IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10-00367-CR No. 10-10-00371-CR
KENNETH RAY MORGAN, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the 54th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 2010-611-C2 and 2010-610-C2
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Kenneth Ray Morgan appeals from convictions for the offenses of Violation of
Protective Order and Assault by Occlusion.1 TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 25.07;
22.01(b)(2)(B) (West 2011). After pleading true to an enhancement paragraph on each
charge, Morgan was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and a $5,000 fine on each
charge.
The offenses occurred at the same time, were tried together, and one jury
deliberated on both offenses simultaneously. The result was a conviction for each of the
1 Morgan was tried jointly for these offenses; however, two separate charges were submitted to the jury. offenses. Due in large part to the complexity of trying, and thus submitting separate
jury charges for each offense, the charges submitted contained a number of problems
including multiple improper citations to statutes, omitted definitions, definitions and
instructions included in one charge that were needed in the other charge or were
unnecessary to the charge in which they were included, references to issues that had
been dropped from the indictment, omitted elements of the offense, assumed the
existence of an element of the offense, and expanded the culpable mental state, also
known as mens rea, beyond the indictment thus allowing a finding of guilt on an offense
other than as included or alleged in the indictment. While the verdict of the jury may
be the proper one because the evidence of guilt was very strong, upon the jury charges
as submitted we cannot say that the numerous errors did not cause Morgan egregious
harm. It seems somewhat comparable to a calculus student that may have ultimately
arrived at the correct answer but due to multiple errors in working through the
problems as shown by his work, it was not an answer for which the instructor can give
any credit.
Specifically, Morgan complains that the respective guilt-innocence jury charge in
the guilt-innocence phase was defective because essential elements were omitted from
the application paragraph in the protective order charge, statutory definitions were
omitted in both jury charges, improper mens rea instructions were included in both jury
charges, the indictment was impermissibly broadened in the assault jury charge, and
the assault jury charge contained a comment on the weight of the evidence.
Because we find that the charges were erroneous and that Morgan was
Morgan v. State Page 2 egregiously harmed, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for new
trials.
Standard of Review for Charge Error
We must first determine whether the charges as submitted to the jury were
erroneous and if so, we must then analyze these complaints utilizing the standards set
forth in Almanza v. State. Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(citing Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 143-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), citing Almanza v.
State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). Under Almanza, unobjected-to jury
charge error will not result in reversal of a conviction in the absence of “egregious
harm.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. It is undisputed that Morgan did not object to
either of the jury charges.
In examining the record for egregious harm, we consider the entire jury charge,
the state of the evidence, the final arguments of the parties, and any other relevant
information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d at
144. Jury charge error is egregiously harmful if it affects the very basis of the case,
deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory. Stuhler
v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Sanchez v. State, 209 S.W.3d 117, 121
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Because these causes were tried together, we are addressing the issues in one
opinion, as it is necessary to consider the entire record when determining harm from
error in the jury charge, and we are of the opinion that the effect of the two erroneous
charges submitted to the same jury increased the harm. We will address each issue
Morgan v. State Page 3 separately as briefed by the parties; however, we will only perform one harm analysis
for each offense.
VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER
In the appeal of the violation of a protective order conviction, Morgan first
complains that the trial court erred by failing to include three elements of the offense of
violation of a protective order in the jury charge. The application paragraph of the
charge as submitted to the jury stated:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 14th day of September, 2009, in McLennan County, Texas, the defendant, Kenneth Ray Morgan, did then and there intentionally or knowingly violate the terms of an order issued by Billy Martin of the Justice of the Peace Court Precinct 1, Place 2 of McLennan County, Texas, on the 26th day of July, 2009, under authority of Article 17.292, Code of Criminal Procedure, by intentionally or knowingly committing family violence against Melissa Eversole, to wit: hitting or striking or grabbing or choking or suffocating the said Melissa Eversole, then you will find the Defendant guilty of the offense of Violation of a Protective Order, as charged in the indictment.
Relevant Statutes—Violation of Protective Order
Section 25.07 of the Penal Code establishes the offense of violation of protective
order in relevant part as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if, in violation of … an order issued under Article 17.292, Code of Criminal Procedure, … the person knowingly or intentionally:
(1) commits family violence….
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 25.07(a) (West 2011).
