Kenneth Cunningham v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 16, 2004
• Docket: 08-03-00363-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

)

KENNETH CUNNINGHAM,                            )                  No. 08-03-00363-CR

                                    Appellant,                        )                             Appeal from

v.                                                                          )                  243rd District Court

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                   )                  of El Paso County, Texas

                                    Appellee.                          )                  (TC# 20020D04974)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Kenneth Cunningham appeals his conviction for aggravated assault. Appellant was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to twenty years’ confinement and a fine of $10,000. We affirm.FACTUAL SUMMARYOn September 11, 2002, Robert Scarpa returned home after work and met Dre, a friend. Dre’s cousin drove the pair over to Appellant’s apartment. Dre went inside first and Scarpa followed fifteen minutes later. Appellant asked Scarpa whether he had called him a “bitch motherfucker.” Scarpa admitted that he had indeed called Appellant that name. At that point, another man in the house hit Scarpa in the face causing him to fall down. Scarpa was then repeatedly hit although he could not remember how many times.

            The man that hit Scarpa along with another man in the apartment held Scarpa down on the kitchen floor. Scarpa saw Appellant lighting the stove and putting what he believed to be a screwdriver to the burner to heat it up. Scarpa believed it was an electric stove since the burners looked like coils and he could see the coils were red hot and glowing. Scarpa struggled to get away. He did not know what was going to happen but he was scared. Appellant approached him with the red hot screwdriver and Scarpa believed Appellant intended to put his eye out. Instead, Appellant placed the screwdriver against Scarpa’s forehead twice and burned him. He reheated it and then burned Scarpa’s chest and the back of his neck.

            Scarpa was picked up and walked to the door where he was told to leave and not to call the police. He went to a nearby house and asked to use the phone to call for help. When his request was denied, he walked the half mile home and called 911. Although there were numerous pay phones along the way, Scarpa did not think to use a pay phone since he was not in a right frame of mind. He described himself as “in a fog” and “making a beeline to [his] house.”

            Officer Julia Arrieta was dispatched to Scarpa’s residence in reference to an aggravated assault. Arrieta described Scarpa as badly beaten with burn marks on his forehead, neck, right cheek, left arm, and chest. He had bruises and scrapes on his back, his right eye was bruised and shut, and he was scared, shaking, and upset. Scarpa told the responding officers what had happened. Arrieta was familiar with Appellant and asked Scarpa to tell them where Appellant lived.

            The police proceeded to Appellant’s apartment. Patrick Jones answered the door but would not allow the officers inside. They were kept waiting for approximately fifteen minutes. Officer Philip Amato was dispatched to assist. Amato spoke to Jones and talked him into allowing the officers inside. After Jones was secured, another individual was located in the kitchen. Officers also found surveillance cameras with monitors overlooking the street and the alley. Officer Arrieta believed that the occupants would have seen the police cars coming. Appellant was not found in the apartment. Scarpa identified the other two men.

            Scarpa went to the hospital where officers photographed him. He then took a taxi home without receiving any medical care. He did not look at his injuries until he arrived home when the adrenaline had worn off and he was beginning to feel pain from the burns. He could not see out of one eye and he felt a stinging sensation in his neck and across his chest. He took a shower and the coolness soothed his burns, but the stinging soon returned. The burns made it painful for Scarpa to lie on his neck or arm. If he wore a shirt, the burns would stick and Scarpa would have to peel off the dead skin and reapply ointment to the burns. The swelling in his eye did not subside until November and the redness remained for some time thereafter. The burns across his chest and neck did not heal until Christmas. Scarpa testified that people had noticed his scars which he displayed to the jury. Photographs showing his injuries were admitted into evidence. Officer Arrieta testified that she was shocked by Scarpa’s injuries; Officer Amato characterized the injuries as serious.

LEGAL SUFFICIENCY

            In his sole point of error on appeal, Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency to support the jury’s finding as to the element of “serious bodily injury.” He complains that the State failed to present any lay or expert testimony as to the extent or permanence of Scarpa’s scarring, especially since the trial was close in proximity to the assault. The State responds that there was sufficient evidence that Scarpa had suffered serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of his bodily organs or members and analogized Appellant’s actions to a trail boss using a glowing, red-hot branding iron to mark his cattle.

Standard of Review

            In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we must review all the evidence, both State and defense, in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573. We do not resolve any conflict of fact or assign credibility to the witnesses, as it was the function of the trier of fact to do so. See Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Instead, our duty is only to determine if both the explicit and implicit findings of the trier of fact are rational by viewing all of the evidence admitted at trial in a light most favorable to the verdict. Adelman, 828 S.W.2d at 422. In so doing, any inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Matson, 819 S.W.2d at 843. Further, the standard of review is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Geesa, 820 S.W.2d at 158.

Aggravated Assault

            There are two ways in which an aggravated assault may be committed. The first occurs when the assailant commits assault in any manner proscribed by Texas Penal Code section 22.01 and in so doing causes serious bodily injury to the victim. Tex.Pen.Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(1)(Vernon Supp. 2004-05). The second occurs when the assailant commits an assault in any manner proscribed by Texas Penal Code section 22.01, and the actor uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Tex.Pen.Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2).

