Filed 8/24/26 Kenny v. Ladow-Kenny CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
BRIAN KENNY, Plaintiff and Appellant,
A166935
v. ANDREA LADOW-KENNY, (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCV265751)
Defendant and Respondent.
After plaintiff Brian Kenny abruptly left trial on its second day, the trial court dismissed his claims and entered a judgment in favor of defendant Andrea Ladow-Kenny pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure1 section 594, subdivision (a). Kenny subsequently filed a motion for new trial, which the court denied. On appeal, Kenny contends the court erred in dismissing his claims because he initially appeared at trial and continued to litigate his case after trial. He further argues that a new trial is warranted based on attorney misconduct and the “improper” dismissal of his claims. We disagree on both counts and therefore affirm the judgment and the order denying Kenny’s new trial motion.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
I. BACKGROUND
Kenny and Ladow-Kenny married in 2003 and divorced in 2007. After their divorce, Kenny and Ladow-Kenny continued to live together on and off in a house owned by Ladow-Kenny until Ladow-Kenny applied for and was granted a domestic violence temporary restraining order against Kenny, requiring him to stay away from Ladow-Kenny and her home.
In December 2019, Kenny filed a Marvin action2 against Ladow-Kenny.
In his complaint, he conceded Ladow-Kenny was the legal owner of two real properties (referred to by the parties as the “Ginny Drive” and “Wilson Lane” properties) but alleged he acquired “an equitable claim of ownership” in the properties. Kenny recorded a lis pendens against the properties.
A. Relevant Pre-Trial Proceedings Ladow-Kenny’s deposition was taken in September 2020. The deposition transcript was completed on September 21, 2020. Kenny thereafter filed a notice of motion to compel further answers. The trial court denied the motion as untimely because it was not filed within 60 days of the completion of the transcript, as required by section 2025.480, subdivision (b).
In September 2020, the trial court granted Ladow-Kenny’s motion to expunge the lis pendens recorded against the Ginny Drive property. The court subsequently granted without leave to amend Ladow-Kenny’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the cause of action for quiet title to that property.
2 Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 669–671, holding that express
or implied contracts between persons living together in a nonmarital relationship should be enforced, unless such contracts were explicitly founded on the consideration of “meretricious sexual services.”
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B. The Trial and Dismissal of the Action Trial began in July 2022. On the second day of trial, before any witnesses were called, Kenny filed a motion for summary judgment, or, in the alternative, a mistrial. Kenny claimed one of Ladow-Kenny’s attorneys, John Mavredakis, dissuaded some of the witnesses Kenny had subpoenaed to testify at trial, including Tom Umphreys and Umphreys’s caregiver, Pam Phetsinoraj, from appearing at trial. Kenny further contended Mavredakis was engaged in “deceit and untruthful statements” throughout the proceedings, resulting in “numerous adverse rulings against [Kenny].”
Accompanying the motion was Kenny’s declaration, in which he stated that he had visited Umphreys that morning, and Umphreys showed him a text message he had received from Phetsinoraj. Kenny said he attached a printout of the text message to his motion. The attachment reads, “Tommy if you don’t want to go to court just call John the lawyer 8582094150 he can’t call you but you have to call him very easy.” Kenny claimed the phone number in the message belonged to Mavredakis. Kenny further asserted that he had heard a “rumor” that Phetsinoraj was not going to appear at trial, and thus he would be unable to correct inaccuracies in her deposition testimony.
The trial court heard argument on the motion. Mavredakis contended his conduct did not rise to the level of witness tampering or dissuading a witness. He knew Umphreys was a paraplegic and “thought [it] might be beneficial to him to take his deposition.”
The trial court denied Kenny’s motion without prejudice, finding the evidence insufficient to conclude that Mavredakis knowingly engaged in dissuading a witness from giving testimony. The court told Kenny that he could remake the motion “if any witness indicates they were dissuaded.”
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After ruling on the motion, the trial court declared a recess. It told the parties that it would “[s]ee [them] all back in twenty (20) minutes,” to which Kenny replied, “[n]o, you won’t, I’m not getting a fair trial—this guy lies all the time—I’m done.” Kenny was not present when the court reconvened. The bailiff checked the lobby outside the courtroom and the parking lot and did not see Kenny or his car.
