Kent v. Consumers Co.

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Kent v. Consumers Co.

173 S.E. 235, 48 Ga. App. 667, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 157

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 28, 1934

Docket23352

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 173 S.E. 235 (Kent v. Consumers Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Kent v. Consumers Co., 173 S.E. 235, 48 Ga. App. 667, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 157 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934).

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Opinion

Stephens, J.

1. Where an alleged unsafe condition of premises which causes injuries to a person going thereon is from a defect in the construction or in some permanent condition of the premises, and not a mere temporary condition containing no element of permanency, an allegation, in a suit against the owner of the premises to recover damages resulting from the injuries, that the defendant had “allowed” the premises to become in such condition, is sufficient as an allegation that the condition of the premises was known to the defendant.

2. The condition existing where an electric wire is stretched across a part of a building and is attached to the building for support, and, because of the distance between the supports and the lack of an intervening support, becomes unfastened and sags and is a menace to people moving about on the floor of the building, is a condition in the construction of the premises, and one which is not merely temporary and without an element of permanency in it.

3. The petition set out a cause of action, and was not subject to the demurrer interposed.

[668]*668Decided February 28, 1934. J oseph D. Lewis, J ohn B. Strother, for plaintiff. McDaniel, Neely & Marshall, W. N. Baird, for defendant.

4. The petition, in alleging that the person killed by coming in contact with the electric wire upon the defendant’s premises was there at the invitation of the person in charge of the defendant’s business thereon, and that the defendant knew of the invitation and consented thereto, is sufficient to withstand a demurrer on the ground that it appears from the petition that the person was on the premises as a trespasser.

Judgment reversed.

Jenkins, P. J., concurs. Sutton, J., dissents.

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Stephens, J.

1. Where an alleged unsafe condition of premises which causes injuries to a person going thereon is from a defect in the construction or in some permanent condition of the premises, and not a mere temporary condition containing no element of permanency, an allegation, in a suit against the owner of the premises to recover damages resulting from the injuries, that the defendant had “allowed” the premises to become in such condition, is sufficient as an allegation that the condition of the premises was known to the defendant.

2. The condition existing where an electric wire is stretched across a part of a building and is attached to the building for support, and, because of the distance between the supports and the lack of an intervening support, becomes unfastened and sags and is a menace to people moving about on the floor of the building, is a condition in the construction of the premises, and one which is not merely temporary and without an element of permanency in it.

3. The petition set out a cause of action, and was not subject to the demurrer interposed.

[668]*668Decided February 28, 1934. J oseph D. Lewis, J ohn B. Strother, for plaintiff. McDaniel, Neely & Marshall, W. N. Baird, for defendant.

4. The petition, in alleging that the person killed by coming in contact with the electric wire upon the defendant’s premises was there at the invitation of the person in charge of the defendant’s business thereon, and that the defendant knew of the invitation and consented thereto, is sufficient to withstand a demurrer on the ground that it appears from the petition that the person was on the premises as a trespasser.

Judgment reversed.

Jenkins, P. J., concurs. Sutton, J., dissents.

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173 S.E. 235, 48 Ga. App. 667, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 157, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kent-v-consumers-co-gactapp-1934.

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