Family violence is defined in section 71.004 of the Texas Family Code in relevant
part as:
Morgan v. State Page 4 an act by a member of a family or household against another member of the family or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault, but not does include defensive measures to protect oneself.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004(a) (West 2008).
Omitted Elements
Morgan complains that the application paragraph was required to include the
phrase “at a proceeding that the Defendant attended” after the description of the
protective order. Further, he complains that the phrase “a member of the Defendant’s
family or household” was required to be included to describe Melissa Eversole. 2 Lastly,
he complains that the phrase “and said act was intended to result in physical harm,
bodily injury, or assault” should have been placed after the manners and means of the
assault. We must determine if the elements complained of by Morgan were elements
that were required to be included in the application paragraph of the jury charge.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that the hypothetically correct jury
charge for a violation of a protective order offense would state the elements of the
charged offense as follows: (1) Morgan, (2) in violation of an order issued on the 26th
day of July, 2009, by the Precinct 1, Place 2 Justice of the Peace Court of McLennan
County, Texas under Article 17.292, Code of Criminal Procedure, (3) at a proceeding
that Morgan attended, (4) knowingly or intentionally, (5) caused bodily injury to
Melissa Eversole by hitting or striking or grabbing or choking or suffocating her, and (6)
said act was intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, or assault. See Villarreal
2In his second issue, Morgan further complains that the abstract portion of the charge was also erroneous by not including the definition of these omitted terms. This complaint will be addressed below. Morgan v. State Page 5 v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
“At a Proceeding the Defendant Attended”
While the specific language of section 25.07 does not require a finding that the
defendant attended the hearing on the protective order, this element in some form is
required to be included in the application paragraph of the jury charge. See Harvey v.
State, 78 S.W.3d 368, 372-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The State contends that the
inclusion of “intentionally or knowingly” immediately prior to “violate the terms of an
order … under authority of Article 17.292, Code of Criminal Procedure” satisfies this
requirement because, although there is no requirement of intent required for the
violation of the order, in order for the jury to determine that there was an intentional or
knowing violation of that order, knowledge of the protective order’s existence would be
required. See Id. The language as set forth in the jury charge was erroneous as it placed
an improper requirement of intent on Morgan and did not require a finding that
Morgan attended the hearing or otherwise had specific knowledge of the existence of
the protective order.
“A Member of the Defendant’s Family or Household” and “Said Act was Intended to Result in Physical Harm, Bodily Injury, or Assault”
Morgan next complains that the violation of protective order charge did not
require findings that Melissa Eversole, the victim, was a member of his family or
household. Morgan further complains that the charge did not require a jury finding
that the assault “was intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, or assault.” The
application paragraph of the jury charge included a requirement that the jury find that
Morgan “intentionally or knowingly committ[ed] family violence against Melissa
Morgan v. State Page 6 Eversole.” “Family violence” was properly defined in the abstract portion of the charge
as “an act by a member of a family or household against another member of the family
or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual
assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent
physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault, but not does include defensive
measures to protect oneself.” However, the application paragraph did not make it clear
that the jury was required to make these findings that were not but should have been
included within the application paragraph. The charge to the jury was erroneous for
failing to include these elements in the application paragraph of the jury charge.
Omitted Definitions
Morgan complains in his second issue that the trial court’s jury charge was
erroneous because it did not include definitions of “family” and “household” in the
abstract portion of the charge as those terms have been statutorily defined and
therefore, were required to be included in the jury charge.3
These terms have been statutorily defined in the Family Code and extended to
the Penal Code in the Violation of Protective Order offense. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§
71.003 (definition of “family”), 71.005 (definition of “household”) (West 2008). “A trial
court is statutorily obligated to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.”
Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 36.14 (West 2007). That statutory obligation requires that each statutory
definition that affects the meaning of an element of the offense be communicated to the
3While “dating violence” has been included in the definition of “family violence,” there was no allegation in the indictment or trial that the State was seeking conviction of the violation of the protective order based on dating violence. Morgan v. State Page 7 jury. Id. The trial court’s failure to include the definitions was erroneous.
