Kenny Jimenez v. State

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided January 7, 2015·No. 07-13-00061-CR·Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-13-00061-CR

KENNY JIMENEZ, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 364th District Court Lubbock County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012-435437; Honorable Brad Underwood, Presiding

January 6, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

Following a jury trial, Appellant, Kenny Jimenez, was found guilty of aggravated robbery and sentenced to confinement for life.1 Appellant asserts on appeal that the trial court erred by (1) omitting the theory of “law of parties” in the application paragraph

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03 (West 2011). An offense under this section is a felony of the first degree.

of the jury charge and (2) admitting his personal rap lyrics during the punishment phase of the trial. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In July 2012, a three count indictment was filed alleging that, on or about June 10, 2012, Appellant, “did then and there, while in the course of committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said property, intentionally or knowingly threaten or place [Chelsea Betenbrough (Count 1), Brianna Neighbors (Count 2), and Brittany Lancaster (Count 3)] in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, and [Appellant] did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm.” At trial, Chelsea, Brianna and Brittany identified Appellant as the person who robbed them at gunpoint in a nightclub parking lot. They testified that, at approximately 11:45 p.m., they were between two cars parked facing a brick wall when a silver SUV pulled behind the cars blocking their exit. Appellant emerged from the SUV carrying a shotgun. He cocked the gun and ordered each of them to give him their “stuff.” They gave him their cellphones, purses, I.D.s, $30 (a ten and a twenty dollar bill), and a wristlet. During the robbery, other persons in the SUV were yelling encouragement to Appellant. After taking their property, Appellant returned to the SUV. The SUV then backed into a parked car and sped away.

Officer Andrew Evans received a radio dispatch describing the SUV and spotted a vehicle matching its description at a convenience store. As he pulled beside the SUV, he saw Appellant. He activated his lights and the SUV accelerated. Officer Evans gave chase. After several miles, the SUV made a sharp turn, hit a curb and completely rolled

over. Appellant’s wife picked up the child thrown from the SUV and ran. Appellant also fled. Two other occupants were apprehended at the scene of the accident. In an inventory search of the SUV, Officers found and confiscated Chelsey’s, Brianna’s and Brittany’s property, as well as the shotgun used in the robbery. Appellant, his wife and his child were taken into custody after officers searched the surrounding yards. When searched, Appellant had a shotgun shell of the same caliber as the shotgun retrieved from the SUV in his pocket.

On February 13, 2013, the court submitted Count 1 of the indictment to the jury.

The jury found Appellant guilty as charged and assessed his sentence at confinement for life. The trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict and this appeal followed.

JURY CHARGE

In analyzing a jury-charge issue, we first determine if error occurred, and if so, we conduct a harm analysis. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The degree of harm required for reversal depends on whether appellant has preserved error by objection. Id. A jury-charge error requires reversal when, after proper objection, the appellant suffers Asome harm@ to his rights. Id.; Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh=g), reaffirmed, Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Because Appellant did not object to the omission of the “law of parties” theory in the application paragraph, reversal is not required unless Appellant has shown Aegregious harm.@ Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174. “Egregious harm” is a difficult standard to meet. Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 490

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The record must show “actual, not just theoretical, harm to the accused,” id. at 490-91, and the appellate court must be able to conclude that, as a result of the complained of error, the defendant has been “deprived of a fair and impartial trial.” Id. at 490.

The State candidly concedes the trial court committed charge error by the complained of omission, but it goes on to assert Appellant was not harmed thereby. Appellant asserts the omission “vitally affected [his] defensive theory” at trial. This assertion is, however, counter to the position Appellant took at trial. During trial, Appellant’s counsel objected to any language in the charge relating to the law of parties, asserting Appellant was indicted as a principal and the law of parties was not raised by the trial’s evidentiary record.2 Further, we find Appellant suffered little, if any, harm from the omission because of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt as a principal, i.e., the testimony of three eyewitnesses identifying him as the perpetrator, describing the SUV in which he was a passenger and the shotgun used in the robbery, plus the presence of the stolen property and shotgun at the scene of the SUV accident where he was apprehended. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.

PUNISHMENT PHASE—RAP LYRICS

Appellant asserts the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce Appellant’s own rap lyrics in the punishment phase of the trial. Appellant wrote the lyrics while he was incarcerated and published them over the jail’s telephone and by

2 At trial, defense counsel stated: “Your Honor . . . I’m going to object to the inclusion of the parties language in the charge on Page 8, and anywhere else any parties language appears, because he was indicted as a principal. I’d submit that the law of the parties issue hasn’t been raised by the evidentiary records of this particular case, and amounts to a comment on the weight.”

letter. The lyrics describe various acts of violence as well as other crimes.3 Appellant asserts the lyrics were inadmissible under the First Amendment of the United States

3 In part, the song lyrics read to the jury were as follows:

New wipe foreign car movin slow motion, butterfly, suicidal when them doors open.

Press a button, then the engine will start, tires thick, and the rhymes got you in the dark.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Kenny Jimenez v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).

Kenny Jimenez v. State (Kenny Jimenez v. State) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Ngo v. State
175 S.W.3d 738 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2005)
Middleton v. State
125 S.W.3d 450 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2003)
King v. State
29 S.W.3d 556 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Corwin v. State
870 S.W.2d 23 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1993)
Cameron v. State
241 S.W.3d 15 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2007)
Taylor v. State
332 S.W.3d 483 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2011)
Conner v. State
67 S.W.3d 192 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2001)
Almanza v. State
686 S.W.2d 157 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1985)
Banda v. State
890 S.W.2d 42 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1994)
Montgomery v. State
810 S.W.2d 372 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1991)
McDonald v. Scott
515 U.S. 1106 (Supreme Court, 1995)