Kenneth James Cooper v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
• Decided: May 21, 2026
• Docket: 10-25-00013-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00013-CR

Kenneth James Cooper, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

On appeal from the 440th District Court of Coryell County, Texas Judge Grant Kinsey, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 21-27032

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Kenneth James Cooper guilty of Sexual Assault of a Child.

The victim was his daughter. The trial court assessed punishment and

sentenced Cooper to 30 years in prison. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In his sole issue on appeal, Cooper contends his trial counsel’s failure to

object to numerous extraneous offenses or request limiting instructions for those offenses constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, he

further contends, his conviction should be reversed and the case remanded to

the trial court for a new trial.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant

must show both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984);

Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The appellant

bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel

was ineffective, and an allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in

the record. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The

failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court's need to

consider the other prong. Williams, 301 S.W.3d at 687.

"Under most circumstances, the record on direct appeal will not be

sufficient to show that counsel's representation was so deficient and so lacking

in tactical or strategic decision-making as to overcome the strong presumption

that counsel's conduct was reasonable and professional." Scheanette v. State,

144 S.W.3d 503, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Thus, trial counsel should

generally be given an opportunity to explain his actions before being found

ineffective. Johnson v. State, 624 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021);

Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

Cooper v. State Page 2 A silent record that provides no explanation for counsel's actions will not

overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance. Johnson, 624

S.W.3d at 586; Rylander, 101 S.W.3d at 110-11; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814.

Thus, if the record does not contain affirmative evidence of trial counsel's

reasoning or strategy, we presume counsel's performance was not deficient.

Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 586; Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 835 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002).

Here, the record is silent as to why trial counsel did not object to the

introduction into evidence of any of the alleged extraneous offenses or at least

request limiting instructions for those offenses. Thus, we presume counsel’s

performance was not deficient.

However, even if, as Cooper argues, counsel’s conduct was so outrageous

that no competent attorney would have engaged in it, thus warranting reversal

without affording counsel an opportunity to explain his actions, see Roberts v.

State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 533-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Goodspeed v. State, 187

S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), Cooper must still prove he was

prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.

To succeed under the prejudice prong, Cooper "must show that there is

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466

Cooper v. State Page 3 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Perez v. State, 310

S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A reasonable probability is "a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. Further, if

the deficient performance pertained to a guilty verdict, as it did here, then

prejudice would depend on "a reasonable probability that, absent the errors,

the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695; Swinney v. State, 663 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2022).

Cooper spends much of his argument under this prong proclaiming he

was prejudiced. However, he never argued or showed that, had trial counsel

objected or requested limiting instructions or both, the jury would have had a

reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Accordingly, Cooper failed to prove he was

prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance prejudice.

CONCLUSION

Cooper did not satisfy his burden to prove the ineffectiveness of his

counsel, and his sole issue on appeal is overruled.

LEE HARRIS Justice

Cooper v. State Page 4 OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: May 21, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed Do Not Publish CRPM

Cooper v. State Page 5