Kenton Lee Bernard, A/K/A Kenneth Lee Madden, A/K/A Kenneth Lee Bishop, A/K/A Larry Wells v. United States

872 F.2d 376, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 6073, 1989 WL 35882
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedMay 3, 1989
Docket88-8309
StatusPublished

This text of 872 F.2d 376 (Kenton Lee Bernard, A/K/A Kenneth Lee Madden, A/K/A Kenneth Lee Bishop, A/K/A Larry Wells v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kenton Lee Bernard, A/K/A Kenneth Lee Madden, A/K/A Kenneth Lee Bishop, A/K/A Larry Wells v. United States, 872 F.2d 376, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 6073, 1989 WL 35882 (11th Cir. 1989).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

In affirming the district court, we reject the appellant’s contention that stealing and transporting interstate a vehicle with the attached trailer constitutes one criminal action warranting concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1983, Kenton Lee Bernard pleaded guilty to two violations of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2312 (West 1970) (interstate transportation of stolen vehicles) and to one violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2314 (West 1970) (interstate transportation of a trailer attached to one of the vehicles). The district court sentenced Bernard to five years in prison for each section 2312 violation and to ten years in prison for the section 2314 violation. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively.

In 1987, Bernard filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1971) challenging the constitutionality of his punishment. Bernard contended that the court’s imposition of consecutive sentences violated the fifth amendment’s prohibition against double jeopardy.

The government contended that theft of the vehicle and the trailer constituted separate criminal actions. The government argued that theft of the vehicle violated section 2312 because the vehicle was “self-propelled.” * Theft of the trailer, the government argued, violated section 2314 because the trailer constituted non-self-propelled “goods.”

In February, 1988, the district court summarily denied Bernard’s section 2255 motion.

II. DISCUSSION

The issue in this appeal is whether the district court violated the fifth amendment’s prohibition against double jeopardy by imposing consecutive sentences for Bernard’s violations of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2312 and 2314.

Double jeopardy prohibits a court from imposing greater punishment than the legislature intended. United States v. Ricks, 817 F.2d 692, 698 (11th Cir.1987) (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983)). “To support a claim of double jeopardy, a defendant must show that the offenses are in law and fact the same offense.” United States v. Vaughn, 859 F.2d 863, 864 (11th Cir.1988). Stealing a vehicle and an attached trailer are not “in law and fact the same offense.” Bernard’s actions violated two separate statutes; one relating to self-propelled “vehicles” and another relating to non-self-propelled “goods.” The fact that the good was attached to the vehicle does not merge the violations. See United States v. Kidding, 560 F.2d 1303, 1308-09 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872, 98 S.Ct. 217, 54 L.Ed.2d 151 (1977) (“[W]e think it likely that dealing illicitly with a tractor and trailer, even if the two items are already hooked together when stolen and when moving in interstate commerce, involves a larger misdeed than dealing with a single trailer.”); United States v. Lofty, 455 F.2d 506 (4th Cir.1972) (a trailer is not self-propelled and should be defined as a “good” rather than as a “vehicle”); and United States v. Kelly, 435 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921, 91 S.Ct. 909, 27 L.Ed.2d 802 (1971) (trailer constitutes “good” because it is not self-propelled). Further, section 2312 requires proof that the stolen item constitutes a self-propelled vehicle. Section 2314 requires no such proof. See Vaughn, 859 F.2d at 864 (“Whether multiple charges constitute one offense turns on whether each charge requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.”). See also *378 United States v. Maldonado, 849 F.2d 522, 524 (11th Cir.1988) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)).

The district court’s imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate the fifth amendment’s prohibition against double jeopardy. Accordingly, the district court’s denial of Bernard’s section 2255 motion is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

*

Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 2311 (West 1970) defines a motor vehicle as "an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle designed for land but not on rails.” (Emphasis added.)

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Related

Blockburger v. United States
284 U.S. 299 (Supreme Court, 1931)
Missouri v. Hunter
459 U.S. 359 (Supreme Court, 1983)
United States of America, and v. Claud Mason Kelly
435 F.2d 1288 (Ninth Circuit, 1971)
United States v. Edward Lofty
455 F.2d 506 (Fourth Circuit, 1972)
United States v. Joseph Kidding and Earl Brown
560 F.2d 1303 (Seventh Circuit, 1977)
United States v. Kevin Anthony Ricks
817 F.2d 692 (Eleventh Circuit, 1987)
United States v. Luis Francisco Maldonado
849 F.2d 522 (Eleventh Circuit, 1988)
United States v. Charlie Joe Vaughn
859 F.2d 863 (Eleventh Circuit, 1988)
Garcia v. Gilman
434 U.S. 872 (Supreme Court, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
872 F.2d 376, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 6073, 1989 WL 35882, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kenton-lee-bernard-aka-kenneth-lee-madden-aka-kenneth-lee-bishop-ca11-1989.