Kentucky Bar Association v. Clyde F. Johnson

437 S.W.3d 137, 2014 WL 1512236
CourtKentucky Supreme Court
DecidedMay 6, 2014
Docket2014-SC-000043-KB
StatusUnknown
Cited by3 cases

This text of 437 S.W.3d 137 (Kentucky Bar Association v. Clyde F. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Kentucky Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kentucky Bar Association v. Clyde F. Johnson, 437 S.W.3d 137, 2014 WL 1512236 (Ky. 2014).

Opinion

*138 OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN MINTON, Chief Judge.

The Board of Governors (the Board) of the Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) recommends this Court suspend Clyde F. Johnson (Johnson) from the practice of law for thirty (30) days; require Johnson’s attendance to the Ethics and Professional Enhancement Program (EPEP); and refer Johnson to the Kentucky Lawyers’ Assistance Program (KYLAP). Finding sufficient cause to do so, we adopt the Board’s recommendations. Johnson, whose KBA number is 84172 and whose bar address is 181 East Court Street, P.O. Box 763, Pres-tonsburg, Kentucky 41653, was admitted to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Kentucky on October 17, 1991.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History and Charges

On February 13, 2013, the Inquiry Commission issued a complaint and subsequently issued charges accusing Johnson of violating SCR 3.130-1.3(c) — which states, “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client;” SCR 3.130-1.4(a) — which states in pertinent part, “[a] lawyer shall (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; [and] (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;” and SCR 3.130-1.16(d)— which states in pertinent part, “[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client ... and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred.”

These charges arose from actions Johnson took while representing Mike and Debby Goodman (the Goodmans) in an action to enforce a tax lien on real property. After Mr. Goodman met with Johnson on May 7, 2010, for a free consultation, Mr. Goodman paid Johnson $500.00, an amount which Johnson estimated as fees and costs for the case. For more than two years following the initial consultation, Mr. Goodman attempted to contact Johnson many times about the pendency of their matter. Having not spoken to Johnson since May 7, 2010, on August 13, 2012, Mr. Goodman sent Johnson a letter via certified mail demanding the return of the $500.00, but the letter was returned unclaimed.

On October 10, 2012, the Goodmans filed a bar complaint against Johnson. On November 19, 2012, Johnson responded to the complaint by stating he admitted the allegations of the complaint in essence, and that he had failed to vigorously pursue the Goodmans’ case. Johnson also outlined remedial measures to ensure a similar problem would not occur again. Johnson then returned the $500.00 to Mr. Goodman in December 2012. On February 13, 2013, the Inquiry Commission issued the aforementioned complaint with three (3) charges. Count I of the charge alleges Johnson violated SGR 3.130-1.3(c) by fail *139 ing to diligently pursue or file the Good-mans’ case: Count II of the charge alleges Johnson violated SCR S.130-1.4(a) by not communicating with the Goodmans about the status of their case, by not returning their phone calls, and by not responding to their letters requesting information. Count III of the charge alleges Johnson violated SCR 8.130 — 1.16(d) by abandoning the Goodmans’ case and not refunding the unearned fee until a subsequent bar complaint was filed against him.

On March 11, 2013, Johnson filed an answer to the charges in which he admitted the veracity of every statement of the charge. Additionally, Johnson accepted responsibility for his actions, and stated he was willing to accept discipline as deemed appropriate. On July 10, 2013, the Louisville Courier-Journal reported that Johnson disappeared on or about June 24, 2013. Johnson remains missing. On August 14, 2013, Bar Counsel filed a motion to submit briefs to the Board pursuant to SCR 3.210(2).

On August 26, 2013, Emergency Temporary Curators appointed by the Floyd Circuit Court filed a response on behalf of Johnson in opposition to Bar Counsel’s motion. On August 28, 2013, Bar Counsel filed a reply to the response stating that the Emergency Temporary Curators do not represent Johnson in this disciplinary matter and that Johnson had already admitted the veracity of the allegations in the charge. On September 9, 2013, the President, President Elect, and Vice President granted Bar Counsel’s motion to submit briefs. Johnson has not replied to Bar Counsel’s brief.

B. The Board’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations

The Board, after summarizing the above, found that Johnson: was properly served with the Commission’s complaint; filed a response admitting the veracity of every statement set forth therein; and was prepared to accept his discipline.

Based on its findings, the Board, by a vote of 17-0, recommended that Johnson be found guilty on all three counts. Considering that Johnson had a prior history of multiple instances of discipline, the Board recommended, by a vote of 11-6, that Johnson be: suspended from the practice of law for thirty (30) days; required to attend EPEP; and referred to KYLAP.

II. ANALYSIS

Johnson has not contested the accuracy of the charges and there is sufficient evidence to support the Board’s findings of fact. Therefore, we accept the Board’s recommendation and find Johnson guilty of violating SCR 3.130-1.3(c), SCR 3.130-1.4(a), and SCR 3.130-1.16(d). Additionally, we find that the Emergency Temporary Curators were appointed for the maintenance of Johnson’s law firm, which is solely separate and apart from a disciplinary action; furthermore, Johnson previously admitted the veracity of the allegations in the charges against him. We therefore give the Emergency Temporary Curators’ argument no weight. As to the appropriate punishment, Bar Counsel recommended in its brief to the Board that a public reprimand would be the appropriate sanction. Johnson never replied to Bar Counsel’s brief. Bar Counsel argued that case law concerning similar violations and the existence of aggravating factors supported that penalty.

In Lutes v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 338 S.W.3d 278 (Ky.2011), Lutes’s clients paid him $375.00 to represent their interests in a child visitation action. Lutes failed to work on the case and failed to communicate with his clients. Moreover, he placed *140 the $375.00 in his operating account prior to it being earned, and the $375.00 was not returned until a bar complaint was filed against him. Lutes admitted the violation of SCR 3.130-1.3, 1.4(a), 1.15(a) & (b), and 1.16(d); he agreed to a public reprimand with the condition that he attend EPEP. Lutes’s disciplinary record consisted of a private admonition in 2009 for similar wrongdoing, and an ongoing suspension for a failure to pay bar dues at the time of the 2011 case.

In Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Zimmerman, 324 S.W.3d 413

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Related

Kentucky Bar Association v. Clyde F. Johnson
457 S.W.3d 720 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
437 S.W.3d 137, 2014 WL 1512236, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kentucky-bar-association-v-clyde-f-johnson-ky-2014.