Kenny v. Snow

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedMarch 18, 2005
Docket2004-1519
StatusPublished

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Bluebook
Kenny v. Snow, (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

04-1519

MICHAEL J. KENNY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

John W. Snow, SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,

Defendant-Appellee, and

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee.

Michael J. Kenny, of Scranton, Pennsylvania, pro se.

Barbara S. Williams, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch, of New York, New York, for defendants-appellees. With her on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General and David M. Cohen, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, of Washington, DC.

Appealed from: United States Court of International Trade

Judge Richard K. Eaton United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Defendant-Appellee,

and

______________________

DECIDED: March 18, 2005 ______________________

Before LOURIE, CLEVENGER, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge.

Michael J. Kenny appeals from the decision of the United States Court of

International Trade sustaining the denial of credit by the Secretary of the Treasury

(“the Secretary”) for a question on a licensing examination for customs brokers. Kenny

v. Snow, No. 03-00011 (Ct. Int’l Trade June 7, 2004) (“Decision”). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On the October 2001 Customs Broker Licensure Examination (“October 2001

Exam”), Kenny missed a passing score by a single incorrect answer. In appealing his score to the United States Customs Service (“Customs”),1 Kenny requested full credit

for Question 32,2 which pertains to classifications under the 2001 Harmonized Tariff

Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”), Chapter 22. Question 32 reads as follows:

Water Street Fishhouses is importing a beer from Mexico to sell at their eating establishments in Texas. The beer is made from malt with an alcoholic strength by volume of 0.4 percent. It is shipped in 1 liter glass bottles. What is the correct classification of the beer?

(A) 2202.90.9010 [“Waters . . . other nonalcoholic beverages . . . Nonalcoholic beer”] (B) 2203.00.0060 [“Beer made from malt in containers each holding not over 4 liters: Other”] (C) 2203.00.0030 [“Beer made from malt in containers each holding not over 4 liters: In glass containers”] (D) 2203.00.0090 [“Beer made from malt in containers each holding over 4 liters”] (E) 2202.90.9090 [“Waters . . . other nonalcoholic beverages . . . Other”]

October 2001 Exam, Question 32 (emphasis added); HTSUS headings 2202, 2203.

Kenny’s answer was (C), while the official answer was (A). Insisting that the

specificity of (C) made it the best answer, Kenny claimed that Question 32 was

1 Effective March 1, 2003, Customs was renamed the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, and is now part of the Department of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 § 1502, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat. 2135, 2308); Reorganization Plan Modification for the Department of Homeland Security, H.R. Doc. No. 108-32, at 4 (2003). The relevant administrative appeal process for challenging examination scores is as follows:

If an examinee fails to attain a passing grade on the examination . . . the examinee may challenge that result by filing a written appeal with [Customs] . . . . Customs will provide to the examinee written notice of the decision on the appeal. If the Customs decision on the appeal affirms the result of the examination, the examinee may request review of the decision on the appeal by writing to the Secretary of the Treasury . . . .

19 C.F.R. § 111.13(f) (2004). 2 Kenny had also sought credit for Question 19; however, Customs’ denial of credit for that question was not subsequently appealed.

04-1519 2 ambiguous for failing to state the temperature at which the “alcoholic strength by

volume” was measured, thereby rendering the “0.4 percent” figure inconclusive.

Unpersuaded, Customs confirmed that (A) was the only correct answer, explaining that:

Chapter 22 Note 3 states: for the purposes of heading 2202 the term “nonalcoholic beverages” means beverages of an alcoholic strength by volume not exceeding 0.5 percent vol. Alcoholic beverages are classified in heading 2203 . . . .

Chapter 22 Note 2 states: for the purposes of this chapter . . . the “alcoholic strength by volume” shall be determined at a temperature of 20 degrees [Celsius]. The question does not contain a statement that the alcoholic strength by volume was determined at a temperature other than 20 degrees [Celsius].

Therefore, the beer described in question #32 does not meet the terms of [answers B, C, and D] . . . . Answer E is incorrect because nonalcoholic beer is provided for under subheading 2202.90.9010.

Addendum to Br. of Appellee, at 4 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added).

After Customs affirmed the result of the October 2001 Exam, Kenny petitioned

the Secretary, see 19 C.F.R. § 111.13(f) (2004), who upheld the denial of credit, noting

that Question 32 stipulated the “alcoholic strength by volume,” which obviated the need

to provide additional information about the temperature. Kenny thereafter sought

reversal of the Secretary’s decision in the Court of International Trade.3 See 19 U.S.C.

§ 1641(e)(1) (2000). Concluding that the Secretary’s findings were supported by

substantial evidence, the Court of International Trade sustained the denial of credit.

This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).

3 Under 19 U.S.C. § 1641(e)(1), the Secretary’s denial of a customs broker license is appealable exclusively to the Court of International Trade. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(g)(1) (2000). Although Kenny’s request for relief is expressed as a desire to receive credit on an examination, we nevertheless treat it for jurisdictional purposes as a challenge to the denial of a license, as the denial of a license is a foregone conclusion for an unsuccessful examinee. See 19 C.F.R. § 111.11(a)(4) (2004).

04-1519 3 DISCUSSION

Consistent with the broad powers vested in the Secretary for licensing customs

brokers under 19 U.S.C. § 1641, the denial of a license can be overturned only if that

decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). Among the lawful grounds for

denying a license is the failure to pass the licensing examination. See 19 U.S.C. §

1641(b)(2) (2000) (“the Secretary may conduct an examination to determine the

applicant’s knowledge of customs and related laws”); 19 C.F.R. § 111.11(a)(4) (2004)

(“to obtain a broker’s license, an individual must have [attained] a passing (75 percent

or higher) grade on a written examination”); 19 C.F.R.

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