Kenneth Jackson v. Commonwealth of Virginia

Court of Appeals of Virginia·Decided March 14, 2000·No. 2096982·Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Elder, Lemons and Senior Judge Cole Argued at Richmond, Virginia

KENNETH JACKSON

*

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

v. Record No. 2096-98-2 JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS MARCH 14, 2000

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY L. A. Harris, Jr., Judge

Esther J. Windmueller for appellant.

Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Kenneth Jackson appeals his conviction upon a conditional guilty plea to possession of cocaine and possession of heroin. Jackson reserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. Finding no error, we affirm his convictions.

I. BACKGROUND

"'Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search involve questions of both law and fact and are reviewed de novo on appeal.'" McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

(1996). This Court, however, is "bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to support them and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Id. at 198, 481 S.E.2d at 261 (citation omitted).

On October 10, 1997, at approximately nine o'clock in the evening, Henrico County Police Officer Glen Hubbard drove to the 3600 block of Kings Pointe Drive in response to a radio call he received. An anonymous caller had reported that a prowler was looking into windows in the back of the apartment complex at that address. Several similar reports had been received by police in the previous two weeks concerning the same apartment complex. This call described a black male, approximately six feet tall, slender, wearing a black jogging suit, walking in the rear of that apartment building, and "looking in rear windows."

Within two minutes of the call, Officer Hubbard arrived at the complex and within one and one-half minutes saw the defendant, Kenneth Jackson, who matched the anonymous caller's description of the suspect precisely where the caller said there was a prowler. Jackson walked at a fast pace toward the front of the building. Before Jackson reached the front of the building, Officer Hubbard asked to speak with him. The defendant ignored Hubbard and proceeded to the front of the building, opened the door to the apartment and started to cross

the threshold. By this time, Officer Edward Smith had joined Officer Hubbard at the entrance to the apartment.

As he was opening the door, Jackson "reached down real quick and started fumbling" and retrieved items "from underneath his pants leg." One of the items appeared to be a shotgun shell. Jackson placed the shotgun shell and other, as yet unidentified, items inside the apartment out of view of the officer but within arm's reach of Jackson. Jackson remained outside the door.

At that time, Hubbard noticed a woman walking toward the doorway from inside the apartment and he "asked her to stop where she was at, which was about halfway between the back of the apartment to the front door." She stopped and Hubbard walked through the doorway into the apartment while Officer Smith detained Jackson outside the door.

During Hubbard's conversation with the woman, he saw some items on the inside ledge of the window near the door where Jackson had placed the items he had in his possession. Hubbard seized the items that consisted of a cigarette pack, a crack pipe, and a shotgun shell casing.

Hubbard pointed out the shell and crack pipe to Smith who placed Jackson under arrest for possession of cocaine. A search of Jackson incident to arrest revealed a wadded up napkin and a foil packet that contained an off white powder. Subsequent analysis of both items confirmed that the items contained

cocaine and heroin. Although the officers did not know it at the time, the residence was Jackson's.

II. TERRY STOP

When a defendant appeals a trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence, "the burden is on appellant to show, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, that the denial . . . constituted reversible error." Stanley v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 873, 874, 433 S.E.2d 512, 513 (1993).

To conduct an investigatory stop of an individual, the police must possess reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the individual is, or has been, engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968); Phillips v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 27, 30, 434 S.E.2d 918, 920 (1993). "[A]nonymous information that has been sufficiently corroborated may furnish reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative stop." Bulatko v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 135, 137, 428 S.E.2d 306, 307 (1993) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990)). The independent corroboration gives "some degree of reliability to the other allegations" of the informant. Id.

Here, an anonymous caller gave police a description of a prowler and his location. Within a few minutes of the call, the officer observed the defendant who matched the clothing and physical descriptions given by the caller. The suspect's

physical characteristics, the clothing he would be wearing and his location were all confirmed by police upon arrival.

Additionally, when the officer reached the location, the defendant behaved suspiciously. He walked quickly by the officers and did not respond to their questions. As he entered the apartment, he "reached down real quick and started fumbling." He then removed some items including one that appeared to be the casing of a shotgun shell. When viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, these facts support a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Jackson was or had been engaged in criminal activity. A Terry stop to investigate further was proper.

III. CROSSING THE THRESHOLD Once a police officer has properly detained a suspect for questioning, he may conduct a limited pat-down search of the suspect for weapons if he reasonably believes, based on specific and articulable facts, that the suspect might be armed and dangerous. See Phillips, 17 Va. App. at 30, 434 S.E.2d at 920. The officer need only "'reasonably believe[] that the individual might be armed.'" Lansdown v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 204, 211, 308 S.E.2d 106, 111 (1983) (quoting Simmons v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 552, 556, 231 S.E.2d 218, 220-21 (1977)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1104 (1984). The officer may rely upon the totality of the circumstances and may consider any suspicious actions of the person searched, such as an obvious attempt to avoid the officer

or any nervous conduct based on the discovery of the officer's presence. See United States v. Bull, 565 F.2d 869, 870-71 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 946 (1978). See also Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 67, 354 S.E.2d 79, 87 (1987).

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Related

Terry v. Ohio
392 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Alabama v. White
496 U.S. 325 (Supreme Court, 1990)
Ornelas v. United States
517 U.S. 690 (Supreme Court, 1996)
United States v. Fred Bull, Jr.
565 F.2d 869 (Fourth Circuit, 1977)
McGee v. Commonwealth
487 S.E.2d 259 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1997)
Williams v. Commonwealth
354 S.E.2d 79 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1987)
Phillips v. Commonwealth
434 S.E.2d 918 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1993)
Simmons v. Commonwealth
231 S.E.2d 218 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1977)
Verez v. Commonwealth
337 S.E.2d 749 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1985)
Bulatko v. Commonwealth
428 S.E.2d 306 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1993)
Lansdown v. Commonwealth
308 S.E.2d 106 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1983)
Stanley v. Commonwealth
433 S.E.2d 512 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1993)
Servis v. Commonwealth
371 S.E.2d 156 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1988)
Reynolds v. Commonwealth
388 S.E.2d 659 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1990)
Harbin v. City of Alexandria
712 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Virginia, 1989)
Washington v. Commonwealth
509 S.E.2d 512 (Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1999)