Kentucky v. EPA
This text of Kentucky v. EPA (Kentucky v. EPA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 24a0331n.06
Case Nos. 23-5343/5345
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED ) Jul 29, 2024 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, et ) KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk al., ) Plaintiffs - Appellants, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) v. STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE ) EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY ) ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ) AGENCY, et al., OPINION ) Defendants - Appellees. ) )
BEFORE: GIBBONS, KETHLEDGE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. The Commonwealth of Kentucky and various business associations sued
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers (“the Agencies”) to enjoin
the implementation of a new Rule altering the Clean Water Act. At issue, primarily, was the Rule’s
redefinition of the phrase “waters of the United States,” which impacts the Agencies’ jurisdiction
to regulate water pollution. Plaintiffs claimed that the Rule was unconstitutional and that it
violated the CWA and the Administrative Procedure Act.
The district court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion; and, shortly
afterwards, dismissed the suit, sua sponte and without notice, for want of standing. But in doing
so, the district court erred. Generally, “a district court may not sua sponte dismiss a complaint
where the filing fee has been paid unless the court gives the plaintiff the opportunity to amend the
complaint.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Benson v. O’Brian, 179
F.3d 1014, 1017 (6th Cir. 1999)). Instead, a district court must usually “notify all parties of its Nos. 23-5343/5345, Kentucky v. Environnemental Protection Agency, et al.
intent to dismiss the complaint” and “give the plaintiff a chance to either amend his complaint or
respond to the reasons stated by the district court in its notice of intended sua sponte dismissal[.]”
Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109, 1112 (6th Cir. 1983). This mandate exists, in part, to increase
judicial efficiency and to better ensure that meritorious cases proceed while, simultaneously,
weeding out improper claims.
Here, after each plaintiff filed its respective complaint and motion for a preliminary
injunction, the Agencies did not move to dismiss those complaints for lack of standing. Instead,
they merely opposed the motions, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to establish “a substantial
likelihood of standing” for purposes of obtaining a preliminary injunction—a “heightened
standard” that “does not apply at the pleadings stage.” Waskul v. Washtenaw County Cmty. Mental
Health, 900 F.3d 250, 255 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018). Indeed, our court has explained that an “inability
to establish a substantial likelihood of standing requires denial of the motion for preliminary
injunction, not dismissal of the case.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, the district court gave no
indication—either at the preliminary-injunction hearing or otherwise—that it might dismiss the
case in the course of deciding those motions. As a result, the plaintiffs lacked notice and the
opportunity to be heard on the question whether their complaints “plausibly alleged their standing
to sue.” Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v. Nabors, 35 F.4th 1021, 1031 (6th Cir.
2022).
True, a district court need not provide such notice—and may sua sponte dismiss a
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—where the “allegations” therein are “totally
implausible, attenuated, or unsubstantial” or where the court otherwise clearly lacks jurisdiction.
Apple, 183 F.3d at 479. But that is not the case here—which is presumably why the Agencies
make no argument to that effect. On this record, the district court erred when it dismissed the
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complaint sua sponte, without affording the plaintiffs notice and the opportunity to be heard. Cf.
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 271 (2015) (holding that, in limited
circumstances, “principles of procedural fairness” might require that a court provide the party with
“an opportunity” to show standing instead of sua sponte dismissing the action for lack of
jurisdiction).
We therefore vacate the district court’s ruling and remand the matter for further
consideration and to allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint(s). We add, however, an additional
note. During the pendency of this appeal, the Agencies amended the Rule at issue in this case.
The amendment, borne out of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651
(2023), alleviated the vast majority of Plaintiffs’ alleged harms and put the viability of this suit
into question. On remand, Plaintiffs must file notice of their intent to file a new suit, amend their
present complaint, or dispense with this litigation altogether.
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