Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 33 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-24-709
KENNETH MURRY Opinion Delivered January 21, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 23CR-23-47]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE TROY B. BRASWELL, APPELLEE JR., JUDGE
AFFIRMED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Kenneth Murry brings this pro se appeal of his conviction by a Faulkner County jury
of possession of a firearm by certain persons. He was sentenced to eight years in the Arkansas
Division of Correction. We must initially note that this appeal poses unique challenges.
Murry does not identify specific issues for appeal, and his assertions are difficult to decipher.1
Citations to relevant authority are rare, and he does not include any record citations. This
court will not make his argument for him or consider an argument that is not properly
developed. Teris, LLC v. Chandler, 375 Ark. 70, 289 S.W.3d 63 (2008); Satterlee v. State, 289
Ark. 450, 711 S.W.2d 827 (1986) (refusing to consider a pro se appellant’s arguments that
were incomprehensible and lacking in authority or convincing argument.) Thus, in instances
1 Murry’s handwritten brief is twenty-two pages. where Murry’s argument is unclear or undeveloped, we do not address it. Satterlee, 289 Ark.
450, 711 S.W.2d 827.2
From Murry’s brief, we have distilled three points: (1) the circuit court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial; (2) the circuit court erred by admitting
the firearm into evidence; and (3) the circuit court erred by allowing witnesses to testify
during the sentencing phase of trial because they had no knowledge of the possession-of-a-
firearm incident. We affirm.
On January 17, 2023, the State filed a criminal information charging Murry with
possession of a firearm by certain persons and as a habitual offender. In the attached
affidavit, the State alleged that Murry had been arrested on January 13 for an outstanding
warrant and that during his arrest, an officer located a firearm in his waistband.
On April 24, the court entered a scheduling order and set a pretrial hearing for July
17, and it charged the time to Murry for speedy-trial purposes. On July 17, the court issued
a scheduling order and set a motion hearing for August 11, and it charged speedy-trial time
to Murry. On August 11, 2023, the court issued a scheduling order and set a pretrial hearing
for October 2, and it charged the time to Murry for speedy-trial purposes.
On January 9, 2024, Murry fired his public defender, and he proceeded pro se. On
January 23, the court ordered a fitness-to-proceed examination.
2 Murry’s argument includes numerous complaints about his incarceration conditions and issues with his other criminal charges and convictions, which we do not address.
2 On March 11, Murry filed a pro se motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. On May
8, the examination report was filed, and the report indicated that Murry was fit to proceed.
On May 13, the court held a hearing and denied Murry’s speedy-trial motion.
The court held a jury trial June 20. At trial, Officer Vanessa Piper testified that on
January 13, 2023, she responded to Murry’s call about not receiving his paycheck from his
employer. She explained that she met Murry at a gas station and learned he had warrants for
his arrest. She testified that she then arrested him and located a firearm in the front
waistband of his pants.
The State also introduced Murry’s prior conviction for first-degree terroristic
threatening from January 22, 2018, and for breaking or entering and theft of property from
February 21, 2019.
The jury found Murry guilty, and the trial proceeded to the sentencing phase. The
State called Abdujabbar Hidais. Murry objected to Hidais’s testimony because Hidais was a
witness to a pending terroristic-threatening case against Murry and had no credibility
concerning the possession-of-a-firearm incident. The court overruled his objection.
Hidais testified that he worked at a gas station, and on August 2022, Murry
threatened to kill him with a screwdriver after they argued about food prices.
Amber Brantley also testified that on January 1, 2023, Murry approached her in a
store and repeatedly made sexually explicit comments. She stated that she told her husband
about the incident. Charles Brantley testified that he confronted Murry at the store and told
him to apologize to his wife. Charles stated that Murry asked, “Is it worth dying over? You
3 ready to fucking die?” Then Murry put his hands in his pockets. Charles testified that Murry’s
action suggested that Murry had a weapon.
Thereafter, Murry was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. This pro se appeal
followed.
The first issue that we ascertain from Murry’s brief is his assertion that the firearm
seized during his arrest was fruit of the poisonous tree because there was no probable cause
for the underlying arrest warrant. Although Murry indicated that he intended to file a
suppression motion at pretrial hearings, he did not file such a motion, did not develop the
argument, and did not obtain a ruling on this issue. As such, the argument is not preserved
for appeal. Holland v. State, 2015 Ark. 341, at 19, 471 S.W.3d 179, 190.
Murry also claims that the circuit court denied his right to a speedy trial, and he
asserts that his trial took place seventeen months after his arrest.
