Kenyatta James v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Opinion

IMPORTANT NOTICE

“NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION”

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED” PURSUANT TO RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE (RAP) 40(D). THIS OPINION SHALL NOT BE CITED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE. UNDER RAP 41, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF KENTUCKY APPELLATE COURTS RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, THAT ARE FINAL UNDER RAP 40(G), MAY BE CITED BY A PARTY FOR CONSIDERATION BY A COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSES THE POINT OF LAW BEING ARGUED BY A PARTY. IF AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION IS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY A COURT THE OPINION SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION IN THE DOCUMENT IN WHICH THE UNPUBLISHED OPINION IS CITED.

RENDERED: AUGUST 20, 2026 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky 2024-SC-0344-MR

KENYATTA JAMES APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT V. HONORABLE JESSICA E. GREEN, JUDGE NO. 21-CR-001063

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING

Kenyatta James appeals from the judgment and sentence of the Jefferson Circuit Court imposed after a jury trial in which he was convicted of the murder of Stephon Monroe, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO-2). James argues he is entitled to a reversal because the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to dismiss the indictment and erred by failing to exclude hearsay evidence during the trial. We affirm the judgment and sentence.

I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND According to video evidence and eyewitness testimony, on February 5, 2021, James murdered Monroe by shooting him outside of Monroe’s house. A dispute involving James’s daughter (Keiara James) and Monroe and/or

Monroe’s girlfriend (Keyshawna Joelle Monroe) appears to have motivated the shooting.

Earlier in the day, Monroe’s sister (Danesha Hobbs), Keiara, and Danesha’s friend (Kailyn Brown) were hanging out at Monroe’s house. Keyshawna was unhappy with that arrangement. To defuse the situation, Danesha, Brown, and Janette Johnson (Danesha’s mother) removed Keiara from Monroe’s house and drove about a block away. While in the vehicle with Keiara, Johnson overheard a phone conversation that Keiara had. Keiara said, “Daddy, get down here now.”

A man, whom Danesha and Brown both recognized to be James, arrived shortly thereafter. James and his daughter had a brief discussion, and according to Monroe’s sister, James said “f*ck this sh*t come on Ki [meaning Keiara]” and they both got into their vehicles and drove to Monroe’s house. Johnson, Danesha, and Brown followed them in their vehicle.

Surveillance video from Monroe’s front door showed that James parked his vehicle in front of Monroe’s house. James was joined in the street by his daughter, and they appeared to be walking toward the vehicle in which Monroe’s girlfriend Keyshawna was sitting. Monroe came out of his house, appeared to say something to James and Keiara, and as they both turned toward Monroe, James raised his gun and opened fire on Monroe, hitting him multiple times. Monroe had a gun, but he was holding it at his side. Monroe fell to the ground on his front porch. James and his daughter both returned to their vehicles and left.

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Johnson, Danesha, and Brown all arrived as the shooting was occurring.

Danesha testified she saw James shoot Monroe between vehicles parked off the street. Johnson reported hearing gunfire and seeing the flash of the gunfire and identified the shooter as the man who Keiara was speaking to earlier.

Also outside Monroe’s house was the girlfriend of Monroe’s brother (Ariana Scott), who was sitting in a vehicle. Scott testified that people were arguing, and Monroe came out of his house and told the man: “We’re not doing this here.” Scott testified she saw the man shoot Monroe.

Dr. William Ralston performed the autopsy on Monroe and testified that he was shot three times, with the most serious injury being a bullet wound through his heart. Dr. Ralston testified that the cause of Monroe’s death was multiple gunshot wounds to his torso.

The defense did not call any witnesses.

The jury convicted James of murder, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and being a PFO-2. It recommended that James serve thirty years for murder, ten years (enhanced from five years by his status as a PFO-2) for the possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and that the sentences be served consecutively for a total of forty years of incarceration.

The trial court sentenced James in accordance with the jury’s recommendations. James appealed to this Court as a matter of right.

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II. ANALYSIS

A. The Trial Court Correctly Denied James’s Motion to Dismiss.

In 2022, James filed a two-and-one-half-page motion to dismiss. James argued dismissal of his indictment was warranted because the lead detective in his case, who had since been fired for multiple emotional and mental health problems, had testified before the grand jury hearing in this action.

