IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS ══════════ NO. 19-0595 ══════════
KENNETH L. HAEDGE, ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
CENTRAL TEXAS CATTLEMEN’S ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT
══════════════════════════════════════════ ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS ══════════════════════════════════════════
PER CURIAM
When a judgment is “for something other than money or an interest in property,” a
supersedeas bond “must adequately protect the judgment creditor against loss or damage that the
appeal might cause.” TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(3). This case involves how “loss or damage” is
calculated on release of a supersedeas bond. After Petitioners lost the underlying appeal, the trial
court ordered them to pay $7,000 from the supersedeas bond. The court of appeals reversed and
required Petitioners to pay $114,280.26 from the bond. The court of appeals calculated this amount
based on the expense Petitioners would have incurred if the judgment had not been superseded.
The proper measure, however, was the actual loss Respondent suffered because the judgment was
superseded. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court’s order
on the supersedeas bond. I. Background
In 1942, the United States Army acquired land in central Texas through eminent domain
to create Fort Hood. The previous owners grazed cattle on the land. As part of the compensation
arrangement, the Government let the landowners and their descendants continue to graze cattle on
the land. The owners established a non-profit corporation, the Central Texas Cattlemen’s
Association, to represent the members, manage grazing rights, and pay lease fees to the Army.
CTCA’s lease with the Army authorizes CTCA to graze no more than 2,000 head of cattle on the
Army’s land at any given time. Membership in CTCA is voluntary but only open to descendants
of the original landowners. Members are allotted shares that determine how many head of cattle
each is allowed to pasture on the land.1 CTCA collects dues from members (“assessments”) in
proportion to their shares to pay for its costs and the lease fees.
CTCA’s bylaws allow for cancelation of a member’s shares for violation of the
association’s bylaws, rules, or regulations. Petitioners (collectively, the Haedge Group) are all
cattle ranchers and previous members of CTCA. In 2015, CTCA cancelled their shares after they
allegedly erected unauthorized cattle pens on the leased land. The Haedge Group sued CTCA and
individual board members to challenge the ouster, alleging causes of action for fraud, conversion,
breach of contract, and defamation.
CTCA moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted in part. After a trial on
the remaining issue, the trial court rendered judgment that the Haedge Group take nothing. The
parties understand that judgment to allow the ouster of the Haedge Group members from the land.
1 1 share = the right to pasture 1.6 head of cattle.
2 The Haedge Group appealed and filed a motion in the trial court to suspend enforcement of the
judgment during the appeal. The trial court allowed the Haedge Group to suspend the judgment by
posting a $2,500 supersedeas bond. The parties interpreted the judgment’s suspension to mean the
Haedge Group could keep its cattle on the leased land during the appeal.
CTCA filed a motion in the court of appeals challenging the trial court’s order suspending
enforcement of the judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a)(4). On March 3, 2016, the court of
appeals ruled that the trial court order allowing the Haedge Group to supersede the judgment was
appropriate, but the amount of the bond was inadequate to protect CTCA. Haedge v. Cent. Tex.
Cattlemen’s Ass’n, No. 07-15-00368-CV, 2016 WL 836084, at *6–8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar.
3, 2016, order) (per curiam). The court of appeals increased the supersedeas bond to $132,400. Id.
at *8–9. This figure was based on (1) its estimation that the appeal would last two years multiplied
by (2) evidence that it would cost the Haedge Group approximately $66,200 per year to lease
alternative land upon which to graze their cattle. The Haedge Group posted a bond in that amount.
During the appeal, all but one of the Haedge Group plaintiffs continued to make their
regular membership payments to CTCA as any other member would. One plaintiff failed to make
$7,000 in payments.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s take-nothing judgment. The Haedge Group
petitioned for review to this Court. That petition was denied. On December 5, 2017, the court of
appeals in its mandate sent the case back to the trial court with the instruction that CTCA
recover of and from the supersedeas bond filed by [the Haedge Group], and their surety, Insurors Indemnity Company, all cattle grazing fees and costs, if any, accrued during the pendency of the appeal not to exceed the amount of the supersedeas bond, as determined by the court below and consistent with this Court’s order on supersedeas dated March 3, 2016 . . . .
3 The trial court held a hearing on the parties’ competing motions for release of the
supersedeas bond. After the hearing, the trial court ordered the parties to submit affidavits to
establish what damage, if any, was incurred by CTCA during the pendency of the appeal. After
consideration of the evidence, the trial court ruled that CTCA was entitled to $7,000 from the
supersedeas bond—the total amount of membership payments unpaid by Haedge Group
members—but nothing else. The trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of this ruling. CTCA appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.