In Kenny’s absence, Ladow-Kenny moved to dismiss the action pursuant to section 594. The trial court granted the motion, finding that Kenny had proper notice of trial, had clear notice to return to court after recess, and had the burden of proof on his claims. The court ordered judgement be entered in Ladow-Kenny’s favor and directed Mavredakis to prepare a judgment for the court’s signature.
A couple of weeks later, Kenny filed an opposition to the proposed judgment and again requested summary judgment in his favor or a mistrial. He acknowledged his behavior on the second day of trial was improper but said he “did not know what else to do” to ensure he received a fair trial. He claimed he had obtained new evidence to support his allegations of misconduct. This new evidence was Umphreys’s affidavit, in which Umphreys declared that Phetsinoraj had told him he “could get out of testifying all together” if he called “John” and that John “had arranged it so she would not have to show up at court or testify at all.” Kenny further claimed that Mavredakis engaged in other unethical conduct, including during Ladow-Kenny’s deposition.
In response, Mavredakis filed a declaration denying that he attempted to dissuade Umphreys and Phetsinoraj from attending trial.
Without ruling on Kenny’s second motion for summary judgment or mistrial, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice and entered
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judgment in Ladow-Kenny’s favor. Following dismissal, the court granted Ladow-Kenny’s motion to expunge the lis pendens recorded against the Wilson Lane property.
C. Kenny’s Motion for New Trial In September 2022, Kenny moved for a new trial on several grounds under section 657. First, he claimed the defense’s misconduct, as detailed in his motions for summary judgment or mistrial, caused an “irregularity in the proceedings.” Second, he contended he was “surprise[d]” by the text message that Phetsinoraj had sent to Umphreys advising Umphreys to call “John the lawyer.” Third, Kenny claimed there was “newly discovered evidence,” pointing to Umphreys’s affidavit that was submitted with Kenny’s second motion for summary judgment or mistrial. Fourth, Kenny argued dismissal under section 594, subdivision (a), was unwarranted because there was insufficient evidence that he had “abandoned” his claims. Finally, Kenny contended there was an error in law justifying a new trial based on the court dismissing his claims and denying his motion for a mistrial.
The trial court denied the motion for new trial. The court reasoned that the trial did not go forward because Kenny voluntarily left on the second day of trial, and not because of surprise, irregularity in the proceedings, or the other bases set forth in Kenny’s motion for new trial.
II. DISCUSSION
Kenny challenges the section 594 dismissal and the trial court’s denial of his new trial motion. We address the arguments in turn.
A. Section 594 Dismissal Kenny contends the dismissal of his action pursuant to section 594 should be reversed because the record shows he did not abandon the prosecution of his case. Specifically, he points to the papers he filed in
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response to the proposed dismissal order and the papers he filed after the court entered judgment in Ladow-Kenny’s favor. We are not persuaded.
Section 594 states in pertinent part in subdivision (a): “In superior courts either party may bring an issue to trial or to a hearing, and, in the absence of the adverse party, unless the court, for good cause, otherwise directs, may proceed with the case and take a dismissal of the action, or a verdict, or judgment, as the case may require; provided, however, if the issue to be tried is an issue of fact, proof shall first be made to the satisfaction of the court that the adverse party has had 15 days’ notice of such trial . . . .” (Italics added.) This provision applies to both parties. (See Forslund v. Forslund (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 476, 489, 495 [“[d]efendant was entitled to proceed with the hearing in [plaintiff’s] absence” under § 594], superseded by statute on other grounds.)
“Subdivision (a) of Code of Civil Procedure section 594 . . . prohibits trial of an issue of fact in the absence of a party unless it is first proven that the absent party ‘has had 15 days’ notice of such trial.’ ” (Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21 Cal.4th 958, 960.) “Compliance with [section 594, subdivision] (a)’s notice requirement is ‘mandatory.’ ” (Id. at p. 963.)
