Kentucky Bar Association v. Heather Mary Boone McKeever

• Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
• Decided: February 15, 2018
• Docket: 2017-SC-0560
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

TO BE PUBLISHED

2017-SC-000560-KB [Q)~iJ~o?/tnftK /./.,.;. Bwstttn,f>c_ • . (

KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION MOVANT

v. IN SUPREME COVRT

HEATHER MARY BOONE MCKEEVER RESPONDENT

" OPINION AND ORDER

The Kentucky Bar Association ("KBA") petitions this Court to impose

reciprocal discipline on Heather Mary Boone McKeever under Supreme Court

Rule ("SCR") 3.435. McKeever was admitted.to practice law in the

Commonwealth_ of Kentucky on October 1,2, 1990. Her bar roster address is

3250 Delong Road, Lexington, Kentucky 40515.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 20, 201 7, the Supreme Court of South Carolina rendered

an Opinion debarring McKeever for numerous violations of the. South Carolina

Rules of Professional Conduct. Matter of McKeever, 805 S.E.2d 201 (S.C.

2017). McKeever and her husband Shane Haffey moved to Charleston, South

Carolina, during the foreclosure of a loan on their Kentucky residence. Id. In . . Charleston, South Carqlina, McKeever met Betty McMichael who owned two

properties -: 991 Governors Road, where she resided, and 986 Governors Road, which she rented out. Id. at 202. Upon learning that McMichael .faced

foreclosure on these properties, McKeever repeatedly offered her legal

representation, despite not beingHcensed to practice law in South Carolina.

Id. In exchange for McKeever's legal services, McMichael permitted McKeever

and her family to live in the 986 Governors Road house rent free during the

course of the representation. I Id.

After McKeever began representing McMichael she compelled her "to

issue a quitclaim deed granting title to 986 Governors Road to Bondson

Holdings, a fictitious entity owned by McKeever and Haffey." Id. While

McKeever was granted permission to appear pro hac vice in the 986 Governors

Road foreclosure action in July 2011, she took no steps to protect McMichael's

interest in·the property. Id. Instead, McKeever filed a pleading styled "Answer

· Class Action Complaint," under the name of a South Carolina attorney who

· was serving as local counsel for her pro hac vice admission. In this pleading,

which was filed without informing local counsel or McMichae't McKeever

asserted thirty-nine affirmative defense.s to remove encumbrances on the

property and secure clear title.2 Id. "Additionally, in an attempt to delay and

hinder the foreclosure proceedings, McKeever falsely claimed that .McMichael

resided at the property, levied allegations against opposing counsel, and filed

notices of depositions· for numerous named and unnamed individuals." Id.

i McKeever obtained a possessory interest in the property, which was the subject of the litigation, without informing McMichael of the inherent conflict of interest. McKeever, 805 S.E.2d at 202. 2 After local counsel discovered that McKeever had filed an answer under her name without her consent, she requested to be relieved as counsel. Id.

2 Ultimately the mortgage holder voluntarily dismissed its action against

McMichael and afterWards McKeever filed the quitclaim deed to 986 Governors.

Road. .Id. The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that McKeever's

decision to wait to file the deed until after the foreclosure actiOn was dismissed

was designed "to avoid any discovery of her interest in the property and the

resulting conflicts of interest." Id. n. 2.

In late 2012, Bank of America purchased the entity which held the note

on 986 Governors Road and reinstituted foreclosure proceedings on the

property. Id. at 202. A title search by Bank of America led to the discovery of

the quitclaim deed granting title to Bondson Holdings. Id. Next, Bank of

America filed its action naming both McMichael and Bondson Holdings. Id.

