Kentucky Bank & Trust Co. v. Duncan (In Re Duncan)

35 B.R. 323, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 4799, 11 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 374
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedDecember 21, 1983
Docket19-30626
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 35 B.R. 323 (Kentucky Bank & Trust Co. v. Duncan (In Re Duncan)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kentucky Bank & Trust Co. v. Duncan (In Re Duncan), 35 B.R. 323, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 4799, 11 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 374 (Ky. 1983).

Opinion

*324 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MERRITT S. DEITZ, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

Kentucky Bank & Trust Co. v. Duncan comes to us as part of the “new pattern of farm bankruptcy litigation” which we easily predicted after a period of high interest rates, restricted credit and statewide crop failures. 1 The case appears to be a fairly typical illustration of farm lending practices in rural Kentucky, and its outcome turns on the question of whether there was “reasonable reliance” by the creditor in lending money based upon an admittedly incorrect financial statement.

Dennis Duncan is a farmer in Madison-ville, Kentucky. Like many others, he capitalized on the easy credit of the 1970s by expanding his farming operation. He worked with the Green River Production Credit Association, and its loan officer, Norman Herron, during the years 1971-1976. 2 Mr. Herron became a vice president at Kentucky Bank and Trust in 1977, and his financial relationship with Duncan continued. Acting through Herron, the bank made loans to Duncan during the next three years, which were paid in full.

In 1980 Kentucky Bank and Trust extended four farm loans to Duncan: $5,000 on March 5; $15,008 on March 11; $20,008 on April 15; and $5,000 on May 22, 1980. The total debt of $45,016 stood unpaid at the time of Duncan’s bankruptcy in March, 1982.

A financial statement and three security agreements were executed during these transactions. 3 Duncan's agricultural financial statement listed assets of $1,742,000 and liabilities of $862,000.- In this proceeding he has stipulated to a corrected statement which shows that his liabilities at the time totaled $1,437,962.

The current problem developed after the 1980 crop failure. The collateral was destroyed and the loans remain unpaid. After Duncan filed a Chapter 7 petition this adversary petition was initiated by the bank. It complains that the debtor’s financial statement was false, and that he falsely represented to the bank that the security interests granted were first and superior liens.

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Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code identifies those debts which will be excepted from discharge. Debts for obtaining money, property, services, or an extension, renewal or refinancing of credit through the use of a false financial statement are within the nondischargeable category. This cause of action is comprised of five elements:

(1) a statement in writing,
(2) that is materially false,
(3) respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition,
(4) on which the creditor reasonably relied, and
(5) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive. 4

• A creditor must prove all five elements by clear and convincing evidence before a debt is excepted from discharge.

The original and corrected financial statements are proof positive of the first three elements. It is the fourth element, reliance, which is the crucial element in this case. Kentucky Bank and Trust must show that it in fact relied on Duncan’s statement, and that its reliance was reasonable. 5 Kentucky Bank’s witnesses predictably testified that they relied on Duncan’s financial statement in approving the 1980 loans.

*325 Reliance is a totally subjective phenomenon, not amenable to direct proof. Often circumstantial evidence must suffice. A loan requirement of a full financing statement and security agreements, which was the procedure followed in this case, are some indicia of actual reliance by a lender. Yet the statute requires even further scrutiny; we must test the reliance for reasonableness.

The code does not specify what is meant by “reasonable reliance”, but federal courts have given some meaning to this phrase, while trying to avoid second-guessing the lending policies of affected creditors.

Shortly after the enactment of the Code, the Seventh Circuit outlined a stringently pro-creditor standard in Matter of Garman, 643 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir.1980). It held that reasonable reliance was lacking when “a creditor’s reliance on the financial statement would be so unreasonable as not to be actual reliance at all.” 6 In other words, virtually any reliance is enough.

We derive little assistance from Garman. Its tautological quality does not facilitate an analysis of what constitutes “reasonable” reliance, nor- is it easily reconcilable with Congress’ intent to have courts consider reliance as an independent requirement among the components which, taken together, comprise actionable misrepresentation. Actual reliance and reasonable reliance are distinguishable phenomena, and we cannot pretend otherwise.

Later courts have departed from the simplicity of the Garman standard. Categories of “unreasonable reliance,” based on the facts surrounding the commercial transaction, have been judicially fashioned. At least four such classifications have emerged, involving cases where: (1) the creditor knows that the financial information is not accurate; (2) the statement contains obviously inadequate financial information; (3) the creditor’s investigation of the statement suggests its falsity or incompleteness; and (4) the creditor fails to verify information on the statement.

Relief is denied in such cases. 7 Creditors who rely on financial statements in these circumstances are considered as having acted “unreasonably,” and have not prevailed in § 523(a)(2)(B) challenges.

In the case before us, we conclude that reliance on the statement supplied by Duncan was unreasonable.

Duncan’s loan negotiations involved Mr. Herron, a vice-president of the bank. These two were not strangers, but had “had a close working relationship” 8 since 1972. For many years, during much of the growth period of the Duncan farm operation, Her-ron was a PCA agent. He necessarily was aware of Duncan’s actual financial profile, because it was his task to know minute details about his client and to maintain an intimate familiarity with the farm business. Consequently, just as Mr. Herron knew that Duncan had PCA “Agri-Facts” available with which to complete the bank financial statement, 9 he knew or must have known that Duncan had understated his liabilities.

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Bluebook (online)
35 B.R. 323, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 4799, 11 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 374, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kentucky-bank-trust-co-v-duncan-in-re-duncan-kywb-1983.