The court of appeals held that the trial court failed to properly carry out the court of appeals’
mandate and improperly calculated CTCA’s damage. ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2019). The court of appeals decided that its original order had already established that, should
CTCA prevail on appeal, $66,200/year would constitute CTCA’s damage for delaying the ouster
of the Haedge Group members. According to the court of appeals, the Haedge Group received this
benefit even though the trial court had rendered a take-nothing judgment against them. “CTCA
proved that it was prevented from grazing approximately 325 head of cattle on the Fort Hood
property for the period of July 10, 2015, when the trial court entered its take-nothing judgment on
the Haedge group’s suit, through December 5, 2017, when this Court issued mandate in the
underlying appeal.” Id. at ___. Based on the duration of the appeal at the rate of $66,200/year, the
court of appeals calculated that CTCA suffered $159,242.76 in damage as a result of the
supersedeas. Because the Haedge Group paid $44,962.50 in dues during the appeal, that amount
was subtracted from the damage award. The court of appeals rendered judgment that CTCA
recover $114,280.26 from the supersedeas bond, and the Haedge Group petitioned for review.
4 II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Appellate review of the calculation of the amount to be recovered from a supersedeas bond
is generally for abuse of discretion. See In re Smith, 192 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. 2006) (reviewing
amount of supersedeas bond to suspend money judgment for abuse of discretion); Klein Indep.
Sch. Dist. v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS ══════════ NO. 19-0595 ══════════
KENNETH L. HAEDGE, ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
CENTRAL TEXAS CATTLEMEN’S ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT
══════════════════════════════════════════ ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS ══════════════════════════════════════════
PER CURIAM
When a judgment is “for something other than money or an interest in property,” a
supersedeas bond “must adequately protect the judgment creditor against loss or damage that the
appeal might cause.” TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(3). This case involves how “loss or damage” is
calculated on release of a supersedeas bond. After Petitioners lost the underlying appeal, the trial
court ordered them to pay $7,000 from the supersedeas bond. The court of appeals reversed and
required Petitioners to pay $114,280.26 from the bond. The court of appeals calculated this amount
based on the expense Petitioners would have incurred if the judgment had not been superseded.
The proper measure, however, was the actual loss Respondent suffered because the judgment was
superseded. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court’s order
on the supersedeas bond. I. Background
In 1942, the United States Army acquired land in central Texas through eminent domain
to create Fort Hood. The previous owners grazed cattle on the land. As part of the compensation
arrangement, the Government let the landowners and their descendants continue to graze cattle on
the land. The owners established a non-profit corporation, the Central Texas Cattlemen’s
Association, to represent the members, manage grazing rights, and pay lease fees to the Army.
CTCA’s lease with the Army authorizes CTCA to graze no more than 2,000 head of cattle on the
Army’s land at any given time. Membership in CTCA is voluntary but only open to descendants
of the original landowners. Members are allotted shares that determine how many head of cattle
each is allowed to pasture on the land.1 CTCA collects dues from members (“assessments”) in
proportion to their shares to pay for its costs and the lease fees.
CTCA’s bylaws allow for cancelation of a member’s shares for violation of the
association’s bylaws, rules, or regulations. Petitioners (collectively, the Haedge Group) are all
cattle ranchers and previous members of CTCA. In 2015, CTCA cancelled their shares after they
allegedly erected unauthorized cattle pens on the leased land. The Haedge Group sued CTCA and
individual board members to challenge the ouster, alleging causes of action for fraud, conversion,
breach of contract, and defamation.
CTCA moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted in part. After a trial on
the remaining issue, the trial court rendered judgment that the Haedge Group take nothing. The
parties understand that judgment to allow the ouster of the Haedge Group members from the land.
1 1 share = the right to pasture 1.6 head of cattle.
2 The Haedge Group appealed and filed a motion in the trial court to suspend enforcement of the
judgment during the appeal. The trial court allowed the Haedge Group to suspend the judgment by
posting a $2,500 supersedeas bond. The parties interpreted the judgment’s suspension to mean the
Haedge Group could keep its cattle on the leased land during the appeal.
CTCA filed a motion in the court of appeals challenging the trial court’s order suspending
enforcement of the judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a)(4). On March 3, 2016, the court of
appeals ruled that the trial court order allowing the Haedge Group to supersede the judgment was
appropriate, but the amount of the bond was inadequate to protect CTCA. Haedge v. Cent. Tex.
Cattlemen’s Ass’n, No. 07-15-00368-CV, 2016 WL 836084, at *6–8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar.