Subsequently, McKeever ~ontacted a South-Carolina attorney, Parker Barnes

Jr., and requested that he serve as local counsel for McMichael, falsely

asserting that she was eligible to appear pro hac vice. Id. Despite not filing an

application to appear pro hac vice, McKeever continued to file motidns on

behalf of Bondson Holdings and _Haffey. Id. at 202-03. The Supr7m.e Court of

South Carolina concluded that "[i]n these various motions and pleadings,

.McKeever asserted frivolous or meritless legal positions, made false statements,

and threatened civil action and criminal prosecution against Barnes, opposing ·~

counsel, the pr~sidingjudge, and the clerk qf court." Id. at 203. Ultimately it

was necessary for a South Carolina attorney to make an appearance for

McMichael, who was able to have the case with Bank of America dismissed .in

2013. Id. at 202. Later McKeever attempted to defraud McMichael and Bank of America by

filing two lawsuits against McMichael in Kentucky. Id. at 203. In the first

action she alleged conversion and disparagement of title based on her false

claim that McMichael had encumbered the 986 Governors Road property with

a mortgage held by Bank of America after the property had been deeded to

Bondson Holdings. Id. In the second action, McKeever brought suit on behalf

of her purported law firm, McKeever Law Offices, LLC, for McMichael's alleged

failure to pay $256,000 in attorney'sfees. Id. McMichael was compelled to

hire counsel in Kentucky to defend these actions. Id. The Supreme Court of

_ South Carolina deemed McKeever's actions to be "intentionally designed to

intimidate arid coerce [McMichael], and to perpetuate the scheme to defraud

her and obtain title'to 986 Governors Road free of any encumbrances." Id.

Additionally, McKeever assisted Haffey with a bankruptcy petition filed in . ~

Kentucky for an entity he owned called Sandlin Farms, wrongfully asserting

_.,. . . that the entity owned an inten~st in 986 Governors Road. Id. The bankruptcy

petition was ultimately dismissed, with the bankruptcy court concluding that

Haffey had engaged in "an ongoing pattern of delay" abusing the bankruptcy

process. 3 Id.

In May 2013, South Carolina's Office of Disciplinary Counsel initiated an

investigation of McKeever's misconduct by serving her with a notice of

3 McKeever later unsuccessfully represented Haffey in his appeal of his bankruptcy _,case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In re Haffey, 576 B.R. 540 (B.AP. 6th Cir. 2017)).

4 investigation. 4 Id. at 204: Subsequently, McKeever failed to submit a written

response to the. allegations as mandated by Rule 19(b) of the Rules for Lawy~r

Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina

Appellate Court Rules (SCACR). Id. Additionally, McKeever "failed to appear to

answer questions under oath, failed to produce subpoenaed documents, and

made numerous false statements to mislead disciplinary counsel." Id.

Due to McKeever's failure to answer the formal charges against her or

appear at her hearing before the Commission on Lawyer. Conduct, her case was

submitted to the Supreme Court of South Carolina as a d.efault case. Id. at

201. While the charges against McKeever were deemed admitted, the Court

conducted a hearing in which McKeever participated to assess penalty. Id. At

that hearing, "McKeever offered no mitigating evidence or explanation for her

conduct." Id. ·

After considering McKeever's case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina

concluded that she violated SCACR 404(a)-(c) and the following provisions of

South Carolina's Rules of ProfessionaLConduct: 1.1 Competence; 1.2 Scope of /

4 The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that in addition to her representation of McMichael, McKeever engaged in the unauthorized practice of law on two other occasions. McKeever, 805 S.E.2d at 203. First, McKeever appeared on behalf of another homeowner facing foreclosure in 2012. Id. Second, she appeared on her adult daughter's behalf when she was charged with speeding in 2015. Id. Despite · being warned repeatedly by the arresting officer that representing her daughter would constitute unauthorized practice of law, McKeever persisted, filing a motion to dismiss arid making multiple appearances in the case. Id. As part of McKeever's representation of her daughter, "McKeever also made.numerous false statements to the court including, asserting dismissal was warranted because the State failed to appear at two earlier hearings and representing that her daughter was entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad litem, despite knowing her daughter had already reached the age of majority." Id. at n. 6.

5 \ Representation and Allocation of Authority .Between Lawyer and Client; 1.3

Diligence; 1.4 Communication; 1.5 Fees; 1. 7 Conflict of Interest: Current

Clients; 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules; 1.16 Declining

or Terminating Representation; 3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions; 3.2

Expediting Litigation; 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal; 3.4 Fairness to

Opposing Party and Counsel; 4.1 Truthfulness i~ Statements to Others; 5.5

Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law; and 8.4

Misconduct. Id. at 204.

