In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-22-00400-CR __________________
KENNETH RAY CHATMAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 9th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 22-03-03134-CR __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Kenneth Ray Chatman appeals his conviction for the manufacture
or delivery of a controlled substance. His indictment included two enhancement
paragraphs. In one appellate issue, Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to
prove that he is the same person who was convicted in cause number 15,290, the
1 prior conviction alleged in the first enhancement paragraph of the indictment.1 We
affirm.
In 2022, Appellant was indicted for the manufacture or delivery of a
controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, in an amount of four grams or more
but less than two hundred grams, a first-degree felony. See Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 481.112(d). The indictment alleged two prior convictions for
enhancement purposes. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d). The first enhancement
paragraph of the indictment alleged the following:
And the GRAND JURY further presents that said Defendant, Kenneth Ray Chatman, was convicted of a felony, to wit: Burglary of a Building on March 22, 1984 in the 221st District Court of Montgomery County, Texas in Cause No. 15-290-CR and said conviction became final prior to the commission of the aforesaid offense in Count I of this Indictment.
The second enhancement paragraph alleged a prior conviction for robbery in 1986.
Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense of manufacture or delivery of a controlled
substance and pleaded “not true” to the two enhancement allegations. The jury found
the enhancement allegations to be true and assessed Appellant’s punishment at forty
years of imprisonment. Appellant timely appealed.
1 Because Appellant’s only issue on appeal challenges the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Appellant was the same person previously convicted in cause number 15,290 as alleged in the first enhancement paragraph, we do not discuss evidence related to the primary offense or to the second enhancement paragraph. 2 Standard of Review and Applicable Law
To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a prior conviction exists, and the
defendant is linked to that conviction. Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016); Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim App. 2007).
No specific document or mode of proof is required to establish these two elements.
Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 918; Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921. Nor is there a “best
evidence” rule in Texas that requires a prior conviction be proven with any
document, much less any specific document. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921. Any type
of evidence, documentary or testimonial, may suffice. See id. at 922.
The State may establish the existence of a prior conviction by admitting
certified copies of the judgment, but certified copies of a prior conviction are
normally insufficient standing alone to link the defendant to the prior conviction,
even if the name on the judgment and sentence matched that of the defendant in trial.
See Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 209-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Paschall v.
State, 285 S.W.3d 166, 174-75 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); see also
Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 919. The State has the burden of proving the link between the
prior conviction and the defendant by bringing forth some additional evidence
showing that the defendant is the same person named in the previous conviction. See
Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 210; see also Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 918.
3 Typically, this link is established by admitting certified copies of a judgment
and sentence and authenticated copies of the Texas Department of Corrections
records, including fingerprints, supported by expert testimony identifying the prints
as identical to known prints of the defendant. Paschall, 285 S.W.3d at 174-75; see
Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 31-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc, op. on
reh’g). While this may be the preferred and most convenient way to establish a prior
conviction and link it to the defendant, the State may prove these elements in
different ways, including the defendant’s admission or stipulation or testimony by a
person who was present when the defendant was convicted of the specified crime
and can identify the defendant as the person. See Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 918; Flowers,
220 S.W.3d at 921-22. Acceptable evidence also includes documentary proof which
contains sufficient information to establish that a prior conviction exists and the
defendant’s identity as the person convicted, such as a record that contains
photographs or a detailed physical description of a named person and the accused
was present in court for the factfinder to compare his appearance with that person
described in the record. See Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 918; Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921-
22; Littles, 726 S.W.2d at 31-32; see also Dorsett v. State, 396 S.W.2d 115, 116
(Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
Regardless of the type of evidentiary “puzzle pieces” the State offers to prove
the existence of a prior conviction and its link to a defendant, the factfinder
4 determines if the pieces fit together sufficiently to complete the evidentiary puzzle.
Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923 (citing Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 835-36 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1988) (op. on reh’g) (equating the proof used to prove prior convictions
to a jigsaw puzzle and the pieces of evidence fitting together like puzzle pieces));
see also Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 919. “If these two elements can be found beyond a
reasonable doubt, then the various pieces used to complete the puzzle are necessarily
legally sufficient to prove a prior conviction.” Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding to determine whether, based
on that evidence, and the reasonable inferences from it, the jury was rationally
justified in finding the allegation “true” beyond a reasonable doubt. See Temple v.