We conduct a de novo review to determine whether specific periods of time are
excludable under our speedy-trial rules. Carter v. State, 2016 Ark. 152, 484 S.W.3d 673. Once
a defendant establishes that his trial took place outside the speedy-trial period, the State bears
the burden of showing that the delay was the result of the defendant’s conduct or otherwise
justified. Id. The time for trial shall commence running from the date of arrest. Ark. R. Crim.
P. 28.2(a). Further, the filing of a speedy-trial motion to dismiss tolls the time for trial and
establishes the end date for the speedy-trial calculation. Ray v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 515, 678
S.W.3d 882. In this case, Murry was arrested on January 13, 2023, and his speedy-trial
motion was filed 423 days later on March 11, 2024.
4 However, the State correctly points out that at least 161 days are excludable for
speedy-trial purposes. Specifically, in the orders entered on April 24, July 17, and August 11,
2023, the court charged the speedy-trial time from April 24 to October 2, 2023, to Murry,
and Murry did not object to the orders. A contemporaneous objection to the excluded period
is necessary to preserve the argument in a subsequent speedy-trial motion. Smith v. State, 2021
Ark. App. 253, at 4, 624 S.W.3d 718, 721. Thus, Murry’s speedy-trial argument is without
merit.
Murry additionally argues that the circuit court erred by allowing Hidais and the
Brantleys to testify during the sentencing phase because their testimony was irrelevant to the
felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge. Murry did not object to the Brantleys’ testimony.
Accordingly, his argument is not preserved. Vaughn v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 136, 456 S.W.3d
767.
As to Hidais’s testimony, we find no error. The circuit court’s decision to admit
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Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 33 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-24-709
KENNETH MURRY Opinion Delivered January 21, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 23CR-23-47]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE TROY B. BRASWELL, APPELLEE JR., JUDGE
AFFIRMED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Kenneth Murry brings this pro se appeal of his conviction by a Faulkner County jury
of possession of a firearm by certain persons. He was sentenced to eight years in the Arkansas
Division of Correction. We must initially note that this appeal poses unique challenges.
Murry does not identify specific issues for appeal, and his assertions are difficult to decipher.1
Citations to relevant authority are rare, and he does not include any record citations. This
court will not make his argument for him or consider an argument that is not properly
developed. Teris, LLC v. Chandler, 375 Ark. 70, 289 S.W.3d 63 (2008); Satterlee v. State, 289
Ark. 450, 711 S.W.2d 827 (1986) (refusing to consider a pro se appellant’s arguments that
were incomprehensible and lacking in authority or convincing argument.) Thus, in instances
1 Murry’s handwritten brief is twenty-two pages. where Murry’s argument is unclear or undeveloped, we do not address it. Satterlee, 289 Ark.
450, 711 S.W.2d 827.2
From Murry’s brief, we have distilled three points: (1) the circuit court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial; (2) the circuit court erred by admitting
the firearm into evidence; and (3) the circuit court erred by allowing witnesses to testify
during the sentencing phase of trial because they had no knowledge of the possession-of-a-
firearm incident. We affirm.
On January 17, 2023, the State filed a criminal information charging Murry with
possession of a firearm by certain persons and as a habitual offender. In the attached
affidavit, the State alleged that Murry had been arrested on January 13 for an outstanding
warrant and that during his arrest, an officer located a firearm in his waistband.
On April 24, the court entered a scheduling order and set a pretrial hearing for July
17, and it charged the time to Murry for speedy-trial purposes. On July 17, the court issued
a scheduling order and set a motion hearing for August 11, and it charged speedy-trial time
to Murry. On August 11, 2023, the court issued a scheduling order and set a pretrial hearing
for October 2, and it charged the time to Murry for speedy-trial purposes.
On January 9, 2024, Murry fired his public defender, and he proceeded pro se. On
January 23, the court ordered a fitness-to-proceed examination.
2 Murry’s argument includes numerous complaints about his incarceration conditions and issues with his other criminal charges and convictions, which we do not address.
2 On March 11, Murry filed a pro se motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. On May
8, the examination report was filed, and the report indicated that Murry was fit to proceed.
On May 13, the court held a hearing and denied Murry’s speedy-trial motion.
The court held a jury trial June 20. At trial, Officer Vanessa Piper testified that on
January 13, 2023, she responded to Murry’s call about not receiving his paycheck from his
employer. She explained that she met Murry at a gas station and learned he had warrants for
his arrest. She testified that she then arrested him and located a firearm in the front
waistband of his pants.
The State also introduced Murry’s prior conviction for first-degree terroristic
threatening from January 22, 2018, and for breaking or entering and theft of property from
February 21, 2019.
