Kenneth Sachs v. Barbara Kiffmeyer

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 21, 2023
• Docket: 22-16175
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 21 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KENNETH SACHS, No. 22-16175

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00244-SMB

v. MEMORANDUM* BARBARA KIFFMEYER,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 15, 2023**

Before: TASHIMA, S.R. THOMAS, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Kenneth Sachs appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of state child custody

proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may affirm on

any basis supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Sachs’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was proper because it is barred

by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d

918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (§ 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s statute

of limitations for personal injury claims); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991-

92 (9th Cir. 1999) (the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Arizona is two

years).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining supplemental

jurisdiction over Sachs’s remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)

(“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

[state-law] claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it

has original jurisdiction.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend

because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home

Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review

and explaining that leave to amend may be denied when amendment would be

futile).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees, set forth in the answering brief, is

2 22-16175 denied without prejudice. Sachs’s pending requests, set forth in the opening and

reply briefs, are denied.

AFFIRMED.

3 22-16175