State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (describing legal sufficiency
standard); Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (explaining
legal sufficiency standard used to sustain conviction “appl[ies] equally to the
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In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-22-00400-CR __________________
KENNETH RAY CHATMAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 9th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 22-03-03134-CR __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Kenneth Ray Chatman appeals his conviction for the manufacture
or delivery of a controlled substance. His indictment included two enhancement
paragraphs. In one appellate issue, Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to
prove that he is the same person who was convicted in cause number 15,290, the
1 prior conviction alleged in the first enhancement paragraph of the indictment.1 We
affirm.
In 2022, Appellant was indicted for the manufacture or delivery of a
controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, in an amount of four grams or more
but less than two hundred grams, a first-degree felony. See Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 481.112(d). The indictment alleged two prior convictions for
enhancement purposes. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d). The first enhancement
paragraph of the indictment alleged the following:
And the GRAND JURY further presents that said Defendant, Kenneth Ray Chatman, was convicted of a felony, to wit: Burglary of a Building on March 22, 1984 in the 221st District Court of Montgomery County, Texas in Cause No. 15-290-CR and said conviction became final prior to the commission of the aforesaid offense in Count I of this Indictment.
The second enhancement paragraph alleged a prior conviction for robbery in 1986.
Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense of manufacture or delivery of a controlled
substance and pleaded “not true” to the two enhancement allegations. The jury found
the enhancement allegations to be true and assessed Appellant’s punishment at forty
years of imprisonment. Appellant timely appealed.
1 Because Appellant’s only issue on appeal challenges the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Appellant was the same person previously convicted in cause number 15,290 as alleged in the first enhancement paragraph, we do not discuss evidence related to the primary offense or to the second enhancement paragraph. 2 Standard of Review and Applicable Law
To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a prior conviction exists, and the
defendant is linked to that conviction. Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016); Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim App. 2007).
No specific document or mode of proof is required to establish these two elements.
Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 918; Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921. Nor is there a “best
evidence” rule in Texas that requires a prior conviction be proven with any
document, much less any specific document. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921. Any type
of evidence, documentary or testimonial, may suffice. See id. at 922.
The State may establish the existence of a prior conviction by admitting
certified copies of the judgment, but certified copies of a prior conviction are
normally insufficient standing alone to link the defendant to the prior conviction,
even if the name on the judgment and sentence matched that of the defendant in trial.
See Beck v. State, 719 S.W.2d 205, 209-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Paschall v.
State, 285 S.W.3d 166, 174-75 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); see also
Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 919. The State has the burden of proving the link between the
prior conviction and the defendant by bringing forth some additional evidence
showing that the defendant is the same person named in the previous conviction. See
Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 210; see also Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 918.
3 Typically, this link is established by admitting certified copies of a judgment
and sentence and authenticated copies of the Texas Department of Corrections
records, including fingerprints, supported by expert testimony identifying the prints
as identical to known prints of the defendant. Paschall, 285 S.W.3d at 174-75; see
Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 31-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc, op. on
reh’g). While this may be the preferred and most convenient way to establish a prior
conviction and link it to the defendant, the State may prove these elements in
different ways, including the defendant’s admission or stipulation or testimony by a
person who was present when the defendant was convicted of the specified crime
and can identify the defendant as the person. See Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 918; Flowers,
220 S.W.3d at 921-22. Acceptable evidence also includes documentary proof which
contains sufficient information to establish that a prior conviction exists and the
defendant’s identity as the person convicted, such as a record that contains
photographs or a detailed physical description of a named person and the accused
was present in court for the factfinder to compare his appearance with that person
described in the record. See Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 918; Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921-
22; Littles, 726 S.W.2d at 31-32; see also Dorsett v. State, 396 S.W.2d 115, 116
(Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
Regardless of the type of evidentiary “puzzle pieces” the State offers to prove
the existence of a prior conviction and its link to a defendant, the factfinder
4 determines if the pieces fit together sufficiently to complete the evidentiary puzzle.
Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923 (citing Human v. State, 749 S.W.2d 832, 835-36 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1988) (op. on reh’g) (equating the proof used to prove prior convictions
to a jigsaw puzzle and the pieces of evidence fitting together like puzzle pieces));
see also Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 919. “If these two elements can be found beyond a
reasonable doubt, then the various pieces used to complete the puzzle are necessarily
legally sufficient to prove a prior conviction.” Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding to determine whether, based
on that evidence, and the reasonable inferences from it, the jury was rationally
justified in finding the allegation “true” beyond a reasonable doubt. See Temple v.
State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (describing legal sufficiency
standard); Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (explaining
legal sufficiency standard used to sustain conviction “appl[ies] equally to the
affirmative findings necessary to sustain the imposition of an enhanced
punishment[]”). The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to
witness testimony. Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360.
Analysis
On appeal, Chatman argues the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s
finding that he is the person who was convicted in cause number 15,290, as alleged
5 in the first enhancement paragraph of his indictment. Jerry Stovall, a sergeant
investigator at the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office, testified at trial
that he was a fingerprint examiner and an expert in fingerprint examination. He has
testified in courts in both Travis County and Montgomery County as an expert in
fingerprint identification. During his direct examination in Chatman’s trial, Sergeant
Stovall provided the following testimony, which ties Chatman based on his
fingerprints to several exhibits the State introduced into evidence during the trial:
Q. (BY [PROSECUTOR]) Showing you State’s Exhibit 25. Do you recognize this?
A. I do.
Q. What is it?
A. It’s a ten-card which is one of those card stocks that I mentioned before where I intentionally recorded fingerprints, right hand, left hand on that card.
Q. And when did you make it?
A. Yesterday at about 4:50.
Q. Okay. In the courtroom today do you see the person whose inked fingerprints appear on that card?
Q. Okay. Can you point to him and identify him by what he’s wearing?
A. Dark suit and suit and -- sorry, my glasses. Kind of a multicolored tie.
6 Q. Okay. Just for the record, out of the three people sitting at the defense counsel table, which one are you pointing to?
A. The gentleman in the middle.
[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, would the record reflect the witness has identified the defendant?
THE COURT: [] It shall.
....
Q. (BY [PROSECUTOR]) So I want to show you what’s been premarked as State’s Exhibit 24 and 14 in particular. Do you recognize these?
Q. And how do you recognize them?
A. They were provided to me previously -- previous to this date to begin working on this print packet.
Q. And is there a fingerprint on State’s Exhibit 14?
A. There is.
Q. And have you compared the defendant’s fingerprints on the inked print with that print on State’s 14?
A. I have.
Q. And do you have an opinion as to whether or not the fingerprints were made by the same individual?
A. It’s my opinion that they belong to the same individual.
Q. Is that individual Kenneth Chatman?
A. Yes. 7 State’s Exhibit 25, the ten-print fingerprint card of Appellant’s fingerprints
personally recorded and obtained by Stovall the day before trial, was admitted into
evidence. Other relevant exhibits admitted at trial include a December 4, 1981
Judgment placing Kenneth Chatman on probation for three years for burglary of a
building in cause number 15,290 in the 221st District Court of Montgomery County
and depicting a right thumb print (State’s Exhibit 14); a March 22, 1984 Order
Revoking Probation and Pronouncing Sentence for Kenneth Ray Chatman in cause
number 15,290 in the 221st District Court of Montgomery County and sentencing
him to three years of imprisonment for burglary of a building (State’s Exhibit 24);
an indictment in 2009 for Kenneth Ray Chatman for two counts of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver/manufacture in cause number 09-10-
10267-CR in the 284th District Court in Montgomery County that listed a prior
conviction for felony burglary of a habitation in cause number 15,290 and a prior
conviction in 05-01-00769-CR for enhancement purposes (State’s Exhibit 15); the
judgment in cause number 09-10-10267-CR convicting “Kenneth Ray Chatman”
(identified by “State ID No. TX03283368”) of the 2009 offense and noting his plea
of true to the enhancements but bearing an unclear fingerprint (State’s Exhibit 16);
and a 2005 judgment in cause number 05-01-00769-CR for “Kenneth Ray Chatman”
(identified by “SID#: TX03283368”) with a fingerprint (State’s Exhibit 19).
