Kennedy v. Ocean Steamship Co.

116 S.E. 874, 29 Ga. App. 737, 1923 Ga. App. LEXIS 179
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedFebruary 22, 1923
Docket13491, 13492
StatusPublished

This text of 116 S.E. 874 (Kennedy v. Ocean Steamship Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kennedy v. Ocean Steamship Co., 116 S.E. 874, 29 Ga. App. 737, 1923 Ga. App. LEXIS 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 1923).

Opinion

Bell, J.

On January 29, 1916, Mrs. Kathleen McLendon Kennedy filed a suit against the Ocean Steamship Company for [738]*738injuries alleged to have been sustained by her on August 27, 1915, while a passenger upon a steamship of the defendant en route from New York to Savannah. The trial of that case resulted in a nonsuit, which was affirmed by this court on December 13, 1917 (Kennedy v. Ocean Steamship Co., 21 Ga. App. 427, 94 S. E. 583). That suit was in one count only. On February 18, 1918, the suit was renewed. The plaintiff in this suit laid her case in two counts. The first count was almost a verbatim copy of the. old suit, and alleged the following: That the defendant is a common carrier of passengers running a line of steamships between Savannah and New York, and that on the date of her injuries petitioner and her husband were passengers on said Steamship City of St. Louis then and-there operated, maintained, and controlled by said defendant, having paid their fare for passage on said boat, and were on said date proceeding on the voyage of said vessel from New York to Savannah.” She further alleges as follows:

5th. About 3:15 p. m. on said date petitioner in company with other passengers on said vessel was walking along the promenade deck of said vessel. She desired to descend from the promenade deck to the hurricane deck of said vessel about midship, and for this purpose proposed to descend a stairway leading from said promenade deck to the said hurricane deck, the stairway being located, for the purpose of affording methods of ascent and descent, between said floors or decks for the passengers on said vessel.
“ 6th. Petitioner’s husband preceded her, and, for the purpose of descending from the promenade deck to the hurricane deck of said vessel, used a stairway provided by the defendant for the purpose of ascent and descent between said decks, petitioner following her husband a short distance behind. To the left of this stairway and leading, from the hurricane deck to the main deck was maintained another stairway or series of steps. Said stairway leading from the hurricane to the main deck was a continuation of the method of obtaining ingress and egress to and from the main deck to the hurricane and the promenade deck above the same. There was also an opening leading out on the hurricane deck from the landing between the two stairways above described.
“ 7th. There were no guards, gates, bars, or signals provided forbidding passengers to use either of said stairways above referred to. Passengers were permitted to use each of said stairways. Said [739]*739stairways were generally and commonly used by passengers and members of tbe crew of said vessel as a method of ingress and egress to and from the main and promenade decks.
“ 8th. The passageway or stairs as aforesaid, and each of them, and the steps thereof, had been covered by the defendant with a metal covering. Said metal covering had been originally raised or corrugated for the purpose of affording a better footing for persons ascending and descending the same, using the said stairs for methods of communication between spid decks. This corrugation was necessary and proper because of the insecurity of the footing, due to the necessary rolling of the vessel during her voyage, the corrugation furnishing a. steadier and more stable footing.
“ 9th. On said 27th day of August, 1915, the metal corrugation, of the steps on the stairs leading from the hurricane to the main deck had been allowed to wear off. By reason thereof the said metal covering and said steps on the passageway referred to were dangerous and ineffective. The corrugation by constant use had worn down, and'the metal covering and stairs had become slick, slippery, and dangerous, having been allowed to remain in use for such length of time that by reason thereof said stairs became worn and smooth instead of corrugated or raised. A reasonable inspection of said steps would have disclosed said defective condition of the same. '
“ 10th. When petitioner" attempted to descend said stairs she did not know of the dangerous and defective condition of said metal covering,' and used the steps. She was unaccustomed to the use of stairs of this character and did not know of the dangers incident to its use.
“ 11th. Petitioner’s husband descended from the promenade to the hurricane deck and passed out of the opening on the side of said vessel to the main portion of said deck, anticipating that petitioner would follow him. Petitioner descended from the promenade to the hurricane deck, and, her husband having passed out of her sight and petitioner seeing a second set of steps leading from the hurricane to the main deck, concluded that her husband had descended the second flight of stairs leading from the hurricane to the main deck, and when she reached the second step of said flight of steps in her- descent her foot slipped, by reason of the slick, [740]*740slippery, and dangerous condition of said steps, and she fell down said flight of steps, sustaining severe and serious injury. Her left leg was broken just above the ankle joint. Her foot and her body sustained serious and permanent injury by reason thereof. She suffered intense pain and was confined to her bed from the «date of injury until the 10th day of October, and was unable to walk without crutches until November 1st.
12th. Petitioner did not know of the defective condition of said steps when she attempted to descend the same. She had not used the same before, and could not by the exercise of ordinary care have known of said defective condition. There were no signs, gates, bars, or other warning prohibiting or forbidding the use of said steps or warning passengers of the dangers incident to the use, and petitioner was proceeding down said stairs or passageway as she had a right to do, and was in the exercise of all ordinary and reasonable care at the time the injuries above set forth were received by her.
13th. Defendant was negligent in the following particulars: (a) In failing to provide a safe passage or stairway between the decks or floors of said vessel. (b) In maintaining a metal covering on said passage or stairway, the corrugation of which had been allowed to wear so that the same became slick, slippery and dangerous. (c) In maintaining • a defective passage or stairway between the decks of said vessel. (d) In failing to inspect the said metal covering to said passageway and in failing to remove said metal covering after the same became worn. The absence of such inspection is here charged and alleged to be negligence. Such reasonable inspection would have discovered the defect, (e) In allowing said metal covering to become worn and in failing to replace the same with a proper metal covering. (/) In failing to guard said stairway by'blocking the same or by posting notice of the danger in the use of said passageway or steps, (g) In failing to warn petitioner of the danger in the use of said steps. (h) In not warning petitioner of the slick, slippery, and dangerous condition of said step and steps, (i) In not having gates prohibiting passengers from using said steps. (/) In not having signs or other written warnings notifying petitioner of the slick, slippery and dangerous condition of said step and steps, (h)

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Bluebook (online)
116 S.E. 874, 29 Ga. App. 737, 1923 Ga. App. LEXIS 179, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kennedy-v-ocean-steamship-co-gactapp-1923.