Erroneous Instructions
Morgan complains in his third issue that the jury charge’s instructions defining
“intentionally” and “knowingly” were erroneous because they included the definition
of the result of his conduct and the nature of his conduct. The jury charge on the
violation of protective order charge included definitions of both “result-of-conduct”
and “nature-of-conduct” related to the definitions of both “intentionally” and
“knowingly.” Assault with bodily injury is a “result-of-conduct” offense, and the State
does not contend that the offense of violation of a protective order is any different. See
Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The inclusion of the
instructions relating to the nature of Morgan’s conduct in the abstract portion of the
charge was erroneous.
ASSAULT BY OCCLUSION
A separate jury charge was submitted to the jury for the assault by occlusion
offense. Morgan complains in his brief to this Court that the jury charge was erroneous
for reasons separate from the jury charge on the violation of protective order offense.
Morgan’s first two issues complain that the trial court erred by including the
definitions of “dating relationship” and “family violence” in the abstract portion of the
jury charge on guilt-innocence for the assault by occlusion offense which he contends
impermissibly broadened the indictment by allowing him to be convicted of an offense
that was in part never presented to the grand jury.
Morgan v. State Page 8 Relevant Statutes
Assault by Occlusion as used in this case is defined in the Penal Code as a
person who “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another,
including the person’s spouse,” which offense becomes a third-degree felony “(b) … if
the offense is committed against … (2) a person whose relationship to or association
with the defendant is described by Section 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005, Family Code, if:
… (B) the offense is committed by intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly impeding the
normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the person or by applying pressure to
the person’s throat or neck or by blocking the person’s nose or mouth; ….” TEX. PEN.
CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) & (b)(2)(B) (West 2011).
The relevant sections of the Family Code are as follows:
§ 71.003:
“Family” includes individuals related by consanguinity or affinity, as determined under Sections 573.022 and 573.024, Government Code, individuals who are former spouses of each other, individuals who are the parents of the same child, without regard to marriage, and a foster child and foster parent, without regard to whether those individuals reside together.
§ 71.004:
“Family violence” means:
(1) an act by a member of a family or household against another member of the family or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault, but does not include defensive measures to protect oneself;
(2) abuse, as that term is defined by Sections 261.001(1)(C), (E), and (G), by a member of a family or household toward a child of the family or Morgan v. State Page 9 household; or
(3) dating violence, as that term is defined by Section 71.0021.
§ 71.005:
“Household” means a unit composed of persons living together in the same dwelling, without regard to whether they are related to each other.
§ 71.0021:
(a) “Dating violence” means an act by an individual that is against another individual with whom that person has or has had a dating relationship and that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the individual in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault, but does not include defensive measures to protect oneself.
(b) For purposes of this title, “dating relationship” means a relationship between individuals who have or have had a continuing relationship of a romantic or intimate nature. The existence of such a relationship shall be determined based on consideration of:
(1) the length of the relationship;
(2) the nature of the relationship; and
(3) the frequency and type of interaction between the persons involved in the relationship. . . .
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.003, 71.004, 71.005, & 71.0021 (West 2008).
Application Paragraph
The application paragraph contained in the jury charge on the assault by
occlusion offense stated:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 14th day of September, 2009, in McLennan County, Texas, the defendant, Kenneth Ray Morgan, did then and there intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury to Melissa Eversole, a member of the Defendant’s family or household, as described by 71.005 or 71.0021(b), Family Code, by intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly Morgan v. State Page 10 impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of the said Melissa Eversole, by applying pressure to the throat or neck and/or blocking the nose or mouth, of the said Melissa Eversole, then you will find the Defendant guilty of the offense of Assault Family Violence by Occlusion, as charged in this indictment.
Dating Relationship
Morgan complains in his first issue that the jury charge erroneously broadened
the charged offense set forth in the indictment because it allowed a conviction based on
a dating relationship, which was set forth in the indictment solely by an erroneous
attempt to reference the section in the Family Code that defines “dating relationship.”
The original indictment from the grand jury alleged in relevant part that “KENNETH
RAY MORGAN … did then and there intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause
bodily injury to MELISSA EVERSOLE, a member of the Defendant’s family or
household, as described by Section 71.033 or 71.005 or 71.00021(b), Family Code ….”
The indictment was amended without objection by the defense prior to trial and
abandoned the reference to Section 71.033, a section that does not exist in the Family
Code, and changed Section 71.00021(b) to 71.0021(b). Section 71.005 contains the
statutory definition of “household” and section 71.0021(b) contains the statutory
definition of “dating relationship.” Presumably the State intended the reference to
section 71.033 which was abandoned to actually refer to section 71.003, which contains
the statutory definition of “family.”