At the subsequent hearing, James’s then-current counsel, who had not filed this motion, declined to present argument in favor of the motion, stating “everything is in his motion” and they had nothing additional to add.

The Commonwealth argued that the fact that the lead detective had been terminated a year after testifying before the grand jury, and vague allegations that he was no longer credible, did not provide a basis for dismissal of the indictment when there was not even an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct.

The trial court orally agreed, stating that without the development of some nexus between the detective’s actions and James’s case, general allegations that the detective had been fired for being dangerous and having PTSD were insufficient for dismissal of the indictment.

In 2024, James filed a pro se motion to dismiss his indictment, which he later amended. James argued that the detective provided perjured testimony before the grand jury. He argued prosecutorial misconduct occurred because the prosecutor knowingly or intentionally presented such false, misleading, or perjured testimony to the grand jury that contradicted the evidence that the Commonwealth had in its possession. James argued this perjured testimony

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was material and improperly influenced the grand jury to indict him for murder, which it would not have done in the absence of such false testimony. 1 On June 7, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on this motion and permitted James to play video to establish his arguments regarding the detective having lied to the grand jury. The trial court disagreed that the videos showed any material lies, but rather only showed minor, incorrect details, or differences in opinion, thus providing grounds to make trial arguments to the jury rather than to dismiss the indictment.

On June 16, 2024, the trial court denied James’s motion to dismiss, in a written order explaining: “All arguments presented by the Defendant go to the weight of the evidence, and not to the admissibility. Any arguments related to sufficiency of the evidence are questions for the jury.”

James argues that the detective lied by testifying to the grand jury falsely in two general areas. First, James argues the detective lied by testifying that James’s daughter Keiara was involved in a sexual relationship with Monroe, she contracted a sexually transmitted infection (STI), Keiara confronted the victim about this, and this is what motivated James to come to Monroe’s home and kill him. James argues that in fact the detective indicated he interviewed Monroe’s girlfriend Keyshawna who stated that she went to Monroe’s home to

1 On appeal, in his section on preservation, James summarizes all the

arguments he made to the trial court. These arguments are broader than those presented on appeal. To avoid confusion, we omit from summarizing prior arguments which were waived on appeal.

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confront him about how she had contracted an STI and Keyshawna told the detective that Keiara overheard the statement and then called James.

Second, James argues the detective lied by testifying that Monroe’s sister Danesha knew James for most of her life, unfairly bolstering the credibility of her identification of James as the shooter. James argues that Danesha’s statement instead indicated that she met James only five years before the shooting, which did not constitute “most of her life.”

James argues that the trial court repeatedly failed to assess whether the false testimony affected the sufficiency of the evidence against him and did not properly consider how these clear misstatements undermined his case by creating motive and opportunity that did not otherwise exist. He argues that his judgment should be reversed and remanded for proper consideration.

“We review a trial court’s decision concerning the dismissal of an indictment for abuse of discretion.” Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 423 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Ky. 2014). This standard examines whether “the trial court’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007).

“This Court has consistently held that a trial judge has no authority to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence prior to trial or to summarily dismiss indictments in criminal cases.” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 245 S.W.3d 733, 735 (Ky. 2008). Pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.64, only the prosecution has the authority to dismiss an indictment. Commonwealth v. Hill, 228 S.W.3d 15, 17 (Ky. App. 2007). While there are narrow exceptions to

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this rule, 2 “an indictment is not invalid because of a defect, unless that defect tends ‘to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.’” Mitchell, 423 S.W.3d at 156 (quoting RCr 6.12).

“Courts are extremely reluctant to scrutinize grand jury proceedings as there is a strong presumption of regularity that attaches to such proceedings.” [Commonwealth v. Baker, 11 S.W.3d 585, 588 (Ky. App. 2000).] In Baker though, the Court of Appeals held a trial court had the “supervisory power to dismiss an indictment where a prosecutor knowingly or intentionally presents false, misleading or perjured testimony to the grand jury that results in actual prejudice to the defendant.” Id. The defendant must demonstrate “a flagrant abuse of the grand jury process that resulted in both actual prejudice” and that the grand jury was deprived of “autonomous and unbiased judgment.” Id.

