 341, 345 (1989) (“Judicial review of an administrative review of an anti-dumping duty order is confined to information contained in the administrative record.”); see generally PPG Industries, Inc. v. United States, 13 CIT 183, 708 F. Supp. 1327 (1989) (judicial review is limited to evi[1182] dence contained in the administrative record); Melamine Chemicals, Inc. v. United States, 2 CIT 113 (1981); Nakajima All Co., Ltd. v. United States, 2 CIT 25 (1981).

Defendant argues the nine items it wishes to strike from Plaintiffs Reply contain evidence or argument not presented to, or obtained by, the Department during the course of the administrative review as required by 19U.S.C. §1516a(b)(2)(A) (1994) andaré, therefore, not properly part of the record for review before this Court. Defendant argues that notwithstanding this case law and precedent, plaintiffs have “again presented to this Court information and argument not presented to Commerce.” (Def.’s Mot. to Strike at 5-6 (footnote omitted).) The nine items defendant wishes the Court to strike from Plaintiffs’ Reply are:

1. The first paragraph on page 1, which continues to page 2.
2. The last paragraph on page 14, which continues to page 15.
3. The first full paragraph on page 15, which continues to page 17, including footnote 8.
4. The last paragraph on page 28, which continues to page 29.
5. The last paragraph on page 29, which continues to page 30.
6. The last paragraph on page 32, which continues to page 33.
7. The first paragraph on page 34, beginning with line 8 (“Plaintiffs can anticipate the expert submissions that might be made on remand * * *”), to the end of the paragraph.
8. The second half of clause (i) on page 37 (“those reporting the least use * * *”).
9. The last paragraph on page 40.

In order to aid the Court in ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Strike, the Court requested plaintiffs answer three questions with respect to each of the nine items at issue, and provided the defendant with a chance to respond to plaintiffs’ answers. The questions presented by the Court were:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. United States, 21 Ct. Int'l Trade 1179, 985 F. Supp. 1162, 21 C.I.T. 1179, 19 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2444, 1997 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 156 (cit 1997).

21 Ct. Int'l Trade 1179 (Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Florida Tomato Exchange v. United States
973 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (Court of International Trade, 2014)
Navneet Publications (India) Ltd. v. United States
32 Ct. Int'l Trade 169 (Court of International Trade, 2008)