Morgan contends that the reference to section 71.0021(b) was insufficient to allow
the inclusion of “dating relationship” in the definition of “family or household.” We
disagree in part with that complaint. We note that “dating relationship” is a separate
Morgan v. State Page 11 definition from the definitions of either “family” or “household” in the Family Code.
The purpose of an indictment is to give a defendant notice of the substance of the
charges against him or her. As such, although it certainly could have been worded
more clearly and should have set forth the correct section numbers, Morgan was given
notice at trial that the State intended to rely on the definitions set forth in the family
code of “household” and “dating relationship” in the indictment. Section 22.01(b)(2)(B)
refers specifically to those sections of the Family Code by number when defining which
persons would qualify as victims for this offense. Morgan does not contend that he did
not have notice of the intent of the State to rely on a dating relationship between
Eversole and himself.
Morgan did not file a motion to quash the indictment, but now raises this
deficiency by claiming that it adds an uncharged manner and means of the offense in
the jury charge. To the degree that Morgan is complaining about a defect in the
substance or form of the indictment, this objection has been waived by the failure to
raise it in the trial court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14; see also Smith v. State,
309 S.W.3d 10, 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). To the extent that Morgan is complaining that
the instruction regarding “dating relationship” was erroneously included in the jury
charge because it broadened the indictment, we also find that this was not erroneous
based on the language of the indictment. We overrule issue one.
Family Violence
Morgan complains that the trial court erred by including the definition of “family
violence” as set forth in Family Code section 71.004 in the jury charge because it is not a
Morgan v. State Page 12 required definition for the charged offense. Morgan contends that the inclusion of the
definition impermissibly broadened the indictment. The State contends that the
instruction was necessary because the definition of “family violence” includes “dating
violence” and that those terms are synonymous. “Dating violence” is defined in section
71.0021(a) of the Family Code but the term “dating violence” was not included in the
definition of “family violence” provided in either charge to the jury. Further, while
“dating violence” is one type of “family violence,” the terms are not entirely
synonymous because “family violence” has a broader meaning than “dating violence.”
However, even if this assertion were correct, the language of this charge would give no
indication that “dating violence” was included in the definition of “family violence” or
how it was connected to the application paragraph of the assault offense. Ultimately,
however, the definition of “dating violence” is not an element of the offense of assault
by occlusion either and was not relevant to this offense.
We agree that the definition of “family violence” should not have been included
in the jury charge for the assault by occlusion offense because neither the term “family
violence” or the term “dating violence” is an element or other necessary part of the
offense of assault by occlusion. However, we do not find that the indictment was
erroneously broadened by the inclusion of this instruction because in the charge before
the jury it had no connection to or was ever tied to the application paragraph.
Morgan complains that the trial court erred in its definitions in the abstract
portion of the jury charge regarding mens rea because the definitions given included an
Morgan v. State Page 13 instruction on “nature-of-conduct” in addition to “result-of-conduct.” Assault by
occlusion is a “result-of-conduct” offense. See Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 540
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The jury charge included the definition of “result-of-conduct”
with the definitions of “intentionally,” “knowingly,” and “recklessly” but also included
the definition of “nature-of-conduct” with the definition of “knowingly” only. The
State concedes that this inclusion was erroneous and we agree.
Comment on the Weight of the Evidence
Morgan complains in his fourth issue that the language of the application
paragraph “a member of the Defendant’s family or household” as it was worded
removed the requirement that the jury determine that issue and in effect, was a directed
verdict by the trial court on that issue.
Article 36.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that the trial court
deliver to the jury a “written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the
case; not expressing any opinion as to the weight of the evidence, not summing up the
testimony, discussing the facts or using any argument in his charge calculated to arouse
the sympathy or excite the passions of the jury.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14
(West 2007). “A charge that assumes the truth of a controverted issue is a comment on
the weight of the evidence and is erroneous.” Whaley v. State, 717 S.W.2d 26, 32 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986); see also Grady v. State, 634 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)
(observing that “trial court in its charge to a jury should never give the jury an
instruction which constitutes a comment by the court on the elements of the alleged
offense, or assumes a disputed fact”).
