Kennecott Copper Corp. (Ut. Cop. Div.) v. Ind. Comm.

205 P.2d 829, 115 Utah 451, 1949 Utah LEXIS 145
CourtUtah Supreme Court
DecidedApril 25, 1949
DocketNo. 7127.
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 205 P.2d 829 (Kennecott Copper Corp. (Ut. Cop. Div.) v. Ind. Comm.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kennecott Copper Corp. (Ut. Cop. Div.) v. Ind. Comm., 205 P.2d 829, 115 Utah 451, 1949 Utah LEXIS 145 (Utah 1949).

Opinion

McDonough, justice.

Certiorari to review an award of the Industrial Commission in favor of one John Kucher for total disability under the occupational disease disability compensation law.

John Kucher worked in the employ of plaintiff mining company for some IOV2 years, from September 30, 1935, to July 15, 1946. On the latter date he became totally disabled by reason of silicosis complicated by active pulmonary tuberculosis. For three years prior to his employment with *453 plaintiff, Kucher worked on the P. W. A. Between 1917 and 1932 he was engaged primarily in underground mining work.

The work record of Kucher while in the employ of plaintiff shows that from September 30, 1935, to April 1, 1937, he worked on the tracks in plaintiff’s open cut copper mine at Bingham. For about 6 weeks thereafter, until May 20, 1937, he worked as a car repairman in the shops, located in the mine area. He was then transferred to a job as a car repairman outdoors “on the hill,” where he worked until January 5, 1938. He was again transferred to a job as a car repairman in the shops, where he worked until August 14, 1938. About the latter date applicant was given a medical examination, including an X-ray of his lungs, which X-ray at the time of the hearing on application for compensation was interpreted to disclose silicosis. He was reassigned in August 1938 to work as a car repairman outdoors “on the hill,” at which job he worked thereafter until July 15, 1946, when as stated he became totally disabled. He was hospitalized in Ogden. Some time following the hearings before the Industrial Commission, he died.

Plaintiff seeks to set aside the award made in favor of Kucher, on the ground that the applicant did not establish any right to recovery under the terms of the statutes on occupational disease. Sections 42-la-13a(3), and 42-la-14, U. C. A. 1943, reads as follows:

“No compensation shall be paid in case of silicosis unless during the ten years immediately preceding the disablement the injured employee shall have been exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide (Si02) dust for a total period of not less than five years in this state and unless total disability results within two years from the last day upon which the employee actually worked for the employer against whom compensation is claimed.”
“Where compensation is payable for an occupational disease the only employer liable shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, provided that in the case of silicosis the only employer liable shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed *454 to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide (SiO,) dust during a period of sixty days or more after the effective date of this act.”

The effective date of the act was July 1, 1941. Under the provisions of the quoted statute, in order to support the commission’s award, the record, including the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, must show (1) that the applicant was exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust for a five year period between 1936 and 1946, and (2) that at least 60 days of such five year period were subsequent to July 1, 1941, when the act went into effect.

It is plaintiff’s contention that there is no competent evidence in the record to support the findings of the commission on either of these elements essential to recovery. Inasmuch as the commission made an award in favor of the applicant, the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to applicant, and if there is competent evidence to sustain the award it must be upheld.

With respect to the first element, since applicant worked for plaintiff during a period of 11 years immediately prior to total disability from silicosis, the only employer, if any, which could be liable, would be plaintiff. There is no contention made that applicant was not exposed to some quantities of silicon dioxide dust during the period of 11 years he worked for plaintiff. The basic contention is that there was no exposure to harmful quantities. In support of such contention, plaintiff calls attention to the fact that after 1938 applicant worked outdoors “on the hill” as a repairman. Plaintiff contends that no harmful quantities of dust were present where he performed the duties of his employment.

Plaintiff offered in evidence reports and surveys to show that the minimum amount of dust would have to be 5.0 million particles per cubic foot of air (m.p.c.f.) over a period of ten years to induce silicosis; and that the United States Public Health Service Bulletin No. 270 shows that with respect to miners in Utah, no silicosis was found where *455 the exposure to dust was less than 6.0 m.p.c.f. This report of a survey, together with plaintiff’s own survey showing that of 2000 of its employees examined only one was found to have silicosis among those who had no underground mining experience, are claimed to show that applicant could not have contracted silicosis in the employ of plaintiff, for the reason that he was not exposed to any harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust. Plaintiff also offered evidence that recent dust counts made in accordance with the standard procedure adopted by the United States Public Health Service show that car repairmen working outdoors on various levels of the open mine were exposed to a weighted average of 1.26 m.p.c.f., with an absolute maximum of 4.5 m.p.c.f.

Surveys frequently tend to show average conditions, but they are not conclusive as to individual cases. What conclusions might be arrived at from a particular survey made by plaintiff on its properties of recent date, is not necessarily an index to what conditions prevailed during previous years. Some of the evidence included the testimony of a safety engineer whose duties are to improve conditions at the mine and to lessen the dangers from dust. His testimony is such that the commission might well have concluded that there was ample opportunity for improvement with respect to dust conditions.

Plaintiff, however, argues that some standards must be used to guide the commission, and that the best available evidence is contained in the report of certain surveys conducted and published as U. S. Public Health Serv- ice No. 270. Substantially the same contentions were made in Uta-Carbon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 104 Utah 567, 140 P. 2d 649, 651, and we said:

“Our legislature has not seen fit to define what amounts of silicon dioxide dust are to he considered harmful. On page 57 of Public Health Bulletin, No. 270, appear the following statements of the report of the International Conference on Silicosis held in Geneva in 1938, with reference to the problem of pneumoconiosis of workers in coal mines:
*456 “ ‘ (a) Silicosis occurs among workers in coal mines when the dust to which they are exposed contains free silica. The minimum -proportion of silica necessary to produce the disease is not, in the present state of knowledge determinable. (Italics ours.)

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Bluebook (online)
205 P.2d 829, 115 Utah 451, 1949 Utah LEXIS 145, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kennecott-copper-corp-ut-cop-div-v-ind-comm-utah-1949.