Kennedy v. Korth

668 P.2d 614, 35 Wash. App. 622, 1983 Wash. App. LEXIS 2784
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
DecidedAugust 29, 1983
Docket12410-2-I; 12411-1-I
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 668 P.2d 614 (Kennedy v. Korth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kennedy v. Korth, 668 P.2d 614, 35 Wash. App. 622, 1983 Wash. App. LEXIS 2784 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

Scholfield, J.

Defendant Dr. Jurgen Korth seeks discretionary review of a trial court order denying his motion to dismiss, for insufficiency of service and lack of jurisdiction, two professional malpractice actions against him. Dr. Korth also moves to strike certain portions of plaintiffs' appellate brief. We reverse.

In 1980, three medical malpractice actions were filed against Dr. Korth. In November 1980, Dr. Korth's surgical privileges were suspended at the hospitals in which he practiced. After initially cooperating with his counsel in defense of the three pending malpractice actions, Dr. Korth left the state of Washington and, presumably, returned to *623 West Germany on some unspecified date in early 1981 and subsequent to January 6, 1981. Thereafter, Dr. Korth did not maintain contact with his attorneys or participate in defense of the pending actions.

The present actions were filed on May 14, 1982. The Larsen complaint alleges medical malpractice occurring in October 1979. The Kennedy complaint alleges medical malpractice occurring in April 1980. On May 27, 1982, Kennedy 1 obtained an ex parte order authorizing service of process pursuant to CR 4(d)(4), 2 CR 4(i), providing alternative provisions for service in a foreign country, 3 and/or *624 RCW 4.28.100(2). 4 The order does not make a finding that particular facts required for service by publication existed. The order provided for alternate service by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint to Dr. Korth's malpractice insurance company, a copy to the firm of attorneys defending Dr. Korth in the first three actions, and then provided as follows:

Copies shall be mailed certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to Defendants' last known address as set forth in the affidavit filed by Plaintiff, provided that the service shall be deemed adequate and complete whether Defendants sign the receipt.

The affidavits filed by Kennedy in support of her motion for an order authorizing alternative service upon a person residing in a foreign country do not make a prima facie showing that Dr. Korth left the United States for the purpose of defrauding creditors or for the purpose of avoiding service of process. From the record, it appears to be undisputed that Dr. Korth changed his residence from the state of Washington to West Germany prior to the filing of the subject actions. There would appear, therefore, to be no basis for an assertion that he left the state of Washington to avoid service of process. While there is an allegation that Dr. Korth disposed of property in the state of Washington prior to or shortly after he moved to West Germany, there *625 is nothing in the record to support the assertion that he did this for the purpose of defrauding creditors. In fact, there is no showing that he had any creditors. At the time he left, he had malpractice insurance to cover the three pending malpractice claims, and the two claims which are involved in this appeal had not yet been filed. When Dr. Korth lost his hospital privileges in the state of Washington, he could reasonably change his residence to a locality where he could practice his profession, and, equally reasonably, could dispose of assets he possessed in the country he is leaving. The record here indicates Dr. Korth permanently changed his residence from Washington to West Germany. We cannot draw from the facts presented any conclusion that Dr. Korth departed Washington for the purpose of defrauding creditors or to avoid service of process. Nor, as we have stated, did the trial judge make such a finding.

The general rule recognized in this state is that personal service is required in order to attain in personam jurisdiction over an individual defendant. Ashley v. Superior Court, 83 Wn.2d 630, 641, 521 P.2d 711 (1974) (Brachtenbach, J., concurred in by four other justices); In re Marriage of Johnston, 33 Wn. App. 178, 653 P.2d 1329 (1982) (service of process by publication insufficient to support a default judgment for child support against a nonresident defendant). But see Dobbins v. Beal, 4 Wn. App. 616, 619, 483 P.2d 874 (1971) (upholds service pursuant to RCW 4.28.100(2) upon the basis of an affidavit "not materially challenged", asserting that defendant left the state of Washington with intent to defraud creditors or to avoid the service of a summons).

Assuming for purposes of this appeal that service pursuant to the order of May 27, 1982 would have satisfied due process requirements as stated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950), respondents nevertheless failed to comply with the provisions of RCW 4.28.100(2). Consequently, the general rule that personal service is required to confer in personam jurisdiction over an individual defendant is *626 applicable here.

The record discloses an address in Kiel, West Germany, where Dr. Korth's wife is living, and there is some indication that Dr. Korth is living there also. Kennedy concedes that no attempt was made to obtain personal service on Dr. Korth in West Germany. 5 Because Dr. Korth was not personally served, the trial judge's decision must be reversed.

After this matter was heard by the trial judge, the respondents received information from postal authorities relating to their efforts to have mail delivered to Dr. Korth. Dr. Korth made a motion to strike said documents from the record in this case, since they were not presented to the trial judge. Although a motion to strike could be granted on that ground, our disposition of the appeal obviates the necessity of ruling on the motion to strike.

Reversed with instructions to dismiss the actions without prejudice.

Swanson and Corbett, JJ., concur.

Reconsideration denied September 27, 1983.

Review denied by Supreme Court November 18, 1983.

1

The record does not disclose whether or not a comparable order was entered in the Larsen case.

2

CR 4(d)(4) provides as follows:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Pascua v. Heil
108 P.3d 1253 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 2005)
Bruff v. Main
943 P.2d 295 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1997)
State v. Clark
129 Wash. 2d 805 (Washington Supreme Court, 1996)
Hoffman v. Connall
718 P.2d 814 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
668 P.2d 614, 35 Wash. App. 622, 1983 Wash. App. LEXIS 2784, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kennedy-v-korth-washctapp-1983.