Morgan v. State Page 14 Morgan’s defense was based on alibi and identity; that being that he was in
another city on the date of the offense and therefore, the offense must have been
committed by another person who was identified as being present at the scene of the
offense around the time of the assault. Our review of the record shows that the issue of
whether or not Morgan and Eversole were residing together was not controverted.
Because of this, we are not persuaded that the charge as written “assume[d] the truth of
a controverted issue.” See Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(citing Whaley v. State, 717 S.W.2d 26, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). See also Munson v. State,
No. 10-09-00319-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6806 at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco August 24,
2011, no pet. h.). We overrule issue four of the assault by occlusion offense.4
Morgan complains in his fifth issue that the trial court erroneously omitted a
definition of “family” in the jury charge on the assault by occlusion offense. The State
contends that the trial court was not required to include the definition of “family”
because it had abandoned the statutory reference to “family” by deleting “71.033” from
the indictment. While we can assume that the State was referring to the definition of
“family” as set forth in section 71.003 of the Family Code, and that section was indeed
marked out on the indictment, the term “a member of Defendant’s family or
household” immediately preceding the statutory references was not deleted and was
submitted to the jury in the charge.
“A trial court is statutorily obligated to instruct the jury on the law applicable to
4This is not to say that the application paragraph should have been phrased as it was. It is preferable for the jury to be charged in such a way that they must find each element necessary for guilt and thus avoid an argument on appeal. Morgan v. State Page 15 the case.” Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (West 2007). That statutory obligation requires that each
statutory definition that affects the meaning of an element of the offense be
communicated to the jury. Id. Because there was a reference to Eversole being a
member of Morgan’s “family” in the application paragraph of the assault by occlusion
offense, the trial court erred by failing to include the statutory definition of “family” in
the jury charge.
HARM ANALYSIS
Having found multiple errors in each of the jury charges, we must next
determine whether these errors constituted egregious harm. The actual degree of harm
of these errors must be evaluated in light of: (1) the entire jury charge; (2) the state of the
evidence, including the contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence; (3)
the final arguments of the parties; and (4) any other relevant information revealed by
the trial record as a whole. Allen v. State, 253 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In
regard to the fourth factor, we must consider, on this record, the submission of the two
separate jury charges each with various errors contained therein.
Having found errors in the charge relating to the violation of the protective order
as discussed above, we must determine if Morgan was egregiously harmed by those
errors.
The Entire Jury Charge
As discussed in detail above, the jury charge as submitted on the violation of
Morgan v. State Page 16 protective order offense was flawed in multiple respects. Three elements of the offense
were not included in the application paragraph. Statutorily defined terms of
“household” and “family” were not included. The inapplicable mens rea relating to
“nature-of-conduct” was included.
Missing Elements
Relating to the element of Morgan’s presence at the hearing on the violation of
the protective order, the State’s burden to establish that Morgan had some knowledge
of the order was, if anything, increased by the requirement that the violation of the
protective order itself was intentional or knowing.
Relating to the element of Eversole being “a member of the Defendant’s family or
household,” the definition of “family violence” set forth in the abstract portion of the
charge included those terms, although their statutory definitions were also improperly
omitted.
Relating to the element of whether the assault was “intended to result in physical
harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault” being omitted from the application
paragraph, we find that although there was a definition of “family violence” included
in the charge, it did not require a finding solely that the assault was “intended to result
in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault” but also added “or that is a
threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily
injury, assault, or sexual assault, but not does include defensive measures to protect
oneself,” which would potentially allow the jury to consider an additional definition
that was not relevant to the offense as alleged in the indictment and could result in a
Morgan v. State Page 17 conviction without the requisite intent.
The definitions of “family” and “household” were not included in the abstract
portion of the charge. However, the omission of the definition of “family” was not
particularly harmful as there was no evidence of a familial relationship. The Family
Code’s definition of “household” is not significantly different from its commonly
known definition. When a statutory term is not defined in the jury charge, we are to
assume that the jury considered the commonly understood meaning of the term in its
deliberations. See Olveda v. State, 650 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). In
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, “household” is defined as (1) those who dwell
under the same roof and compose a family; also (2) a social unit composed of those
living together in the same dwelling. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 561 (10th
ed. 2000). We see no meaningful distinction between the two definitions. Additionally,
the Family Code’s definition of “household” was included in the assault by occlusion
jury charge.
