KENTUCKY BAR ASS'N v. Sebastian

353 S.W.3d 616, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 125, 2011 WL 4431185
CourtKentucky Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 22, 2011
Docket2011-SC-000311-KB
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 353 S.W.3d 616 (KENTUCKY BAR ASS'N v. Sebastian) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Kentucky Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
KENTUCKY BAR ASS'N v. Sebastian, 353 S.W.3d 616, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 125, 2011 WL 4431185 (Ky. 2011).

Opinion

*617 OPINION AND ORDER

The Respondent, Ruth Ann Sebastian, KBA Member Number 81972, whose Bar roster address is P.O. Box 8716, Lexington, Kentucky 40353, and who was admitted to the Kentucky Bar on April 24,1987, is alleged to have committed multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Responsibility. A trial commissioner appointed by the Chief Justice has heard the matter, found by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent committed the violations, and recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for nine months, which the Court deems to be 270 days. This Court adopts the recommendation.

I. Background

The matter stems from three separate case files, which have been consolidated.

A. KBA File 11323

Respondent was hired by Dwayne Rider and his siblings in 2002 to probate the estate of their mother, Alice Hedger. She was also retained to investigate some real estate issues related to the estate and evaluate a prospective lawsuit against Mrs. Hedger’s brother arising out of the estate. Respondent was paid $10,000 for the representation, by a check from Trina Jolly. 1

Respondent filed an entry of appearance in the probate case, but did nothing further. Communication between her and her clients broke down. Though there is some evidence that an address change by Mr. Rider contributed to this, the trial commissioner found that Respondent made “no serious effort ... to maintain contact with the Riders.” The trial commissioner noted that a woman named Carol Hughes, who identified herself as a paralegal working for the Kentucky Department for Workers’ Claims, testified that she had done some real estate title research and had made copies of some deeds on Respondent’s behalf. None of this material, however, was produced to the clients or the trial commissioner. The commissioner also noted that Respondent claimed to have performed some tasks related to the estate, including contacting realtors and appraisers, but she had no documentation of this work and could not even identify the persons she claimed to have spoken with. Respondent also claimed to have prepared a report of her research, which was sent to Mr. Rider. But he never received it. When she was told of this, she claimed to have sent the report a second time, this time the original, leaving her with no copy. Again, Mr. Rider never received this report.

Mr. Rider eventually hired another attorney, who requested the files, any re *618 ports, and a refund of the fee. Respondent claimed that she could not produce any of this because water had damaged her files, and the alleged report and computer on which it had been prepared.

Despite claiming to have done work on the case, Respondent could not produce any documentary evidence — no mailing receipts, no phone records, no water-damaged files. As the commissioner concluded, “[ajpparently, not even a trace of ... Respondent’s work remained.”

These actions led the Inquiry Commission to issue a three-count charge against Respondent alleging violations of SCR 3.130-1.3, 2 which required diligent and timely work; SCR 3.130-1.5(a), which required a lawyer’s fee to be reasonable; and SCR 3.130-1.16(d), which required the return of a client’s papers and refund of any unearned fee upon the end of representation.

B. KBA File 15045

Respondent represented Naomi Hughes before her death, having drafted a revocable living trust in 1999 and a will in 2001. In 2002, Naomi executed a new will drafted by one of her sons, Gregory Hughes naming another son, Ross Hughes, as executor of her estate. She also revoked the 1999 trust and transferred ownership of her home to her sons. She died in November 2002, less than a month later.

In February 2003, Respondent filed an entry of appearance in the probate of Naomi’s estate, claiming to be her attorney and including a statement describing the circumstances around the preparation of the previous trust and will. She also filed an objection to the pleadings filed by the attorney for the estate, a proposed settlement agreement, and several other documents. She also filed a circuit court action seeking to set aside several of the deeds transferring property from Naomi to her sons. Essentially, Respondent sought to inject herself into the probate of the estate and to challenge the proposed settlement of the estate, which she felt did not comply with her understanding of the decedent’s wishes. To justify her actions, Respondent claimed to have known Naomi’s wishes and that she “was trying to represent Naomi’s interests rather than Naomi herself.”

The trial commissioner found that at some point, Respondent was essentially trying to represent Carol Hughes, one of Naomi’s daughters, who was actually represented by her lawyer. She is the same Carol Hughes referred to above who claimed to have done some work for Respondent.

Respondent did not reply when she was served with a copy of the bar complaint in this file.

The commissioner noted that while Respondent’s actions demonstrated a clear ignorance of her ethical responsibilities, they did not involve a bad motive.

The Inquiry Commission issued a four-count charge alleging violations of SCR 3.130-1.1, which requires competent representation, for her filing a document claiming to represent a dead person (the statement describing the previous will and trust); SCR 3.130-1.9(a), which bars representing a client whose interests are materially adverse to a former client’s, for representing Carol Hughes; SCR 3.130-3.7(a), which bars an attorney from being an advocate in a matter in which she is likely to be a witness, for having made *619 factual claims about Naomi’s actions and wishes; and 3.130-8.1(b), which bars an attorney from knowingly failing to respond to a bar complaint.

C. KBA File 16493

This file arises solely from Respondent’s failure to respond to orders of the Court of Appeals. Respondent represented an appellant in a case before that court in 2007. Three months after Respondent filed the notice of appeal, the court issued an order requiring Respondent to file a status report and inquiring about the pre-hearing statement that had not been filed, despite being required by court rules. Respondent did not comply with the order.

Several months later, the appellee in the case moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Respondent did not reply to the motion, and the court granted it. In its dismissal order, the court ordered Respondent to show cause why she should not be fined for having failed to comply with court’s previous order. Respondent did not respond to this order.

The court then issued a series of orders requiring Respondent to appear before it, none of which she heeded. Eventually, the court held Respondent in contempt, ordered her to pay a $500 fine, and referred the matter of her noncompliance to the bar association for possible disciplinary proceedings.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
353 S.W.3d 616, 2011 Ky. LEXIS 125, 2011 WL 4431185, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kentucky-bar-assn-v-sebastian-ky-2011.