3, 2016, order) (per curiam). The court of appeals increased the supersedeas bond to $132,400. Id.
at *8–9. This figure was based on (1) its estimation that the appeal would last two years multiplied
by (2) evidence that it would cost the Haedge Group approximately $66,200 per year to lease
alternative land upon which to graze their cattle. The Haedge Group posted a bond in that amount.
During the appeal, all but one of the Haedge Group plaintiffs continued to make their
regular membership payments to CTCA as any other member would. One plaintiff failed to make
$7,000 in payments.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s take-nothing judgment. The Haedge Group
petitioned for review to this Court. That petition was denied. On December 5, 2017, the court of
appeals in its mandate sent the case back to the trial court with the instruction that CTCA
recover of and from the supersedeas bond filed by [the Haedge Group], and their surety, Insurors Indemnity Company, all cattle grazing fees and costs, if any, accrued during the pendency of the appeal not to exceed the amount of the supersedeas bond, as determined by the court below and consistent with this Court’s order on supersedeas dated March 3, 2016 . . . .
3 The trial court held a hearing on the parties’ competing motions for release of the
supersedeas bond. After the hearing, the trial court ordered the parties to submit affidavits to
establish what damage, if any, was incurred by CTCA during the pendency of the appeal. After
consideration of the evidence, the trial court ruled that CTCA was entitled to $7,000 from the
supersedeas bond—the total amount of membership payments unpaid by Haedge Group
members—but nothing else. The trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law in
support of this ruling. CTCA appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.
The court of appeals held that the trial court failed to properly carry out the court of appeals’
mandate and improperly calculated CTCA’s damage. ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2019). The court of appeals decided that its original order had already established that, should
CTCA prevail on appeal, $66,200/year would constitute CTCA’s damage for delaying the ouster
of the Haedge Group members. According to the court of appeals, the Haedge Group received this
benefit even though the trial court had rendered a take-nothing judgment against them. “CTCA
proved that it was prevented from grazing approximately 325 head of cattle on the Fort Hood
property for the period of July 10, 2015, when the trial court entered its take-nothing judgment on
the Haedge group’s suit, through December 5, 2017, when this Court issued mandate in the
underlying appeal.” Id. at ___. Based on the duration of the appeal at the rate of $66,200/year, the
court of appeals calculated that CTCA suffered $159,242.76 in damage as a result of the
supersedeas. Because the Haedge Group paid $44,962.50 in dues during the appeal, that amount
was subtracted from the damage award. The court of appeals rendered judgment that CTCA
recover $114,280.26 from the supersedeas bond, and the Haedge Group petitioned for review.
4 II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Appellate review of the calculation of the amount to be recovered from a supersedeas bond
is generally for abuse of discretion. See In re Smith, 192 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. 2006) (reviewing
amount of supersedeas bond to suspend money judgment for abuse of discretion); Klein Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 87, 87 (Tex. 1986) (“The sole issue before
this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow [a party] to supersede
the injunctive portion of the judgment.”); State v. Lain, 349 S.W.2d 579, 586 (Tex. 1961)
(reviewing amount of supersedeas bond for abuse of discretion where the trial court rendered
judgment quieting title and granting injunctive relief). We employ the same standard of review
here. Under an abuse of discretion standard, we defer “to the trial court’s factual determinations if
they are supported by evidence,” but review legal determinations de novo. Stockton v. Offenbach,
336 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. 2011). In this case, the relevant facts are not in dispute. We defer to
the trial court’s factual determinations and examine only the legal question of how damage should
be calculated on the supersedeas bond.
B. Calculation of Loss or Damage on a Supersedeas Bond
The trial court set the supersedeas bond at $2,500. On the original motion challenging the
bond, the court of appeals increased the bond amount to $132,400 based on evidence presented
that “it would cost [the Haedge Group] approximately $66,200 per year to lease land upon which
they could graze their cattle.” Haedge, 2016 WL 836084, at *3. In the present appeal, the court of
appeals held “that the cost of alternative grazing lands would represent the damages to CTCA
during the pendency of the appeal,” as that “amount represents the ‘cost’ to CTCA of being put in
5 the position of being required to forego the use of the Haedge group’s 203.5 shares representing
325 head of cattle.” ___ S.W.3d at ___. Under the circumstances of this case, that calculation of
damages was erroneous.
