Kenny v. Coughlan, No. 106747 (Jul. 6, 1992)

1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 6429
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJuly 6, 1992
DocketNo. 106747
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 6429 (Kenny v. Coughlan, No. 106747 (Jul. 6, 1992)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kenny v. Coughlan, No. 106747 (Jul. 6, 1992), 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 6429 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION PETITION FOR APPEAL OF DECISION OF THE FAMILY MAGISTRATE DATED APRIL 3, 1992 I.

This is an appeal initiated by the state of Connecticut pursuant to 46b-231 (n) of our statutes from a decision of a Family Support Magistrate. (Lifshitz) (hereinafter "magistrate")1 It follows the magistrate's sua sponte March 30, 1992 decision to reopen the judgment of paternity in this case because the affirmation of paternity document signed and filed by the minor child's plaintiff-mother, Lorraine Kenny, while notarized, was not witnessed. — The appeal is sustained; the judgment is reinstated; and the matter is remanded to the magistrate for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. CT Page 6430

II.
By way of procedural background, Steven Coughlan, the named defendant, filed December 20, 1991 a document signed by him and notarized in which he acknowledged that he was the father of Donovan Kenny, born September 13, 1991. This document entitled "Acknowledgment of Paternity" bore the signatures of two witnesses to Mr. Coughlan's own signature. Accompanying the Coughlan document was another one, the focus of this appeal, entitled "Affirmation of Paternity", signed by Lorraine Kenny, in which she stated that Coughlan was Donovan's father. This second document was notarized, but not witnessed.2 All of these documents were filed with the clerk of the court and this triggered the provisions of section 46b-172 (a), effectively causing a judgment of paternity to enter by operation of law.3 Subsequent to this "statutory" judgment of paternity entering, the state of Connecticut, which had been providing public assistance to Lorraine Kenny and her child, Donovan, in its Aid to Families with Dependant Children program, sought and obtained a court order for Steven Coughlan's appearance before this court February 28, 1992 to show cause why he ought not to contribute to the support of his acknowledged child, Donovan. At the February 28th hearing before the magistrate, the assistant attorney general and Steven Coughlan reported their agreement for Donovan's support. However, during this hearing, the magistrate observed the Affirmation of Paternity document, executed by Donovan's mother, Lorraine Kenny, had not been witnessed and he indicated "I read the statute to require that the affirmation be properly acknowledged and witnessed." Transcript, hearing of February 28, 1992 at 3. Thereafter, the magistrate, on his own motion, reserved decision concerning the validity of the judgment, and on March 30, 1992, filed a memorandum of decision, ordering the reopening of the judgment and the continuing the case to a date certain to give the state an opportunity to file a "properly witnessed affirmation" or suffer the court's "sua sponte [dismissing] this case." Record, Memorandum of Decision, dated February 28, 1992 at 7. This appeal follows.4

III.
The magistrate, in his written memorandum, correctly observes that the statute (46b-172) does not require the written affirmation of paternity to be witnessed. He does note, however, that an internal operations manual for the Connecticut Department of Human Resources defines an affirmation of paternity to mean "`a witnessed and notarized statement signed by the mother of a child. . . .' (emphasis added) Connecticut Department of Human Resources, Bureau of Child Support Enforcement, Child Support Program, Program Manual Volume 4, Chapter 405, Paternity Determination 405.1(a)(3) and (6), Page 1." Id. at 6.5 Thus, CT Page 6431 the magistrate relies for his decision in part upon this definition and the desirability of having such an affirmation of paternity witnessed "to mitigate the possibilities of misuse of the [statutory] procedure" for establishing paternity, Id. at 5, and the possibility that a foreign jurisdiction would not recognize such a statutory judgment where the affirmation of paternity is not witnessed. — We are not persuaded. — We think that the General Assembly, upon our reading of the relevant statutes, has determined that the affirmation of paternity document need not be witnessed.

Section 46b-172, as already noted, does not facially require that the affirmation document be witnessed and our research uncovered numerous other statutes providing for an affirmation without requiring witnesses for its legal validity.6 However, we did locate other statutes whereby the General Assembly did require witnesses for a particular document's legal efficacy. See e.g.,47-5 (conveyance, of land require two witnesses); 45a-251 (wills invalid unless attested by two witnesses); 50a-3 (b) (c) (international will requires two witnesses for its validity). The silence of the legislature in the first instance concerning affirmations of paternity and its statutory mandates for witnesses in other specified instances is persuasive evidence to us that this affirmation of paternity document need not be witnessed. The General Assembly in section 1-23 has provided for an affirmation in lieu of an oath.7 Such an affirmation has been described as "a solemn and formal declaration that the contents of a declaration, written or oral, are true. . . ." State v. Assuntino, 180 Conn. 345,354 (1980). See also 58 Am.Jur.2d Oath and Affirmation 3; 67 CJS Oaths Affirmations 2. Against this backdrop of legal precedent, we think section 46b-172 is clear on its face and ought not be subject to our modification or construction to require witnesses. Cilley v. Lamphere, 206 Conn. 6, 9-10 (1988).

Finally, all of the parties to this judgment support it as entered and continue to do so upon this appeal. We discern, on this record, no jurisdictional deficits for the magistrate's order to reopen on his own motion this judgment or for his suggested order to dismiss this case if the affirmation document did not become perfected with the advent of witnesses.8

IV.
We conclude that the decision of the magistrate to reopen the judgment sua sponte is legally erroneous. Therefore, the judgment is reinstated; and the matter is remanded to the magistrate for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Orders may enter accordingly. CT Page 6432

/s/ William Patrick Murray WILLIAM PATRICK MURRAY, J. A Judge of the Superior Court APPENDIX A

STATE OF CONNECTICUT SUPERIOR COURT

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Related

State v. Assuntino
429 A.2d 900 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1980)
Cilley v. Lamphere
535 A.2d 1305 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 6429, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kenny-v-coughlan-no-106747-jul-6-1992-connsuperct-1992.