Here, the requirements for proceeding with trial in Kenny’s absence under section 594 were met. The trial court concluded that Kenny had proper notice of the trial, a finding Kenny does not challenge on appeal. Moreover, because Kenny personally appeared on the first two days of trial, he had adequate notice of trial for purposes of section 594. (§ 594, subd. (a); Elliano v. Assurance Co. of America (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 170, 175; Parker v. Dingman (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1016 [“[a]ctual notice, however acquired, is sufficient”].) Kenny does not contend otherwise. Nor does he claim that the court abused its discretion in implicitly concluding there was
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no good cause excusing his absence from trial. (See § 594, subd. (a).) Kenny’s only explanation for leaving trial was that he did not know how to address the defense’s alleged misconduct as a non-attorney. However, “[p]ro. per. litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys” (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543) and “are not entitled to special exemptions from the California Rules of Court or Code of Civil Procedure” (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284).3 Further, Kenny had “actual notice” that trial would resume after a twenty-minute recess. (Colony Bancorp of Malibu, Inc. v. Patel (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 410, 418.) On this point, Colony is instructive. There, defense counsel returned to court late after a break. (Id. at p. 416.) The court had ordered the parties back at a specific time and resumed trial at that time in defense counsel’s absence. (Ibid.) Defense counsel arrived during the plaintiffs’ direct examination of a witness. (Id. at p. 417.) The appellate court rejected the defendant’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated. (Id. at pp. 417–419.) Since defense counsel had “actual notice the trial would resume at 1:30 p.m., . . . the trial court had the authority to
3 Kenny relies on Gamet v. Blanchard for the proposition that courts
should treat self-represented litigants with special care to ensure they are not “inadvertently misled” by either the adverse party or the court. (Gamet v. Blanchard, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1284.) Kenny’s reliance on Gamet is misplaced. There, the self-represented litigant was misled by confusing orders and communications from the trial court, which the appellate court found warranted a “do-over.” (Id. at pp. 1283–1285.) In so holding, the court noted that “in propria persona litigants are not entitled to special exemptions from the California Rules of Court or Code of Civil Procedure” but that “special care should be used to make sure that verbal instructions given in court and written notices are clear and understandable by a layperson.” (Id. at p. 1284.) The record here does not indicate that Kenny was misled by the court or opposing counsel during trial. His decision to leave trial is not excused.
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proceed with the matter in the absence of [defendant] and his counsel” under section 594. (Id. at p. 418.) Likewise, here, because Kenny had actual notice of the time that trial would resume and chose not to return and participate in the trial, the court was authorized to proceed with trial in his absence under section 594.
Finally, dismissal of the action and entry of judgment in Ladow-
Kenny’s favor was proper. As the plaintiff, Kenny had the burden of proof on his claims. (Gebert v. Yank (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 544, 552.) Because the trial court proceeded with trial in Kenny’s absence before any evidence was presented, as it was permitted to do under section 594, subdivision (a), Kenny did not meet his burden of proof. In sum, his “failure to appear for trial after having received proper notice of the trial date authorized the entry of judgment against [him] under . . . section 594, following an ‘uncontested’ evidentiary hearing.” (Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 705.)
In so concluding, we reject Kenny’s contentions that dismissal under section 594, subdivision (a) is improper where the plaintiff filed post-trial motions, thereby showing “no intention to abandon the case,” and where the plaintiff initially appeared for trial. Kenny presents no authority or legal analysis in his opening brief to support his assertions. The authority he cites for the first time in his reply brief is inapposite. In arguing that “[c]ontinued litigation activity is the antithesis of abandonment,” he cites Harris v. Billings (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1405. However, Harris concerned the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of her action, not dismissal under section 594, and the court never addressed the concept of “abandonment.” (Id. at p. 1405.) Likewise, Reid v. Balter (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1186 has nothing to do with dismissal under section 594. Rather, the question addressed by the Reid
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court was whether dismissal of the case was authorized under the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act where the plaintiffs failed to appear at a status conference. (Reid, at p. 1193.) Finally, Kenny relies on Fisher v. Gibson (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 275, 284 for his argument that dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims constitutes “prejudice as a matter of law” where the court has previously found triable issues of fact in denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Fisher did not decide this issue or even address dismissal of claims. Cases are not authority for propositions not decided. (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154–155.) Harris, Reid, and Fisher are of no assistance to Kenny.