Haney v. Commonwealth, 653 S.W.3d 559, 569 (Ky. 2022). “Actual prejudice” is established when “the indictment would not have been issued except for the perjured testimony.” Baker, 11 S.W.3d at 589 (quoting United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1985)).

James established that the officer made misstatements in his grand jury testimony as to who contracted an STI and how long Danesha knew James. However, these misstatements, whether deliberate or accidental, did not result in actual prejudice to James. The detective correctly told the grand jury that eyewitnesses and video evidence established that James shot Monroe. This testimony alone was more than sufficient for the grand jury to determine James should be indicted for murder. Any difference between James’s actual motive and the motive described by the detective was of secondary importance.

2 See Bishop, 245 S.W.3d at 735; Alexander v. Commonwealth, 556 S.W.3d 6, 9 n.1 (Ky. App. 2018); Buckner v. Commonwealth, 515 S.W.3d 670, 672 (Ky. App. 2016).

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It was undisputed that Danesha knew James and could identify him, and she was not the only eyewitness. Therefore, James failed to establish actual prejudice. We are further unconvinced that James established that the faulty testimony kept the grand jury from exercising its own judgment in choosing to indict him. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss James’s indictment under these circumstances. B. Any Error in Admitting Keiara’s Phone Statement Was Harmless.

During Johnson’s testimony, the Commonwealth asked her about overhearing a phone call made by James’s daughter Keiara. This was meant to elicit the testimony that Keiara stated “Daddy” on the phone. The defense objected on the basis that such testimony would be hearsay. The prosecution countered that this testimony would fit within the present sense impression exception to hearsay. The trial court allowed the prosecution to elicit testimony that Keiara said “Daddy” but indicated the issue was “on the verge of being very problematic.”

The Commonwealth asked: “[Johnson], when Keiara was on the phone, do you know who was on the other end of that call?”

Johnson replied: “All I heard was her say, ‘Daddy, get down here now.’”

To the extent that this statement went beyond what the trial court had ruled was permissible, when Johnson provided additional testimony which helped identify the man who later arrived as Keiara’s father, James failed to make another objection. Johnson confirmed that she believed Keiara was on

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the phone with her “Daddy” and Johnson told that to the detective that evening.

The Commonwealth then referred to this testimony in its closing argument, stating that Keiara “calls Daddy.” James objected to the Commonwealth making any further inferences from such testimony. The trial court overruled this objection on the basis that the Commonwealth has a “little leeway.” The Commonwealth proceeded to argue that Keiara was in a verbal altercation when “she calls Daddy,” and then “Daddy shows up.”

On appeal, James argues the statement should have been excluded because that “the Commonwealth failed to establish a contemporaneous foundation to support admission of Keiara’s phone statement” as Johnson did not tell the police the night of the incident about Keiara making a phone call to her father and failed to provide corroboration of the statement. James states that this testimony prejudiced him because it interfered with his defense in which he tried to cast doubt on James being the murderer by establishing that Keyshawna used her phone before the murder and she may have called someone to hurt her cheating boyfriend.

Any error in admitting this statement was harmless as we “can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 688–89 (Ky. 2009). Overwhelming evidence confirmed James met Keiara near Monroe’s house, they drove to Monroe’s house, and then James shot Monroe. James’s defense of a possible, unidentified alternative perpetrator summoned by Monroe’s

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girlfriend would not have been more effective without the testimony about Keiara’s phone call. The jury would have had to disbelieve multiple eyewitnesses and reinterpret the surveillance footage to conclude that a similar looking unknown man somehow arrived and interacted with Keiara outside of James’s house before shooting Monroe at Keyshawna’s behest. Given the overwhelming evidence James was the person who shot and killed Monroe, we affirm.

III. CONCLUSION

The Jefferson Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to dismiss James’s indictment, and any error in permitting the witness to testify as to his daughter’s statement was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm James’s conviction and sentence.

All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Jennifer Wade Steven J. Buck Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt Assistant Public Advocates

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman Attorney General of Kentucky

Matthew R. Krygiel Assistant Attorney General