In assessing what penalty would be appropriate for these numerous

. etbical violations, the Supreme c.ourt of South Carolina noted: McKeever's

"pattern ·of abusing thejudicial process," efforts to mask her misconduct,

"attempt[s] to intimidate a former client through meritless law~uits," "lack of

candor with various courts," and her "blatant disregard for this state's

regulation of the legal profession." Id. at 201, 204. Accordingly, the Supreme

Court of South Carolina imposed the following sanctions against McKeever: 1)

that she be "permanently debarred, prohibiting her from seeking any form of

admission to practice law (including pro hac vice admission) in South Carolina,

and prohibiting her from advertising or soliciting legal services in the state;" 2)

requiring her to pay McMichael for attorn'ey's fees related to the Kentucky court

proceedings;s arid 3) ordering her to pay the costs of the disciplinary

investigation and formal proceedings. Id. at 204. Additionally, the Supreme

s The Kentucky judge ordered McKeever to pay McMichael $1500 for her attorney's fees, but McKeever thr.eatened an appeal, causing McMichael to back off any attempt to collect.

6 Court of South- Carolina noted that it-reserved the right to void any title to real

property McKeever .wrongfully granted to herself and Haffey in violation of the

South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. Id.

On October 17, ~017, t:he KEA.petitioned this Court for reciprocal

discipline pursuant to SCR 3.435. J'he KBA requests McKeever be disbarred

from the practice of law in Kentucky as reciprocal discipline for her debarring

-in South Carolina. McKeever has filed a response to the KBA's petition and

opposes the KBA's request on multiple grounds.

ANALYSIS

The.South Carolina ethical.rules violated by McKeever are substantially

· comparable to our Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct. Under SCR 3.435

when an attorney licensed to practice law in this Commonwealth is subjected

to d_iscipline in another jurisdietion, this Court will impose identical discipline

unless the attorney proves by substantial evidence: "(a) a lack of jurisdiction or

fraud in the out-of-state disciplinary proceeding, or (b) that misconduct

established warrants substantially different discipline in this State." Further,

SCR 3.435 is clear that "[i]n all other respects, a final adjudication in another

jurisdiction that an attorney has been guilty of misconduct shall establish

conclusively the miscbnduct for purposes of a disciplinary proceeding in this ·

State."

McKeever contends that the South Carolina disciplinary proceeding was

the result of fraud. Specifically, McKeever alleges that the disciplinary

proceeding was the result of personal animus by Barbara Seymour formerly of

7 ;

the South Carolina Offic~ of Disciplinary Counsel. According to McKeever,

Seymour filed a 2016 complaint against her in concert with another South

Carolina attorney Dean Hayes - after McKeever had filed two ethics complaints

against Hayes and a law firm of which he was a member. McKeever focuses

her ire towards Seymour referring to her as a "classic bully" and stating that

her employment with the state of South Carolina was terminated. However,

McKeever has presented no evidence substantiating her attacks against

Seymour's character or establishing that there was fraud in South Carolina's

disciplinary process.

Related to McKeever's allegation of fraud in the South Carolina

disciplinary process is her claim that she was never provided with notice of the

ethics complaint by the South Carolina's Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

However, attached as an exhibit.to McKeever's pleading in this Court is a copy

of the Commission on Lawyer Conduct's Default Order against McKeever.· . In

that Order, the Commission· on Lawyer Conduct states that "[McKeever] was

served at both the address she maintains with the Kentucky State Bar arid her

last known address, which is her residence in South Carolina." Yet, even if the

Court were to disregard this Order and assume McKeever's allegation was true,

her pleading to this Court makes clear that she was aware of the ethics

complaint prior to the Supreme Court of South Carolina's adjudication of her

case.