The jury found Murry guilty, and the trial proceeded to the sentencing phase. The
State called Abdujabbar Hidais. Murry objected to Hidais’s testimony because Hidais was a
witness to a pending terroristic-threatening case against Murry and had no credibility
concerning the possession-of-a-firearm incident. The court overruled his objection.
Hidais testified that he worked at a gas station, and on August 2022, Murry
threatened to kill him with a screwdriver after they argued about food prices.
Amber Brantley also testified that on January 1, 2023, Murry approached her in a
store and repeatedly made sexually explicit comments. She stated that she told her husband
about the incident. Charles Brantley testified that he confronted Murry at the store and told
him to apologize to his wife. Charles stated that Murry asked, “Is it worth dying over? You
3 ready to fucking die?” Then Murry put his hands in his pockets. Charles testified that Murry’s
action suggested that Murry had a weapon.
Thereafter, Murry was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. This pro se appeal
followed.
The first issue that we ascertain from Murry’s brief is his assertion that the firearm
seized during his arrest was fruit of the poisonous tree because there was no probable cause
for the underlying arrest warrant. Although Murry indicated that he intended to file a
suppression motion at pretrial hearings, he did not file such a motion, did not develop the
argument, and did not obtain a ruling on this issue. As such, the argument is not preserved
for appeal. Holland v. State, 2015 Ark. 341, at 19, 471 S.W.3d 179, 190.
Murry also claims that the circuit court denied his right to a speedy trial, and he
asserts that his trial took place seventeen months after his arrest.
We conduct a de novo review to determine whether specific periods of time are
excludable under our speedy-trial rules. Carter v. State, 2016 Ark. 152, 484 S.W.3d 673. Once
a defendant establishes that his trial took place outside the speedy-trial period, the State bears
the burden of showing that the delay was the result of the defendant’s conduct or otherwise
justified. Id. The time for trial shall commence running from the date of arrest. Ark. R. Crim.
P. 28.2(a). Further, the filing of a speedy-trial motion to dismiss tolls the time for trial and
establishes the end date for the speedy-trial calculation. Ray v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 515, 678
S.W.3d 882. In this case, Murry was arrested on January 13, 2023, and his speedy-trial
motion was filed 423 days later on March 11, 2024.
4 However, the State correctly points out that at least 161 days are excludable for
speedy-trial purposes. Specifically, in the orders entered on April 24, July 17, and August 11,
2023, the court charged the speedy-trial time from April 24 to October 2, 2023, to Murry,
and Murry did not object to the orders. A contemporaneous objection to the excluded period
is necessary to preserve the argument in a subsequent speedy-trial motion. Smith v. State, 2021
Ark. App. 253, at 4, 624 S.W.3d 718, 721. Thus, Murry’s speedy-trial argument is without
merit.
Murry additionally argues that the circuit court erred by allowing Hidais and the
Brantleys to testify during the sentencing phase because their testimony was irrelevant to the
felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge. Murry did not object to the Brantleys’ testimony.
Accordingly, his argument is not preserved. Vaughn v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 136, 456 S.W.3d
767.
As to Hidais’s testimony, we find no error. The circuit court’s decision to admit
evidence in the penalty phase of a trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Stover v. State,
2014 Ark. App. 393, 437 S.W.3d 695. Additionally, a defendant who has received a sentence
within the statutory range short of the maximum sentence cannot show prejudice from the
sentence. Gill v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 524, 376 S.W.3d 529.
Evidence relevant to sentencing may include relevant character evidence or evidence
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-103(5), (6) (Supp.
2025); see also Huff v. State, 2012 Ark. 388, at 7, 423 S.W.3d 608, 612 (stating that “[e]vidence
of uncharged criminal conduct can be admissible at the penalty phase of a trial if it is relevant
5 evidence of the defendant’s character or as evidence of an aggravating circumstance”).
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the evidence. Ark. R. Evid. 401. All relevant evidence on the question of
sentencing may be considered, and it may include evidence on the issue of rehabilitation.
Crawford v. State, 362 Ark. 301, 208 S.W.3d 146 (2005). In Stover, we held that the testimony
of subsequent crimes in the sentencing phase was relevant because the commission of a crime
was an aggravating circumstance, it showed Stover’s character, and it demonstrated his lack
of potential for rehabilitation. Stover, 2014 Ark. App. 393, 437 S.W.3d 695. Similarly, in this
case, we find no abuse of discretion.3
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm Murry’s conviction.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN and BARRETT, JJ., agree.
Kenneth Murry, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: James Hill, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
3 Murry also complains that the State did not provide him with a witness list until June 2024. However, Murry does not otherwise develop his argument. This court will not make his argument for him or consider an argument that is not properly developed. Satterlee, 289 Ark. 450, 711 S.W.2d 827.