Kennedy v. Gamble & Gamble Construction Co.

26 Pa. D. & C.2d 530, 1961 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 72
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Butler County
DecidedAugust 10, 1961
DocketA.D. no. 138
StatusPublished

This text of 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 530 (Kennedy v. Gamble & Gamble Construction Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Butler County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kennedy v. Gamble & Gamble Construction Co., 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 530, 1961 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961).

Opinion

Shumaker, P. J.,

This matter is before the court on preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer filed in behalf of the additional defendant to the complaint against the additional defendant.

The South Butler County School District is a school jointure made up of the school districts of the town[531]*531ships of Clinton, Penn, Winfield, Jefferson and the Borough of Saxonburg, all in the southern part of Butler County, which joint school system on July 1, 1953, established the South Butler County School Authority for the purpose of erecting a new Junior-Senior High School on a tract of land situate in Jefferson Township.

The general contract for the construction of said building was awarded by said authority to defendant, Gamble & Gamble Construction Company and, before the building was fully completed, the employes of the joint school system and the public generally were invited to take tours through the new building. These tours were conducted, and the visitors escorted by members of the school board, the authority board and by the project inspector employed by the authority to inspect the work as it progressed.

On March 30,1958, about 4:30 p.m., a Sunday afternoon, one of the plaintiffs, Ruth S. Kennedy, a teacher in the South Butler County School District, entered the new building and proceeded to look through the building alone, without guide or escort. She entered the auditorium and experienced the misfortune of falling off a platform and sustaining serious injuries thereby.

Charging the contractor with negligence in failing to warn of the danger, in failing to provide a barrier or railing on the platform, and in failing to provide adequate lighting in the auditorium so that persons invited upon the premises might see any existing dangers, the injured school teacher and her husband filed a complaint in trespass against the contractor for her injuries and expenses incurred thereby.

The contractor brought on the record, as additional defendant, the school district, claiming that the school district had sole and exclusive possession of the premises during said inspection tours, and averring [532]*532negligence on the part of said school district in bringing about the harm to the injured plaintiff for which plaintiffs now complain.

It is the position taken by the contractor as defendant that the school district is alone and solely liable to plaintiffs or, in the alternative, that the additional defendant is jointly liable with the original defendant or is liable over to it.

The additional defendant, by preliminary objections filed and now before us in the nature of a demurrer, contends that a cause of action is not made out by the complaint of defendant against the additional defendant in that a school district or joint school system as a governmental agency is immune from tort liability when the municipal operation giving rise to plaintiffs’ cause of action is governmental in nature. The school district strongly contends that any dominion or control by a school district of a partially constructed school building is a municipal operation which is governmental in nature, thus relieving the school district of liability to plaintiffs in the instant case.

The law has long been well and firmly established in Pennsylvania that a municipality or public agency actively engaged in the performance of a governmental function is immune from liability for negligence in the maintenance of its land or building, or in which the activity is conducted: Hill v. Allentown Housing Authority, 378 Pa. 92 (1953); Hartness v. Allegheny County, 349 Pa. 248; Kesman v. Fallowfield Township School District, 345 Pa. 457, and cases cited therein.

It is equally well established that a municipality or public agency is liable in tort for negligence of its servants and employes where the activity conducted by the governmental agency is proprietary in nature. Morris v. Mount Lebanon Township School District, 393 Pa. 633 (1958).

[533]*533The above-stated principles of law apply to the matter of liability of school districts. See cases above cited.

The sole or single question now before us may be very easily and simply stated as follows: Is a school district liable for injuries sustained by one invited to visit and inspect a school building nearing completion, which injuries were brought about through negligently having the premises in a dangerous condition?

The answer may be as simply given: It definitely is liable, if the open-house inspection was a proprietary activity of the school district. Otherwise, if the same was a governmental function.

But this correct answer is utterly meaningless. We must now determine whether open-house inspection of a school building is a proprietary or governmental function of the school district. This is the real issue now before this court. Here, the legal going gets extremely rough and hazardous.

Indeed, the distinction in the law determining tort liability of municipal corporations arising out of the exercise, on one hand, of so-called governmental functions and, on the other, of corporate or proprietary functions have long been in a state of confusion and uncertainty. The decisions on this matter have been more or less arbitrary, and not wholly consistent with one another, perhaps because they have been based primarily on practical consideration of public policy rather than on principle of logic: Honaman v. Philadelphia, 322 Pa. 535.

Perhaps there is no issue known to the law which is surrounded by more confusion than the question whether a given municipal operation is governmental or proprietary in nature: Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549.

Two reasons may be assigned therefor: First, the concept of proprietary functions has been viewed [534]*534“liberally”, and exceptions to the rule of nonliability for the conduct of governmental functions have been created because of judicial recognition that the losses caused by the torts of public employes should be treated, as in other cases of vicarious liability, as cost of governmental administration; second, the tests yet devised for distinguishing between governmental and proprietary functions have proven unsatisfactory.

In general, and perhaps unhelpfully, it has been said that if a given activity is one which a local government unit is not statutorily required to perform, or if it may also be carried on by private enterprise, or if it is used as a means of raising revenue, the function is proprietary: Morris v. Mount Lebanon Township School District, supra.

In the case just cited, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized the perplexing and troublesome problem by the use of the following language:

“The doctrine of sovereign immunity and its application to local government law need not detain us here. The errors of history, logic and policy which were responsible for the development of this concept have been clearly exposed, and thoroughly criticized. Nevertheless, the solution of the problem of government responsibility in tort is toó complex an undertaking to permit the partial and piecemeal judicial reform which the plaintiff seeks. Establishment of a comprehensive program by legislation applicable to the Commonwealth and to all of its sub-divisions is sorely needed to deal effectively with tort claims arising out of the conduct of governmental activities”: (page 635)

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Related

Engemann v. Colonial Trust Co.
105 A.2d 347 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1954)
Morris v. Mount Lebanon Township School District
144 A.2d 737 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1958)
Honaman v. Philadelphia
185 A. 750 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1936)
Kesman v. Fallowfield Township School District
29 A.2d 17 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1942)
Hartness v. Allegheny County
37 A.2d 18 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1944)
Scibilia v. Philadelphia
124 A. 273 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1924)

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Bluebook (online)
26 Pa. D. & C.2d 530, 1961 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 72, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kennedy-v-gamble-gamble-construction-co-pactcomplbutler-1961.