Supersedeas bonds “must adequately protect the judgment creditor against loss or damage
that the appeal might cause.” TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(3). This rule requires calculating the “loss or
damage” that the judgment creditor—CTCA here—faces during the appeal, not the avoided losses
or other benefit that might accrue to the judgment debtor if the judgment is superseded. “The
common definition of damage is loss due to injury: injury or harm to person, property, or
reputation.” Barnes v. Mathis, 353 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tex. 2011) (quotation marks and citation
omitted); accord Damage, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“loss or injury to person or
property”). “Loss or damage” in the supersedeas context refers to “monetary or material losses
ascertainable by proof, either by the judgment itself, or, where that is not conclusive, by evidence
relating to proof of damages generally.” Los Campeones, Inc. v. Valley Int’l Props., Inc., 591
S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1979, no writ) (quoting State v. Watts, 197 S.W.2d
197, 198 (Tex. App.—Austin 1946, writ ref’d)).
Here, CTCA demonstrated no monetary or material losses as a result of the appeal apart
from one plaintiff’s failure to pay $7,000 in dues. CTCA points to the calculation of the
supersedeas bond amount made by the court of appeals on the original motion challenging the
bond, but this is insufficient to prove any actual loss or damage CTCA has sustained. We have
previously noted that the initial calculation of a supersedeas bond for appeal is different from the
final calculation of loss or damage that results from the appeal. McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse,
6 LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 285 (Tex. 2018).2 The court of appeals erred by calculating CTCA’s
damages based on the Haedge Group’s estimated cost to lease alternative grazing pastures. The
expense the Haedge Group would have incurred to remove their cattle from the Fort Hood property
and find alternative pastures does not alone establish the loss or damage that CTCA actually
incurred.
It is undisputed that CTCA continued to receive dues payments from the Haedge Group
during the appeal, with the exception of $7,000. It is also undisputed that CTCA could never have
received $66,200 per year or any other comparable market price for the grazing rights at issue.
Had the Haedge Group’s ouster been immediate, the most CTCA could have expected was to
charge other members the same dues payments it assessed the Haedge Group for grazing rights
during the same time period. Based on the structure of the Association and its lease agreement
with the Army, CTCA could not have profited from re-leasing the Haedge Group’s grazing rights
at prevailing market rates. Instead, if the judgment had not been superseded, CTCA would simply
have replaced the Haedge Group’s dues with dues paid by other members. As a result, CTCA has
not shown loss or damage beyond the $7,000 amount the trial court ordered released to it.
The court of appeals also suggested that, because CTCA was deprived of the right to
transfer the Haedge Group’s shares, CTCA’s other members were damaged in the loss of these
shares. But there is no evidence in the record establishing that other members of CTCA incurred
additional costs pasturing their cattle elsewhere and would have availed themselves of the Haedge
2 “[T]he evidence presented at the hearing setting the bond amount was evidence of what damages the appeal might cause Coffeehouse if its judgment were not immediately enforced, not what damages the appeal actually did cause it.” McFadin, 539 S.W.3d at 285.
7 Group’s shares had they been available. Indeed, at the hearing on release of the bond, CTCA’s
president, Brandon Belt, submitted an affidavit in which he stated, “The damages is to CTCA, not
directly to its members, as the lease is between CTCA and the Army, not between the members
and the Army.” Even if CTCA had argued and made a showing that its members were harmed, it
is doubtful this would be sufficient to prove damage to the Association itself, which was the only
defendant below.3
III. Conclusion
“[T]he purpose of a supersedeas bond is to preserve the status quo by staying the execution
or enforcement of the judgment or order appealed from pending the appeal.” Shell Petroleum Corp.
v. Grays, 62 S.W.2d 113, 118 (Tex. 1933). Here, that is precisely what occurred in the trial court.
During the pendency of the appeal, CTCA was in the same position it had been prior to obtaining
a favorable judgment. It continued to receive the same membership dues it otherwise could have
received had the Haedge Group members been ousted earlier and their shares transferred. Except
for the $7,000 deficiency, CTCA did not demonstrate any loss or damage caused by the
supersedeas. It is entitled to no further amounts from the bond. Accordingly, without hearing oral
argument, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the order of the trial court on
release of the supersedeas bond. See TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1.
3 The court of appeals cited our holding in Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control Board, 852 S.W.2d 440, 447 (Tex. 1993), for the proposition that an association can claim damage suffered by its members. That case involved associational standing determining when an association may bring suit on behalf of its members. See id. Here, CTCA was sued in its own right as an organization. Its members were not parties, and CTCA offered no evidence of damage to any particular members. Even if an organization could sometimes recover for damage to its individual members in this context, it cannot do so without evidence demonstrating that individual members were actually damaged.
8 OPINION DELIVERED: June 26, 2020