On March 13, 2017, McKeever attempted to disrupt her disciplinary

proceedings by filing a ".Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Temporary

8 Injunction, Permanent Injunction, and Damages," which challenged the

constitutionality and jurisdiction of the South Carolina Office of Disciplinary

Counsel in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Kentucky. This pleading, which was attached as an exhibit to McKeever's

response to the KBA's motion, lists Seymour and each of the members of the

Commission on Lawyer Conduct ~s defendants irt both their official and

individual capacities. Particularly noteworthy in McKeever's pleading are the

following daims: 1) under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 for vio~ations of "ministerial and

discretionary duties" related to the disciplinary complaint filed against

McKeever; 2) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. alleging "us[e] of the mails to defraud Haffey

. of money and/ or property;" .a~d 3) for "Tortious Interference with Court

Ordered Agreements and Private Contracts."

Additionally, McK~ever alleges that Seymour "has equally att~mpted to

·invade Haffey's privacy, misused state investigative funds in regards to him,

has illegally attempted to deprive him of property, has violated his due process

rights and defamed him (if the documents have been 'publishedl" McKeever

goes on to state that "[t]he record in the -m~tter reflects Seymour's arrogant

disregard for McMichael, and her disrespect for her position as a public

servant, makes her.a menace to the public at large and she should be removed

from further participation in the [Office of Disciplinary Counsel] proceedings -

arid terminated as a public servant." McKeever asserts in her pleading to this

9 Court that a copy of this federal suit was submitted to- the Supreme Court of

·South Carolina in March 2017.6

Also, on March 17, 2017, McKeever's husband Haffey submitted a letter·

to the South Carolina Supreme Court in which he:; states that he _is the co-

owner of 986 Governors Road and that the property was subject to his Chapter

12 bankruptcy proceeding. As such, it is clear that McKeever was aware of the

disciplinary proceedings that had been instituted against her prior to the

Supreme Court of South Carolina's consideration of this case on March 22,

2017. Further, the Opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina is clear

that McKeever was present at that hearing on sanctions and "offered no

mitigating evidence or explanation for her conduct." Id. at 201.

Beyond McKeever's allegations of fraud, she also raises meritless

arguments concerning the content, finality, and transmission of the Opinion of

the Supreme Court of South Carolina. McKeever claims that the Opinion lacks

"findings of fact or conclusions of South Carolina law" and does not include

· "specific case numbers or docket sheets to instances where McKeever allegedly

engaged in the unlawful practice oflaw[.]" We disagree as the Supreme Court

of South Carolina thoroughly documented McKeever's ethical transgressions · ' and identified the numerous Rules of Professional Conduct· that she brazenly

violated. Nor do we accept her argument that the Supreme Court of South

Carolina's order is interlocutory or not final. The Supreme Court of South

6 McKeever's suit was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction on May 17, 2017. Haffey v. Seymour, Civil Action No. 5:17-124-KKC, 2017 WL 2175470 (E.D. Ky. 201~. .

10 Caroliha's willingness to void any title to real property McKeever wrongfully

granted to herself and Haffey in violation of the South Carolina Rules of

Professional Conduct does not make the Court's order interlocutory. Nor has

McKeever presented any evidence that she has sought to forestall enforcement

of the Opinion, by petitioning the Supreme Court of South Carolina for

reconsideration or seeking to enjoin enforcement of the decision by a federal.

court with jurisdiction to consider the case. 7 s

Finally, McKeever argues that this Court should not disbar her as

reciprocal discipline for her debarring in South Carolina.. First, McKeever /

contends that the action of the Supreme Court of South Carolina was

improper, by alleging that there is no provision-for "debarment" in South

Carolina's RLDE. M~Keever is correct that at the time she was sanctioned that

debarment was not a specifically enumerated punishment for attorney

misconduct.9 However, Rule 7 of the RLDE includes a catch-all provision to

provide the. Supreme Court of South Carolina with "broad powers" to impose

1 We are similarly unmoved by McKeever's argument that she has not received a copy of the Opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. McKeever claims that due to her failure to receive a copy of the Opinion that she was deprived "of the opportunity to contact the Kentucky Bar proactively, leaving [her] blindsided with lack of opportunity to meet with the Kentucky Bar as to a resolution without the use of the Court's resources and without litigation." We are skeptical of McKeever's claim that · she did not receive a copy of the Opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. However, even if McKeever had not initially received a copy of the Opinion, which is publicly accessible; she does not identify how it has prejudiced.her in this proceeding. s McKeever also alleges that the Opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina interferes-with a "Kentucky Federal Order." However, this argument is unpersuasive given that McKeever fails to even identify what federal case would supposedly be impacted by the Opinion of the Supreme Court of South· Caroiina. 9 After the adjudication ofMcKeever's case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina amended its rules to explicitly identify debarment as an available penalty for ethics violations. ·