However, we note that “dating violence,” which was an allegation included in
the assault by occlusion offense, was not part of the indictment in the violation of
protective order offense. When reviewing the two charges submitted jointly to the jury,
the distinct allegations allowed in the definition of “family violence” which was
presented in both jury charges also enhances the confusing language of the charges.
The mens rea instruction in the jury charge improperly included the definitions of
Morgan v. State Page 18 “nature-of-conduct” which could have been largely minimized had the charge properly
included the element of “intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or
sexual assault” in the application paragraph because then a finding would have been
required relating to the result of Morgan’s conduct. This failure enhances the error of
including the surplus definition.
Conclusion on Review of Charge Factors
The multiple errors in the charge, especially the omitted elements, significantly
increased the harm to Morgan.
The State of the Evidence
The state of the evidence, including the contested issues and the weight of the
probative evidence, demonstrates that the protective order was issued by authority of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires the presence of the defendant, and the
order indicates that Morgan was present. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.292(j)
(West Supp. 2010). Further, there is an acknowledgement of receipt of the order signed
by Morgan and witnessed by a deputy. There was no evidence presented that Morgan
was unaware of the existence of the protective order.
The evidence was uncontroverted that Eversole was assaulted and suffered
bodily injury as a result. Morgan’s defense was that he was working out of town on the
day of the offense. Eversole and a neighbor who lived two houses down from Eversole
and Morgan but was at her mother-in-law’s house next door to Eversole and Morgan’s
house each testified that Morgan was residing with Eversole at the time of the offense
and had been for a period of approximately six to eight weeks. Eversole identified
Morgan v. State Page 19 Morgan as the person who had assaulted her and the neighbor observed Morgan
outside of the residence of Eversole and Morgan shortly after Eversole had come next
door to the mother-in-law’s home for help after the assault. The neighbor’s husband
had been a friend of Morgan since high school and the neighbor had known him since
she was seventeen. The neighbor testified that she saw Morgan leave the scene with
several other men in a pickup truck shortly after the assault.
There was no evidence of a familial relationship between Eversole and Morgan.
The only evidence of the lack of Eversole and Morgan constituting a household was one
comment by the defense’s witness that Morgan had resided in Lufkin prior to the
offense but had been “back and forth.” However, that witness provided no work
records or other documentation of Morgan’s employment even though he contended
that they did exist and he had been subpoenaed to bring them with him to court.
The contested issue in the violation of protective order offense was whether or
not Morgan was there the day of the offense or if someone else who was seen at the
residence actually assaulted Eversole. The jury, as the sole fact-finder and determiner
of the credibility of the witnesses, chose to believe Eversole and the neighbor and to
disbelieve Morgan’s witness. The evidence of Morgan’s guilt was strong and reduces
the harm from the erroneous jury charge.
Final Arguments of the Parties
Morgan did not argue that he did not know of the existence of the protective
order or that Eversole was a member of his family or household. Rather, the focus of
the argument was on the inconsistencies found in the testimony and on whether
Morgan v. State Page 20 another individual committed the offense because Morgan was working in Lufkin.
In its closing argument, the State defined the offense of violation of protective
order as “…the Defendant on or about a certain date in our county intentionally or
knowingly committed family violence in violation of that order,” which does not set
forth each of the required elements. There was nothing further in either argument that
increased the harm from the errors as shown above.
Other Evidence from the Record as a Whole
During voir dire, the State made references to a dating relationship being
relevant to the violation of protective order offense, which it was not according to the
indictment. The jury charge from the assault by occlusion charge contained definitions
that, while applicable to the violation of protective order charge, were not included in
the violation of protective order charge. The underlying assault alleged in the violation
of protective order offense was not entirely related to the assault by occlusion, but also
allowed findings of hitting, striking, or grabbing in addition to choking or suffocating.
The assault by occlusion jury charge contained multiple errors as well, which increases
the harm suffered by Morgan.
CONCLUSION ON VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER
While we recognize the strength of the evidence against Morgan, we cannot
overlook the multiple errors in the jury charge including those which allowed the jury
to convict Morgan without making findings as to required elements of the offense. We
find that Morgan was egregiously harmed by the errors in the jury charge relating to
the violation of protective order offense. We sustain issues one, two, and three.
