Kennedy v. Seaboard Oil Co. of Delaware

99 F. Supp. 730, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4179
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedSeptember 6, 1951
Docket22469
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 99 F. Supp. 730 (Kennedy v. Seaboard Oil Co. of Delaware) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kennedy v. Seaboard Oil Co. of Delaware, 99 F. Supp. 730, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4179 (N.D. Cal. 1951).

Opinion

HARRIS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, heirs of the late Frank Kennedy, ask for an accounting from March 31, 1931, to date, from defendant, Seaboard Oil Company of Delaware. They base their alleged cause of action upon an interest in certain oil lands in the Kettleman Hills region of California, which lands defendant and its predecessors have developed over the years subsequent to the date of March 1931.

The present suit was commenced by Frank Kennedy September 25, 1941. It was removed to this Court February 4, 1943. Plaintiff Kennedy delayed action thereafter as shown by affidavits, 1 because of related *731 litigation pending in the District Court for the Southern District of California. The United States was there proceeding against General Petroleum Corporation, et al., in its suit to recover additional royalty payments, which it contended it was entitled to by reason of a different pricing structure from that utilized by the oil company over the years of its lease. The suit culminated in favor of the government on March 30, 1946, D.C., 73 F.Supp. 225, affirmed Continental Oil Co. v. U. S., 9 Cir., 1950, 184 F.2d 802.

The government action against General Petroleum Company dealt with the value of ■oil produced in the Kettleman Hills during the same period involved in the present litigation. The Court held that the market had not been a free one, at least up to August 29, 1935, and that the royalty paid the government, the owner of the land, was inadequate.

Plaintiffs’ predecessor, on learning of the government’s suit, first became apprised of the fact that the basis for his own royalty receipts, may not have been a correct one. Negotiations between him and his assignee failed to satisfy Kennedy of the propriety of the adjusted payment. Therefore he commenced the present action.

Defendant has moved the Court to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff’s right to an accounting is barred by the statute of limitations which is effective for all purposes prior to September, 1937. Defendant asks the Court to dismiss the action for an accounting as to all matters arising prior to the four-year period covered by the statute of limitations. Defendant contends that such dismissal will dispose of the entire action for all practical purposes. Such contention is based upon the decision in United States v. General Petroleum Corporation, supra, which held that pricing practices of the defendants were competitive after 1935.

In order that plaintiffs may establish their right to an accounting from March 31, 1931, to date, they must allege a fiduciary relationship with defendant so as to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs have sought to accomplish this result by pleading co-adventure or tenancy in common or joint adventure in the land or a relationship of trust and reliance which led to the production of oil and out of which the present royalty dispute has arisen. The Court will review, briefly, the relationship of the parties with respect to the oil lands involved before it attempts a legal analysis of the motion to dismiss.

There are two parcels of land involved in the instant case. Frank Kennedy was the owner in fee of one parcel which defendant has chosen to designate A. This parcel Kennedy sold to defendant’s predecessor, reserving a percentage royalty interest in the production of oil and gas from the land. The other parcel, designated B, was owned by the United States. Kennedy had obtained a permit from the government to exploit this land and assigned his interest to defendant’s predecessor. As in the case of parcel A, Kennedy reserved a royalty out of the production of oil and gas that might be realized from parcel B. In each case, Kennedy’s agreement stated that the reserved royalty constituted a covenant running with the land.

In the beginning of 1931 both parcels became part of the Kettleman North Dome Association, a California corporation. This organization was established to operate oil lands in a certain area. It required the several members of the association to transfer all their equipment to the association which was to take exclusive possession of the lands for purposes of development and operation.

Defendant contends that joint participation of Kennedy and defendant in the Kettleman North Dome Association 2 ter *732 minated any unity of interest which may have existed between the grantor and grantee of parcel A. Up to the time of the Kettleman agreement, unity of possession may have existed and may have entitled Kennedy to enter the property and drill oil for himself. But after February 1931 such right it is claimed ceased to exist and rested exclusively with the new Kettleman North Dome Association.

The several exhibits which plaintiffs have attached to. the complaint and which establish the basis for the present litigation set forth the documents of assignment of the particular parcels involved and indicate the relationship existing between the parties. According to plaintiffs’ interpretation of Exhibit A there was a reservation by Kennedy which excepted a certain percentage of the product of the land to the grant- or. The deed provided that Kennedy should have the right to take the product in kind or in money, such option to be exercised not oftener than every six months. Under the reservation, Kennedy was to pay his share of taxes upon his portion of oil and gas reserved. Furthermore, the reservation was to be construed as a covenant running with the land.

Plaintiffs contend that the agreement between Kennedy and his grantee was of such a nature as to establish both co-adventure and a co-tenancy in parcel A and that by reason of such agreement Kennedy awd his successors in interest were entitled to an accounting. Under Exhibit B, Kennedy conveyed his operational rights in the lands to which he held, a United States permit. Under the assignment of his interest, once more Kennedy reserved to himself a royalty interest to be paid in oil or in money, such reserved interest to run with the land.

When, in 1931, Kennedy and his grantee agreed to deliver all of their possessory and operational rights to the Kettleman North Dome Association, their agreement included a proviso, on page 19, that: “Each member agrees to pay to his lessor or any other persons .having valid claims to rentals, royalties or participation in the proceeds of his lands controlled by the association, the amount to whdch such person may be entitled *. * This language plainly protects the existing status of all parties to Kettleman North Dome Association. Whatever the relationship may have been at the time lands were deeded to Kettleman North Dome Association, such status is preserved.

If Kennedy actually enjoyed co-tenancy in his ownership of the product of the land and was entitled to a possession equal in dignity with that of the defendant, such right continued and thereafter Kennedy •was entitled to a full accounting.

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Bluebook (online)
99 F. Supp. 730, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4179, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kennedy-v-seaboard-oil-co-of-delaware-cand-1951.