In any event, the plain language of section 594 does not support Kenny’s interpretation of the statute. (See Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 535, 566–567 [courts must follow unambiguous “plain meaning” of statute].) Section 594 clearly permits the trial court to proceed with trial in a party’s “absence” so long as that party had the requisite notice. (§ 594, subd. (a).) Under the ordinary meaning of “absence,” a party may be absent at various points during trial. (See Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2026) <https://www.merriamwebster .com/dictionary/absence> [as of August 3, 2026] [defining “absence” as “a failure to be present at a usual or expected place”]; Dictionary.com (2026) <https://dictionary.com/browse/absence> [as of August 3, 2026] [defining “absence” as the “state of being away or not being present”].) The statute does not place any temporal limitations on the qualifying “absence.” Nor does it require a showing that the absent party has completely abandoned their case before the trial court can dismiss the case. Thus, to conclude that section 594, subdivision (a) is inapplicable where the party initially appeared for trial or filed post-trial motions would require us to “ ‘insert qualifying
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provisions not included in the statute,’ ” which we cannot do. (Greiner v. Keller (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 332, 338.)
In sum, Kenny has not met his appellate burden to demonstrate trial court error in dismissing his case and entering judgment in Ladow-Kenny’s favor pursuant to section 594. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [appellant has burden to demonstrate error].)
B. Denial of New Trial Motion The authority of a trial court to grant a new trial “is established and circumscribed by statute.” (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2007) 41 Cal.4th 624, 633.) Section 657 provides seven grounds for a new trial. Kenny invokes five of them: (1) “ ‘[i]rregularity in the proceedings’ ”; (2) “ ‘[a]ccident or surprise’ ”; (3) “ ‘[n]ewly discovered evidence’ ”; (4) “ ‘[i]nsufficiency of the evidence’ ”; and (5) “ ‘[e]rror in law.’ ” (§ 657, subds. (1), (3)–(4), (6)–(7).) As we will explain, Kenny has not established that reversal is required on any of these grounds.
1. Irregularity in the Proceedings Kenny contends there was an irregularity in the proceedings based on attorney misconduct, namely the alleged witness dissuasion. He argues that the witness dissuasion prejudiced him because he would have had a more favorable result if witnesses had appeared and testified at trial.
A trial court may order a new trial because of an irregularity in the proceedings that prevented one of the parties from receiving a fair trial. (§ 657, subd. (1).) Attorney misconduct is an irregularity in the proceedings warranting a new trial only if the moving party demonstrates that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the moving party would have been reached in the absence of the misconduct. (Garcia v. ConMed
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Corp. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 144, 149.) “[A] reviewing court makes ‘an independent determination as to whether the error was prejudicial.’ ” (Ibid.)
Kenny’s own conduct undercuts his claim of prejudice. Kenny’s prejudice argument assumes the witnesses did not appear at trial, yet Kenny voluntarily left trial before any witnesses were called, resulting in the dismissal of his case under section 594, as discussed above. Even assuming the witnesses would not have appeared at trial, Kenny was not without remedy. He could have sought a continuance of trial (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c)(6)) and/or a warrant for the arrest of the non-appearing witnesses (§ 1993), as he threatened to do in a text message he sent to Phetsinoraj prior to trial. Kenny’s failure to take these steps in the trial court precludes him from attacking the judgment on appeal based on alleged witness dissuasion. (See Telles Transport, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1167 [“a party loses the right to appeal an issue caused . . . by failing to take the proper steps at trial to avoid or correct the error”]; People v. Kramer (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 452, 469 [“[h]aving failed to take appropriate steps to eliminate any adverse effect the [improper witness] questions may have had, [the appellant] may not complain for the first time on appeal that the propounding of the questions constituted prejudicial misconduct”].)