Morgan v. State Page 21 Assault by Occlusion
Having found that the jury charge relating to the assault by occlusion offense
was erroneous because it included an unnecessary instruction relating to “family
violence,” set forth an improper “nature-of-conduct” mens rea relating to “knowingly,”
and omitted the definition of the term “family,” we must next determine whether
Morgan was egregiously harmed by the errors.
We must determine whether the jury charge as a whole increased or decreased
the harm suffered by Morgan. One significant error in the jury charge on the assault by
occlusion offense is that the section numbers from the Family Code set forth in the
charge were never connected to the appropriate definitions in the abstract portion of the
jury charge. The definitions of “household” and “dating relationship” were included in
the abstract portion of the jury charge but the section numbers referenced in the
application paragraph were never connected to those definitions or otherwise explained
in the charge.
Inclusion of Definition of “Family Violence”
The application paragraph in the charge for this offense erroneously referred to
the offense as “Assault Family Violence by Occlusion,” which is not the proper name
for the offense and could also potentially allow the consideration of the threat portion of
the definition as part of the offense. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (definition of
family violence). However, the jury had properly received this definition in the jury
charge for the violation of a protective order, for which the definition was relevant in
Morgan v. State Page 22 part, but still not relevant as it defines family violence as constituting a threat of
violence.
Improper Mens rea
The improper mens rea relating to the nature of Morgan’s conduct was only
provided in relation to the intent of “knowingly” but was erroneous. In the application
paragraph, the State had attempted to abandon the allegation of “family” by striking
the erroneous section number that had been alleged, but the State did not remove it
from the term “a member of the Defendant’s family or household,” which was then
limited to sections 71.005 and 71.0021(b), neither of which define “family.” Section
71.0021(b) does not define either “family” or “household” but is the separate definition
of “dating relationship.”
Omission of Definition of “Family”
Because the State did not fully abandon the allegation of Eversole being a
member of Morgan’s family, the failure to include the definition was erroneous.
However, because there was no evidence of a familial relationship between them, this
failure does not increase the harm suffered by Morgan. We overrule issue five.
However, the other errors in the jury charge for the assault by occlusion offense
did increase the harm suffered by Morgan.
State of the Evidence
The assault by occlusion was the lesser-mentioned offense throughout the trial.
Eversole testified that during the altercation between herself and Morgan, Morgan
impeded her ability to breathe by holding his hand over her nose and mouth.
Morgan v. State Page 23 Photographs were introduced into evidence which showed that Eversole had sustained
a cut on the inside of her mouth which was consistent with Eversole’s account. There
was no evidence presented that this did not in fact occur. The evidence of the assault by
occlusion against Eversole, who was a member of Morgan’s household, was strong and
reduced the harm suffered by Morgan.
Arguments of the Parties
In his closing argument, Morgan contended that the evidence was not sufficient
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Eversole’s normal breathing or circulation
of blood was impeded during the altercation. Morgan did not deny that some type of
assault had occurred but that he was not there that day but someone else was. There
was no argument by either the State or Morgan relating to the relationship between
Morgan and Eversole as not being a household or dating relationship. The arguments
of the parties did not describe the intent required or the erroneous “nature-of-conduct”
definition. The arguments did not increase the harm suffered by Morgan.
In voir dire, the State referenced a dating relationship as being one of the ways
that Morgan could have committed the offense of the assault by occlusion at least twice.
There was no other evidence in the record from voir dire, the evidence, or the rest of the
record as a whole beyond the inconsistencies and errors in each of the jury charges that
caused harm to Morgan.
CONCLUSION ON ASSAULT BY OCCLUSION
Ultimately, although the evidence against Morgan was strong, we find that the
Morgan v. State Page 24 multiple errors contained both in the application paragraph and the abstract portion of
the charge caused egregious harm to Morgan because it allowed the jury to consider the
irrelevant definition of “family violence” and a dating relationship which was never
properly connected between the definitions in the abstract portion and the application
paragraph. We sustain issues two and three.
CONCLUSION
Because we have found that the jury charges for each offense were erroneous and
those errors caused egregious harm, we reverse the judgments of conviction and
remand for a new trial on both offenses or as may be charged in the indictments as
amended.
TOM GRAY Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Reversed and Remanded Opinion delivered and filed October 12, 2011 Do not publish [CR25]
Morgan v. State Page 25