8 On appeal, Appellant argues Stovall later testified that he did not use State’s
Exhibit 25, the inked fingerprint card as the “known” fingerprints in the case, as the
basis of comparison to the fingerprint on State’s Exhibit 14 (the judgment placing
Kenneth Chatman on probation in cause number 15,290). In support of that
argument, Appellant relies on the following testimony by Stovall:
Q. (BY [PROSECUTOR]): I want to start here on State’s 24. Can you tell us what the cause number is in this case?
A. 15290.
Q. And what is the defendant’s name on this order?
A. Kenneth Ray Chatman.
Q. And what is this document titled up on the top?
A. Order Revoking Probation and Pronounce Sentence - - Pronouncing Sentence[.]
Q. I’m showing you State’s Exhibit 14. Is that the same cause number at the top?
A. Correct.
Q. And for the same defendant?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what charge do we see?
A. Burglary of a building.
Q. And is that a felony charge?
A. Yes, sir. 9 Q. And at the very bottom where it says right thumbprint, do we see a print?
Q. You mentioned earlier that you were able to compare that to the inked card that we put right above in State’s 25. Is this the inked print you compared to that print?
A. So I compared to the offense that he was in custody for currently, and that print matched that print.
In relying on this testimony on appeal, Appellant argues that the “known”
fingerprint that Stovall compared to State’s Exhibit 14 was not admitted into
evidence, the source of the “known” fingerprint was never clarified, and the record
is unclear as to what fingerprint(s) Stovall compared to the fingerprint in State’s
Exhibit 14. Appellant further argues that the signature in State’s Exhibit 14 does not
appear to be similar to any signature offered by the State into evidence and it does
not provide any evidence of Appellant’s identity, and that the other exhibits
containing judgments linking Appellant to cause number 15,290 contain minimal
identifiers and are not sufficient to identify Appellant as the one convicted in those
exhibits.
The jury heard Stovall’s initial testimony that he personally obtained
Appellant’s fingerprints the day before trial and those prints were recorded on a card,
admitted as State’s Exhibit 25. Sergeant Stovall testified that he agreed he
“compared the defendant’s fingerprints on the inked print with that print on State’s
10 14[]” (the judgment for probation for in cause number 15,290), and in Stovall’s
expert opinion the fingerprints both belonged to Appellant. This testimony was
sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the first enhancement paragraph was true.
See Paschall, 285 S.W.3d at 174-75. The jury, as the sole judge of credibility and
weight to be attached to witness testimony, could have considered all of Stovall’s
testimony, drawn reasonable inferences from his testimony, and concluded that
Stovall’s testimony did not conflict with his prior testimony that in his expert opinion
the “known” fingerprints he collected from Appellant on State’s Exhibit 25 and the
fingerprint on State’s Exhibit 14 both belonged to Appellant. See Temple, 390
S.W.3d at 360.
In addition to Stovall’s testimony comparing the fingerprints, other evidence
supported the jury’s finding that Appellant is the same person who is the subject of
the conviction in cause number 15,290, and Stovall agreed that the fingerprint on
State’s Exhibit 19, the judgment in cause number 05-01-00769-CR for “Kenneth
Ray Chatman[,]” matched the inked fingerprint of Appellant that Stovall had
“compared it to earlier[.]” Notably, the SID number on that judgment matched the
SID number for “Kenneth Ray Chatman” on State’s Exhibit 16, the judgment in
cause number 09-10-10267-CR and the judgment recites that “Kenneth Ray
Chatman” pleaded true to the prior convictions alleged in the enhancement
paragraphs, and the indictment in cause number 09-10-10267-CR (admitted as
11 State’s Exhibit 15) stated that one of the prior convictions alleged for enhancement
purposes was the conviction in cause number 15,290. Sergeant Stovall testified that
the SID numbers are assigned by the State of Texas when someone is arrested, the
number never changes during an individual’s life, and the SID number is linked to
the individual’s fingerprints anytime they are booked for an offense.
Considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding,
we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant is the person who is the subject of the prior
conviction in cause number 15,290. See Temple, 390 S.W.3d at 360; Flowers, 220
S.W.3d at 923. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal, and we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
LEANNE JOHNSON Justice
Submitted on October 9, 2023 Opinion Delivered December 13, 2023 Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.