Kenya Holt v. Department of the Navy

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJanuary 30, 2023
DocketSF-0752-16-0129-I-2
StatusUnpublished

This text of Kenya Holt v. Department of the Navy (Kenya Holt v. Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kenya Holt v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

KENYA K. HOLT, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-16-0129-I-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: January 30, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Kevin Mirch, Esquire, San Diego, California, for the appellant.

John William Torresala, Esquire, Camp Pendleton, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained his removal based on one charge of conduct unbecoming a civilian police officer arising from misconduct for which imprisonment may be imposed—namely, that he engaged in sexual misconduct for which he was

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

arrested and charged. Because the appellant was convicted in a California state court of forcible rape, the administrative judge found that collateral estoppel precluded him from challenging the merits of the underlying misconduct. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in applying the Board’s case law regarding collateral estoppel, that he should have applied the common law of California, and that the Board should stay his removal until his criminal conviction has been fully litigated. ¶2 Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulatio n or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to consider the new and material evidence that the appellant’s criminal conviction has been fully litigated and to apply the common law of California regarding collateral estoppel, we AFFIRM the initial decision. ¶3 The appellant asserts that the administrative judge should have applied the common law of California to analyze whether he was collaterally estopped from challenging his criminal conviction and the misconduct underlying the charge. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4. The administrative judge applied the Board’s doctrine of collateral estoppel to find that the appellant was estopped from arguing that he did not engage in the disputed misconduct. Refiled Appeal 3

File, Tab 33, Initial Decision at 5-6 (citing Kavaliauskas v. Department of the Treasury, 120 M.S.P.R. 509, ¶ 5 (2014)). However, when an appellant is found guilty of a crime under state law, the Board will apply the common law of that state regarding collateral estoppel to determine the preclusive effect of the conviction. Graybill v. U.S. Postal Service, 782 F.2d 1567, 1571-73 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see Mosby v. Department of Housing & Urban Development , 114 M.S.P.R. 674, ¶ 5 (2010). Accordingly, we modify the initial decision to consider the doctrine of collateral estoppel under California law. ¶4 Under California law, the following four criteria govern the application of collateral estoppel to issues raised in a prior criminal proceeding: (1) the prior conviction must have been for a serious offense so that the defendant was motivated to fully litigate the charges; (2) there must have been a full and fair trial to prevent convictions of doubtful validity from being used; (3) the issue on which the prior conviction is offered must of necessity have been decided at the criminal trial; and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior trial. Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1990); see, e.g., Holguin v. City of San Diego, 135 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 2015). Collateral estoppel will not be applied unless the time for appeal has elapsed. See Ayers, 895 F.2d at 1271-72. ¶5 Here, the appellant’s conviction was for a serious offense, the issues are the same, and the appellant is a party in both actions. The appellant asserts only that he has not fully litigated his conviction, and thus the Board should stay his removal to afford him the opportunity to do so. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. However, we have considered the agency’s argument and the case disposition information, submitted for the first time on review, indicating that the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division 2 (California Court of Appeal), has since affirmed the appellant’s conviction and that he did not file an appeal with the Supreme Court of California, as this evidence and argument demonstrates that the conviction has since been fully litigated. PFR File, Tab 6 at 7-8, Tab 9 at 29-36; 4

see Cleaton v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 296, ¶ 7 (2015), aff’d, 839 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The California Court of Appeal affirmed the appellant’s conviction of forcible rape on October 17, 2017. People v. Holt, No. E066715, 2017 WL 4640113 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2017) . The appellant had 10 days to file a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(e)(1). He did not do so, and the California Court of Appeal issued a remittitur on December 19, 2017, certifying that the case is complete. PFR File, Tab 9 at 31. Accordingly, the appellant’s argument that the Board should stay his removal to afford him the opportunity to fully litigate his appeal is moot. Thus, we sustain the charge and affirm the removal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Larry E. Graybill v. United States Postal Service
782 F.2d 1567 (Federal Circuit, 1986)
Cleaton v. Department of Justice
839 F.3d 1126 (Federal Circuit, 2016)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Holguin v. City of San Diego
135 F. Supp. 3d 1151 (D. South Carolina, 2015)
Ayers v. City of Richmond
895 F.2d 1267 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Kenya Holt v. Department of the Navy, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kenya-holt-v-department-of-the-navy-mspb-2023.