11 any other requirements or sanctions it deems appropriate. See In re Crews,

698 S.E.2d 785, 795 (S.C. 2010). As such, there was no issue with the

Supreme Court of South Carolina debarring McKeever for her ethical violations.

Second, McKeever contends that disbarring her would be an

inappropriate punishment undet these circumstances. Tacitly arguing for a

sanction short of disbarment, McKeever notes that attorneys who are disbarred ·

in South Carolina are permitted to apply for reinstatement after a five-year

period, whereas disbarment in Kentucky is irrevocable. In considering what

disciplinary sanction is appropriate for McKeever, we note that this Court has

on occasion imposed a lesser sanction when reciprocal discipline is sought by J

the KBA. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Association v.. Moeves, 297 S.W.3d 552 (Ky.·

20.09).

While we appreciate McKeever's argument that our disciplinary process

differs from some of our sister states, such as South Carolina, in that

disbarment in this Commonwealth is irrevocable, we find that this penalty is

the sanction appropriate for her pattern of serious misconduct. Her

misconduct certainly . does not warrant "substantially differ~nt discipline" . in

Kentucky.· SCR 3.435. While McKeever has no prior discipline, her serial

misconduct reflects adversely on the profession of law. "The practice of law is

an honorable profession and no lawyer should ever do any act or acts that

would in any way reflect poorly upon the honorable profession of law." Grisby

v. Kentucky Bar Association, 181 S.W.3d 40, 42 (Ky. 2005) (citing Kentucky Bar

Association v. Burbank, 539 S.W.2d 312 (Ky. 1976)). "It is a fong standing

12 principle that for one to be worthy to practice law, the person must have a good

moral character upon entering the profession, and must maintain such

character all through his or her professional life. Id. (citing In re Lane, 291

S.W.2d (Ky. 1956)).

It is clear that McKeever abused her relationship of trust and confidence

with McMichael in an unsuccessful scheme to obtain the residence located at

986 Governors Road. Additionally, McKeever's unethical actions were not

limited to the courts of South Carolina, as she wrongly employed the judicial

process of this Commonwealth tO subject McMichael to further harassment.

McKeever's conduct in the two other unauthorized practice cases further

illustrates her willful disregard of professional conduct rules. Having reviewed

the record, we find substantial evidence supporting the Supreme Court of

South Carolina's debarment of McKeever and no evidence or credible argument

justifying "substantially different discipline" in Kentucky.

Accordingly, having concluded reciprocal discipline is appropriate

pursuant to SCR 3.435, this Court ORDERS:

1. Heather Mary Boone McKeever is subject to reciprocal discipline for ,,•

the misconduct found by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. McKeever's

misconduct is established conclusively for purposes of disciplinary proceedings

in this State:

2. Under SCR 3.435(4) McKeever is permanently disbarred from the

practice of law in Kentucky, effective ten (10) days from the date of th~

rendition of this Opinion and Order.

13 3. McKeever must notify all courts and clients of her disbarment in

accordance with SCR 3.390. Those notifications must be made by letter in the

United State mail within ten (10) days from the date of entry of this Opinion

and Order. McKeever must also simultaneously provide a copy of all

notification letters to the Office of Bar Counsel. Also, to the extent possible,

McKeever must cancel and cease any advertising activities in which she is

engaged; AND

4. In accordance with SCR 3.450, McKeever is directed to pay all costs

associated with these disciplinary proceedings . against her,. if . there are any, for

which execution may issue from this Court upon finality of this Opinion and

Order.

All sitting. All concur.

ENTERED: February 15, 2018.