Kenny further claims there was a “[p]attern of [m]isbehavior”
throughout the proceedings. Specifically, he cites Mavredakis’s failure to file “paperwork” stating that he was representing Ladow-Kenny until after he had defended her deposition, and he also alleges that Mavredakis and his cocounsel deceived the court with misleading statements and that Mavredakis made improper speaking objections during Ladow-Kenny’s deposition and was “coaching” her.
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Kenny has forfeited these claims for several reasons. First, as to these claims, he does not address prejudice beyond a conclusory assertion that Mavredakis’s conduct during Ladow-Kenny’s deposition “created extreme prejudice” to his case. “[O]ur duty to examine the entire cause arises when and only when the appellant has fulfilled his duty to tender a proper prejudice argument.” (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.) Moreover, Kenny does not explain through legal analysis and citation to authority why the speaking objections and the alleged coaching were improper. “[A]n appellant must do more than assert error and leave it to the appellate court to search the record and the law books to test his claim.” (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 557.) Kenny also raised the deposition issues in a motion to compel, which was denied by the trial court on untimeliness grounds. Kenny claims the court misstated the date his motion to compel was filed, but even if it was filed on the date Kenny contends it was filed—November 23, 2020—it was still filed outside the 60-day period for filing a motion to compel because the record of the deposition was completed on September 21, 2020. (See § 2025.480, subd. (b).) This 60-day limitation is mandatory. (See Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410 [untimely motions to compel “renders the court without authority to rule on [the motions] other than to deny them”].) The failure to timely challenge inadequate deposition testimony in the trial court forfeits the issue. (Young v. Daimler AG (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 855, 867, fn. 7.)
Accordingly, Kenny has not demonstrated prejudicial misconduct, and the trial court acted within its discretion in denying his new trial motion on that ground. (See Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 379, 387 [“[t]he determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within
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the court’s discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears”].)
2. Surprise Kenny next contends a new trial is warranted because the text message Phetsinoraj sent Umphreys advising Umphreys to contact “John the lawyer” surprised him. We disagree that a new trial is warranted on this ground.
A new trial may be granted on the ground of “[a]ccident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.” (§ 657, subd. (3).) In this context, surprise “denotes some condition or a situation in which a party to an action is unexpectedly placed to his detriment. The condition or situation must have been such that ordinary prudence on the part of the person claiming surprise could not have guarded against and prevented it.” (Wade v. De Bernardi (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 967, 971.) To warrant relief, the moving party must demonstrate that the surprise was “of such importance or magnitude in its influence upon the result arrived at from the trial” as to have caused injury to the movant. (Wilson v. Kopp (1952) 114 Cal.App.2d 198, 206.)
Here, the “surprise” was Kenny’s having become aware early in trial of potential attempts by the defense to dissuade certain witnesses from appearing at trial. The surprise itself did not cause injury to Kenny but rather alerted him to the possibility that certain witnesses would not appear at trial. As discussed above, if Kenny believed the witnesses were critical to his case, he could have taken steps to ensure their testimony would be presented at trial. Moreover, we cannot say that the surprise influenced the outcome of trial, given that the dismissal of the case was the result of Kenny’s own conduct. We therefore conclude this is not the type of accident or surprise that warrants a new trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not
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abuse its discretion in denying the new trial motion based on surprise or accident.
3. Newly Discovered Information Kenny contends his evidence of the defense’s alleged witness dissuasion, namely the affidavit Umphreys submitted with Kenny’s second motion for summary judgment or mistrial, constitutes newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial.
New trials “for newly discovered evidence are disfavored.” (Missionary Guadalupanas of Holy Spirit Inc. v. Rouillard (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 421, 438.) The essential elements which must be established for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence are: (1) the evidence is newly discovered; (2) reasonable diligence has been exercised in its discovery and production; and (3) the evidence is material to the moving party’s case. (Sherman v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1161.)
“Material” in this context means likely to produce a different judgment.
