UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA MONROE DIVISION
KENNETH MITCHELL CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-1254
SECTION P VS. JUDGE JERRY EDWARDS, JR.
C. WENDELL MANNING, ET AL. MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Kenneth Mitchell, a prisoner at Louisiana State Penitentiary proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this proceeding on approximately November 13, 2024, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He names the following Defendants: Judge C. Wendell Manning, Assistant District Attorney John G. Spires, Deputy Clerk Amanda Guice, and Detective Eric Newnum.1 For reasons that follow, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. Background
Plaintiff claims that Deputy Clerk Amanda Guice and Bastrop City Police Detective Eric Newnum filed a “false affidavit and false warrant into public records on August 6, 2012.” [doc. # 8, p. 4]. He claims that on August 9, 2012, Detective Newnum “endorsed the false affidavit and false warrant to himself to exceed the 4th Judicial District Morehouse Parish, Bastrop, La. to enter into the 5th Judicial District, Richland Parish, Rayville, La. to make an illegal arrest and illegal search without any warrants. [sic].” Id. Plaintiff claims that on August 10, 2012, in an arrest report, Detective Newnum falsely
1 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court. claimed that he obtained a search warrant from Judge Manning. [doc. # 8, p. 5]. Plaintiff claims that Judge Manning “filed the false affidavit, false warrant and false arrest report into the 4th Judicial District Civil Section [on] August 2, 2023.” [doc. # 8, p. 5]. Plaintiff claims that Assistant District Attorney Spires informed him that “there were ‘no
search warrants’ in the record.” [doc. # 8, p. 5]. For relief, Plaintiff seeks immediate release from confinement. [doc. # 8, p. 6]. Law and Analysis
1. Preliminary Screening
Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2 See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his Complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. Courts are also afforded the unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), “‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” contentions are clearly baseless. Id. A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is
facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, supra. A well-pled complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra.
In making this determination, the court must assume that all of the plaintiff’s factual allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. A complaint fails to state a claim where its factual allegations do not “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[U]nadorned, the-defendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. “[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 632 F.3d 148, 152-53 (5th Cir. 2010). Courts are “not free to speculate that the plaintiff ‘might’ be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint.” Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court may dismiss a prisoner’s civil rights complaint as frivolous based upon the complaint and exhibits alone. Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986). “To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA MONROE DIVISION
KENNETH MITCHELL CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-1254
SECTION P VS. JUDGE JERRY EDWARDS, JR.
C. WENDELL MANNING, ET AL. MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Kenneth Mitchell, a prisoner at Louisiana State Penitentiary proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this proceeding on approximately November 13, 2024, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He names the following Defendants: Judge C. Wendell Manning, Assistant District Attorney John G. Spires, Deputy Clerk Amanda Guice, and Detective Eric Newnum.1 For reasons that follow, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. Background
Plaintiff claims that Deputy Clerk Amanda Guice and Bastrop City Police Detective Eric Newnum filed a “false affidavit and false warrant into public records on August 6, 2012.” [doc. # 8, p. 4]. He claims that on August 9, 2012, Detective Newnum “endorsed the false affidavit and false warrant to himself to exceed the 4th Judicial District Morehouse Parish, Bastrop, La. to enter into the 5th Judicial District, Richland Parish, Rayville, La. to make an illegal arrest and illegal search without any warrants. [sic].” Id. Plaintiff claims that on August 10, 2012, in an arrest report, Detective Newnum falsely
1 This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636, and the standing orders of the Court. claimed that he obtained a search warrant from Judge Manning. [doc. # 8, p. 5]. Plaintiff claims that Judge Manning “filed the false affidavit, false warrant and false arrest report into the 4th Judicial District Civil Section [on] August 2, 2023.” [doc. # 8, p. 5]. Plaintiff claims that Assistant District Attorney Spires informed him that “there were ‘no
search warrants’ in the record.” [doc. # 8, p. 5]. For relief, Plaintiff seeks immediate release from confinement. [doc. # 8, p. 6]. Law and Analysis
1. Preliminary Screening
Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, his complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2 See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, his Complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Id. at 327. Courts are also afforded the unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), “‘prisoner’ means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” contentions are clearly baseless. Id. A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is
facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. Id. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, supra. A well-pled complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly, supra.
In making this determination, the court must assume that all of the plaintiff’s factual allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998). However, the same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. A complaint fails to state a claim where its factual allegations do not “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[U]nadorned, the-defendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. “[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton, Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp, 632 F.3d 148, 152-53 (5th Cir. 2010). Courts are “not free to speculate that the plaintiff ‘might’ be able to state a claim if given yet another opportunity to add more facts to the complaint.” Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown) Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
A hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson v. Barrientos, 926 F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991). A district court may dismiss a prisoner’s civil rights complaint as frivolous based upon the complaint and exhibits alone. Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986). “To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consistent with the standard above, a “[S]ection 1983 complaint must state specific facts, not simply legal and constitutional conclusions.” Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).
2. Habeas Corpus
Plaintiff seeks only habeas corpus. Although Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, his request is an explicit challenge to the very fact and duration of his physical imprisonment.3 Habeas corpus relief is unavailable through a civil rights action. See Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998) (any claim attacking the validity or duration of confinement must be raised in a habeas corpus petition); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment,
3 See, e.g., Florence v. Garcia, 713 F. App’x 306, 307 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Florence’s requests for dismissal of the charges and for immediate release sound in habeas . . . .”). and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”). “A habeas petition . . . is the proper vehicle to seek release from custody.” Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff may, after he exhausts all his available state court remedies, pursue his request for immediate release from custody through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the Court should deny Plaintiff’s relief as an improper request for habeas corpus. Because Plaintiff does not seek any cognizable relief,4 the Court should dismiss his claims. Recommendation
For the reasons above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Kenneth Mitchell’s request for habeas corpus relief be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to his right to pursue the relief in a separate habeas corpus proceeding after he exhausts all his state remedies. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims under Section 1983 be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failing to state claims on which relief may be granted. Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of any objections or response to the district judge at the time of filing. Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the
4 Plaintiff filed two complaints. The form on which he filed his second pleading instructed him to state exactly what he wanted the Court to do for him. [doc. # 8, p. 6]. proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (Sth Cir. 1996). In Chambers, Monroe, Louisiana, this 6 day of October, 2025.
ths eh Kayla lyye McClusky United States Magistrate Judge