            The indictment charged Appellant with intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly causing serious bodily injury to Scarpa by burning him with a hot screwdriver and with an unknown object. The jury was charged that a person commits an assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. Aggravated assault was defined as committing assault and causing serious bodily injury to another. Serious bodily injury is “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” Bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. Tex.Pen.Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(8), (46)(Vernon Supp. 2004-05).

Serious Bodily Injury

            Though often a matter of degree, there must be a meaningful distinction between “bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury.” Hernandez v. State, 946 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1997, no pet.), citing Moore v. State, 739 S.W.2d 347, 349, 352 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987). The determination that an injury qualifies as serious bodily injury must be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. There are no wounds that constitute “serious bodily injury” per se. Id.; see e.g. Moore, 739 S.W.2d at 352 (a knife wound, even though it may be caused by a deadly weapon, is not per se serious bodily injury); Webb v. State, 801 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990)(the necessity of surgery, alone, is insufficient to establish serious bodily injury). “Serious bodily injury” does not depend upon whether the victim received medical treatment. Moore, 739 S.W.2d at 354. A person who receives injuries is qualified to express an opinion as to the severity of those injuries. Coshatt v. State, 744 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987, pet. ref’d), citing Hart v. State, 581 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979).

Serious Permanent Disfigurement

            An injury which leaves a scar is insufficient to establish serious permanent disfigurement. Hernandez, 946 S.W.2d at 113; see McCoy v. State, 932 S.W.2d 720, 724 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d)(slight scar on the lip, though permanent, was not sufficient to show serious permanent disfigurement). Instead, there must be evidence of some significant cosmetic deformity. Id.; see Brown v. State, 605 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980)(testimony that broken nose would cause disfigurement and dysfunction if untreated sufficient to establish serious bodily injury); Moore, 802 S.W.2d at 369 (sufficient evidence of serious bodily injury where victim’s cheek bone was fractured in three places; surgery necessary to prevent significant cosmetic deformity); Pitts v. State, 742 S.W.2d 420, 421-22 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987, no pet.)(evidence of significant disfigurement where victim suffered five fractures in the facial area necessitating several surgeries to repair the damage). The relevant issue in determining the degree of disfigurement is the damage caused by the wound when inflicted, not disfigurement as exacerbated or ameliorated by medical treatment. Id., citing Brown, 605 S.W.2d at 575; Moore, 802 S.W.2d at 370; Goodman v. State, 710 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no pet.).  

Protracted Loss or Impairment of Any Body Organ or Member

            Protracted impairment means that some function of either an organ or body member is impaired. Hernandez, 946 S.W.2d at 113. The Penal Code does not define the phrase “bodily member or organ.” The Dallas Court of Appeals has held that the back is a separate definable part of the body sufficient to bring it within the statutory term. Colshatt v. State, 744 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1987, pet. ref’d). The Amarillo Court has determined that teeth fall within the definition. Lenzy v. State, 689 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1985, no pet.). Absent a statutory definition, a term must be “taken and understood in its usual acceptation in common language”. Thus, a bodily member may be construed as “[a] part or organ of the body; especially a limb or other separate part.” Id. at 310.

Application

            We have reviewed the color photographs showing Scarpa’s injuries at the time of the assault: (1) a burn over ten inches in length spanning across his collarbone across his chest to the opposite arm pit one inch in width in spots; (2) a burn on the back of his neck spanning at least three inches long and approximately three-fourths of an inch wide in places; (3) a burn on his left arm spanning three inches long and three-fourths of an inch wide in places; (4) a burn in the middle of his forehead spanning two inches long and half an inch in width; (5) a burn on the right side of his forehead spanning two and a half inches long and a fourth inch wide; (6) bruising to the right side of his face from his ear down his cheek bone approximately three inches long and up from his temple down to the cheek bone approximately two and a half inches wide; (7) bruising on his back left shoulder four inches long and two inches wide; (8) bruise on his lower back over two inches long and approximately one and a half inches wide; (9) bruising on the back of his right shoulder four inches long and two inches in width in places; and (10) bruising on the back of his upper right shoulder two inches long and one inch in width. The jury examined these photographs and observed the resulting scars ten months after the injury. Scarpa testified that the burns across his chest and neck did not heal until around Christmas and that people had noticed his scars. Both Scarpa and Officer Arrieta testified they were shocked by the injuries. Officer Amato testified that he had not seen injuries worse than Scarpa’s.

            The jury can apply common sense, knowledge, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life in drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence. No medical testimony was needed for the jury to recognize the serious disfigurement resulting from the burns, especially from the scars on Scarpa’s face. The jury could have rationally determined that Scarpa suffered serious permanent disfigurement simply by viewing the color photographs of his injuries at the time of the assault, the resulting scars on his face, neck, arm, and chest, and the characterization of the injuries by Scarpa and Officers Arrieta and Amato. Accordingly, we overrule the sole point and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

December 16, 2004                                                    

                                                                                    ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Justice

Before Panel No. 2

Barajas, C.J., McClure, and Chew, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)