Kenyatta v. Kelly

375 F. Supp. 1175, 18 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 825, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9243
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 29, 1974
DocketCiv. A. 71-2595
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 375 F. Supp. 1175 (Kenyatta v. Kelly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kenyatta v. Kelly, 375 F. Supp. 1175, 18 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 825, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9243 (E.D. Pa. 1974).

Opinion

OPINION

DITTER, District Judge.

This is a civil rights action for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by the plaintiffs to enjoin the defendants from gathering information about lawful and peaceful activities protected by the First Amendment, and from harassing and intimidating plaintiffs through a pattern of illegal acts from exercising their freedoms of speech and assembly.

Faced with general denials by the defendants, plaintiffs filed two discovery motions. First, they requested admissions by the defendants as to the authenticity of certain documents affixed to their complaint. Second, they propounded interrogatories regarding the organization, function, statutory authority, and investigative activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to then-defendant, J. Edgar Hoover (now by operation of FRCP 25 the defendant, Clarence Kelly). The defendants objected to the request for admissions and some of the interrogatories on the grounds that the information sought was privileged from discovery in the public interest. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to compel answers to their interrogatories and to determine the sufficiency of the objection to their request for admissions. The defendants submitted an in camera response to these motions on the issue of privilege from disclosure in the public interest. After oral argument I concluded the in camera response was proper.

IN CAMERA SUBMISSION

The only appropriate method for considering the defendants’ claim of privilege was by an ex parte in camera examination of the facts underlying that assertion. This type of procedure has been sanctioned by many courts. See, e. g., Bristol-Myers Company v. FTC, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 424 F.2d 935 (1970); Machin v. Zuckert, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 335, 316 F.2d 336 (1963); Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D.Pa. *1177 1973); Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F.Supp. 175 (D.Md.1970); Black v. Sheraton, 50 F.R.D. 130 (D.D.C.1970). As Judge VanArtsdalen said in Philadelphia Resistance v. Mitchell, Civil No. 71-1738 (E.D.Pa., filed Aug. 3, 1972), “Normally, I would be reluctant to invoke this procedure [In camera inspection] for fear of tainting the impartiality of the judge by creating the impression of judicial privity with a party-litigant. But in determining the applicability of a claim of privilege, the Court is thrust into a role different than that normally assumed. Considering the possible injury from an improper exercise or non-exercise of the investigatory privilege, it is only the court, through an in camera examination that can objectively analyze the material and decide the merits of the privilege while concomitantly minimizing the effects of any disclosure.”

REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS

The plaintiffs attached to their complaint photostatic copies of 11 documents which were allegedly stolen on March 8 and 9, 1971, from the offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation located in Media, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs’ first motion, brought pursuant to FRCP 36, requested admissions by the defendants as to the genuineness of these documents. The defendants objected on the grounds that the documents contained privileged information and because they had been stolen from the FBI.

The plaintiffs contend that the doctrine of privilege is not applicable to their request for admissions. Plaintiffs argue that if the documents ever were privileged, their status has changed by reason of the fact that they were stolen, their copies widely distributed to the media, and they were discussed by various government officials. According to plaintiffs, Rule 36 is not a discovery device at all since it presupposes that the party proceeding under it knows the facts or has the documents and merely wishes his opponent to concede their genuineness, citing 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2253, at 706. In effect, plaintiffs are saying that privilege can only be asserted as to matters which have not been divulged.

I disagree. Like Rules 33 and 34, Rule 36 is specifically tied to Rule 26(b)(1), which provides that parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter “not privileged.” Thus, an “. . . objection will lie if a request goes beyond the scope of discovery as broadly defined in Rule 26(b). Privileged information is not within that scope; a request is improper when a valid objection of privilege would lie if the request, reformulated as a question, were put to the party at trial.” Wright & Miller, supra, § 2262, at 734. Thus, the right to object on the grounds of privilege is not lost merely because there has been disclosure.

The FBI is charged with the responsibility of investigating the activities of those who violate the law. Concomitant with the duty to investigate the criminal must exist the privilege to investigate the suspect, for until information has been acquired, classified, analyzed, and disseminated neither guilt nor innocence can be even surmised. Whether the data is true or false and whether evaluative or factual in nature, the documents in question obviously contain privileged matter, gathered by the FBI in keeping with its responsibilities. Whether or not charges have been brought or a particular subject of inquiry is guilty or innocent does not affect the privileged nature of the information any more than the existence of the privilege means that under no circumstance will the contents of the documents be disclosed.

Ordinarily when privilege is asserted by the government it is for the purpose of maintaining confidentiality. The court then balances the needs of the plaintiff to obtain the information against the nature of that information and the governmental need to withhold it. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-12, 73 S.Ct. 528, 531-534, 97 L.Ed. *1178 727 (1953); Philadelphia Resistance v. Mitchell, 58 F.R.D. 139, 142-143 (E.D.Pa.1972).

Here, although the factors are different, the balance must be struck — not between secrecy and disclosure, but between the policy of the law which seeks to discourage theft and the policy of the law which seeks to minimize the costs of trial and its time requirements.

There is no suggestion that any of the plaintiffs had a part in the burglary which produced the documents from the Media FBI office. It is obvious, however, that the break-in was accomplished by persons who were (or became) sympathetic with the plaintiffs, antagonistic to the defendants, or both. It follows that if the plaintiffs are permitted to capitalize on this burglary to even a limited degree, those who committed it— and those of a similar disposition — may be encouraged to perpetrate other offenses of a like nature for like purposes. It is equally true that to whatever degree the plaintiffs are kept from obtaining benefit from that burglary, those benefits diminish in value and correspondingly, there is less incentive for those who are tempted to participate in criminal activities of this nature.

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Bluebook (online)
375 F. Supp. 1175, 18 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 825, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9243, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kenyatta-v-kelly-paed-1974.