(Sherman v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161.) To establish materiality, the movant must demonstrate that the newly discovered evidence is “of such character as would make it reasonably certain that upon a new trial a different judgment would result.” (Bliss v. Security- First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 50, 59–60, italics added; see People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 328 [newly discovered evidence must be “such as to render a different result probable on a retrial of the cause”].) “Evidence which does not affirmatively prove an issue . . . does not compel the granting of a new trial.” (Bostard v. Bostard (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 793, 798; see Carpenter v. Kilgour (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 651, 658 [no abuse of discretion in denying new trial motion where newly
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discovered evidence was “irrelevant to the issue of failure of consideration that was actually before the court”].)
For the reasonable diligence element, the movant “must state the particular acts or circumstances which establish diligence” in discovering and producing the evidence at trial. (In re Marriage of Liu (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 143, 154–155.) If the movant fails to do so, the motion must be denied. (Ibid.)
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kenny’s new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence. First, Kenny made no showing in the trial court or on appeal that the evidence of witness dissuasion makes it “reasonably certain” that a different judgment will result on a retrial of his Marvin claims. (See Bliss v. Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, supra, 81 Cal.App.2d at pp. 59–60.) Nor can he make such a showing since that evidence does not affirmatively prove any issue relevant to his claims. (See Bostard v. Bostard, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d at p. 798.) Moreover, Kenny failed to “state the particular acts or circumstances” which establish that he acted with reasonable diligence to obtain and produce the evidence at trial. (See In re Marriage of Liu, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 154.) The record belies any such claim of diligence, because Kenny voluntarily left trial before any witnesses were called despite the court having told him he could remake his motion for summary judgment or mistrial if any witness indicated that they were dissuaded from appearing at trial. (See Laurence v. Los Angeles Junk Co. (1933) 129 Cal.App.499, 503 [affirming denial of new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence because the appellant had the opportunity to produce the evidence at trial and failed to do so].)
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As Kenny has failed to demonstrate that he established all necessary elements of a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence, we affirm the denial of his new trial motion on that ground.
4. Insufficient Evidence and Error in Law Lastly, Kenny contends a new trial is warranted because there was insufficient evidence that he “abandoned” his claims for purposes of section 594, and it was an “[e]rror in [l]aw” to dismiss the case. As discussed above, however, the record and the law supports the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case under section 594, notwithstanding Kenny’s post-trial filings and his initial appearance at trial. Thus, the decision to dismiss the case was not erroneous as a matter of law or based on insufficient evidence. (See § 657, subds. (6), (7); Howell v. State Dept. of State Hospitals (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 143, 149 [“ ‘we can reverse the denial of a new trial motion based on insufficiency of the evidence . . . only if . . . the evidence compels the conclusion that the motion should have been granted’ ”]; Collins v. Sutter Memorial Hospital (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1, 17–18 [“a trial court may grant a new trial [under § 657, subd. (6)] if ‘its original ruling, as a matter of law, was erroneous’ ”].) Kenny further asserts it was an error in law “not to recognize the improper behavior by the Defense,” but he does not develop this argument further. Accordingly, we treat this argument as forfeited. (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 [“[w]e are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them”].) No new trial is warranted on the grounds of insufficient evidence and error in law.4
4 Kenny also contends the trial court erred in granting Ladow-Kenny’s
motion for expungement of a lis pendens recorded against the Wilson Lane property while his new trial motion was pending. Because we are affirming the judgment and the order denying Kenny’s new trial motion, this issue is moot. (See Mix v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 987, 989 [trial court
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III. DISPOSITION
The judgment and the order denying Kenny’s motion for new trial are affirmed.
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LANGHORNE WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
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HUMES, P. J.
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BANKE, J.
Kenny v. Ladow-Kenny / A166935
required to grant a motion for expungement of lis pendens “in the wake of the defeat of the claimant in the trial court” unless the court determines that its ruling will probably be overturned on appeal].) Kenny otherwise asserts numerous contentions throughout his opening brief that are unsupported by authority and/or record cites, and most of them are not set forth under a separate heading. We do not consider these arguments. (See Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 377, fn. 3 [“ ‘we do not consider all of the loose and disparate arguments that are not clearly set out in a heading and supported by reasoned legal argument’ ”].)