Kent Tenneson Sams v. State of Idaho

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52503

KENT TENNESON SAMS, )

) Filed: August 21, 2026 Petitioner-Appellant, )

) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk v. )

) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED STATE OF IDAHO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Respondent. )

)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Peter G. Barton, District Judge.

Judgment summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

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MELANSON, Judge Pro Tem Kent Tenneson Sams appeals from a judgment summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Following a jury trial, Sams was found guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (I.C. §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005(9)) and subsequently admitted to being a persistent violator (I.C. § 19-2514). Sams was sentenced to a unified term of life imprisonment, with a minimum period of confinement of thirteen years. Sams did not file a motion under I.C.R. 35.

On September 22, 2022, Sams challenged the length of his sentence in a direct appeal and this Court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See State v. Sams, Docket No. 50114 (Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2023). On April 4, 2024, Sams filed a pro se petition and affidavit for post-conviction

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relief. Sams requested the assistance of counsel, which the district court granted. Sams was given until May 31, 2024, to amend his post-conviction petition, but no proposed amendments were filed. The State filed a motion for summary dismissal, and the district court held a hearing on the motion during which Sams presented no evidence in opposition. The district court subsequently summarily dismissed Sams’s petition for post-conviction relief. Sams appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010); Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 923. Over questions of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069; Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).

III.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Sams asserts the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief without providing him with twenty days’ notice of the reason the petition was dismissed and an opportunity to respond. Sams also contends that, had the trial court known of his medical condition through a current GAIN assessment, his sentence would have been more lenient. Sams argues that he properly raised this issue in his petition for post-conviction relief. The State responds that Sams has failed to establish that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition. We agree with the State.

The scope of post-conviction relief is limited. Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 438, 163 P.3d 222, 227 (Ct. App. 2007). A petition for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal. I.C. § 19-4901(b). A claim or issue that was or could have been raised on appeal may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings. Id.; Mendiola v. State, 150 Idaho 345, 348-49, 247 P.3d 210, 213-14 (Ct. App. 2010). Idaho Code Section 19-4901(a)(4) provides that a person may seek post-conviction relief if “there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.” Idaho Code Section 19-4901(b) provides that this remedy “is not a substitute . . . for any remedy incident to

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the proceedings in the trial court.” Post-conviction relief proceedings are designed to permit a challenge to an underlying conviction or to an illegal sentence; they are not intended as a means of pursuing a collateral attack upon the manner in which the trial court exercised its sentencing discretion. Brandt v. State, 118 Idaho 350, 352, 796 P.2d 1023, 1025 (1990).

Where the State has filed a motion for summary dismissal, but the court dismisses the petition on grounds different from those asserted in the State’s motion, it does so on its own initiative and the court must provide twenty days’ notice. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). If the district court dismisses on grounds not contained in the State’s motion, the petitioner has no opportunity to respond and attempt to establish a material issue of fact. Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 865, 243 P.3d 675, 681 (Ct. App. 2010).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, when a district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition relying in part on the same grounds presented by the State in its motion for summary dismissal, the notice requirement has been met. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010). In Kelly, the petitioner argued the district court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief because the State’s motion for summary dismissal contained no notice of the grounds on which his claim was dismissed and the district court dismissed several of his claims on grounds entirely different than the grounds argued by the State. The State’s motion sought dismissal on the grounds that there was no evidentiary basis to support Kelly’s claims, and the State supported its conclusion citing extensively from Idaho law. Id. at 522, 236 P.3d at 1282. The district court considered Kelly’s petition under several grounds not raised by the State, but it also dismissed Kelly’s claims on the ground that Kelly did not provide facts sufficient to support his claims. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Kelly was afforded sufficient notice because, when a district court summarily dismisses a petition for post-conviction relief based in part on the arguments presented by the State, the notice requirements of I.C. § 19-4906(b) are satisfied. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 523, 236 P.3d at 1283.

In this case, the State requested summary dismissal because Sams failed to support the claims he asserted in his petition for post-conviction relief. Sams failed to provide any information on how his medical history would have affected his GAIN assessment or why receiving a new GAIN assessment would have changed his sentence. Furthermore, the State argued that Sams’s claim that he was denied a GAIN assessment was not supported by the record because he had

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voluntarily waived a new GAIN assessment. Finally, the State asserted that I.C. § 19-4901(b) foreclosed Sams’s claim in post-conviction because the claim could have been raised on direct appeal. The State contended that Sams did not pursue action under I.C.R. 35, which is the proper avenue for a reduction in sentence based on new information and is a remedy incident to proceedings at the trial court. Post-conviction relief is not a substitute for a remedy under I.C.R. 35. The district court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal based on the arguments presented by the State. The district court found that all of Sams’s claims in his petition for post-conviction relief “could have been brought on direct appeal” and were improper under I.C. § 19-4901(b). Because the district court summarily dismissed Sams’s post-conviction petition relying, in part, on the same grounds presented by the State in its motion for summary dismissal, the notice requirement was met.

On appeal, Sams also argues that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief where Sams’s claim regarding his missing GAIN evaluation could not have been raised on direct appeal because it was not preserved by an objection. We disagree. If Sams contends the trial court had an obligation to order a GAIN evaluation as part of the sentencing process, such a claim could be raised on direct appeal. Accordingly, the district court correctly held that this claim was not cognizable in post-conviction because it could have been raised on direct appeal. To the extent Sams is contending trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve a claim related to the lack of a GAIN evaluation, Sams did not allege a claim in his petition.

In addition, Sams also fails to argue that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to sentencing without a GAIN evaluation. Even assuming that Sams has raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact in support of such a claim. A petition for post-conviction relief, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, will survive a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s case. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000). Sams has not presented any argument regarding how he was prejudiced by the lack of a GAIN evaluation at sentencing. Without such, he cannot

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show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing any potential ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Sams was provided adequate notice of the bases for dismissing his post-conviction petition and failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on any of his claims. Sams has, therefore, failed to show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Sams has failed to show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment summarily dismissing Sams’s petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.

Judge LORELLO and Judge PETTY, CONCUR.